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A B S T R AC T
The idea of a dialogical approach to the self is now becoming an increasingly recog-
nised phenomenon within psychology. The dialogical self is a conceptual system in 
which the role of dialogicality in consciousness and human activity is addressed. The 
idea of a dialogical self is based on Bakhtin’s concept of polyphony, it provides an ac-
count of self-multiplicity and challenges reductionist accounts of the self associated 
with the individualism of traditional psychology. This thesis focuses on two models 
that provide an account of a dialogical self. In order to address the complexities that lie 
behind the integration of ideas from different psychotherapeutic traditions, a histori-
cal analysis of terms and concepts and the methodological principles that underpin 
the development of Hubert Hermans’ dialogical self theory and Anthony Ryle’s cogni-
tive analytic therapy is undertaken.  Without an idea of the methodological principles 
that underpin theoretical integrations, we run the risk of assuming that terminological 
overlaps mean the same thing, potential differences in meaning become concealed. 
In analysing dialogical self theory alongside cognitive analytic therapy, the author 
concludes that each idiosyncratic integration impacts on the meanings that unfold, 
and that what develops is unique to the model rather than an interchangeable concept.
Keywords: Bakhtin, cognitive analytic therapy, conceptual systems, dialogicality, 
dialogical self, dialogical self theory, historical analysis, polyphony, self-multiplicity.
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A B S T R A K T I
Minuuden dialoginen tarkastelu tunnetaan psykologian alalla yhä paremmin. 
Dialoginen minuus on käsitteellinen järjestelmä, jossa tutkitaan ihmisen toiminnan 
ja tietoisuuden dialogisuutta. Bahtinin moniäänisyyden käsitteeseen perustuva näke-
mys minuuden dialogisuudesta kuvaa minuuden moninaisuutta ja haastaa perintei-
seen, individualistiseen psykologiaan kuuluvan reduktionistisen minuuskäsityksen. 
Tässä väitöskirjassa käsitellään kahta dialogisen minuuden mallia. Koska erilaisten 
psykoterapiatraditioiden käsitysten yhdistäminen ei ole yksinkertaista, väitöskirjassa 
tehdään historiallinen analyysi termeistä ja käsitteistä sekä Hubert Hermansin dialo-
gisen minuuden teorian ja Anthony Rylen kognitiivis-analyyttisen terapian kehitty-
misen taustalla olevista metodologisista periaatteista.  Jos eri teorioiden yhdistämisen 
metodologisia periaatteita ei ymmärretä, on vaarana erehtyä olettamaan, että osittain 
päällekkäisillä termeillä on sama sisältö. Tällöin niiden mahdollisia merkityseroja ei 
huomata. Dialogisen minuuden teorian ja kognitiivis-analyyttisen terapian analyysin 
perusteella todetaan, että kummankin idiosynkraattinen integraatio vaikuttaa avau-
tuviin merkityksiin ja että tulokset riippuvat mallista pikemmin kuin keskenään vaih-
dettavissa olevista käsitteistä.
Avainsanat: Bahtin, dialoginen minuus, dialogisen minuuden teoria, dialogisuus, his-
toria-analyysi, kognitiivis-analyyttinen terapia, käsitteelliset järjestelmät, minuuden 
moninaisuus, moniäänisyys
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1 Introduction
Ay, in the catalogue ye go for men: As hounds and greyhounds, mongrels, 
spaniels, curs, shoughs, water-rugs, and demi-wolves, are clept all by the 
name of dogs: the valu’d file distinguishes the swift, the stow, the subtle, the 
housekeeper, the hunter, every one according to the gift which bounteous na-
ture hath in him clos’d: whereby he does receive particular addition from the 
bill that writes them all alike: and so of men. (Macbeth, Shakespeare, 1606)
This research is a historical analysis of the conceptual systems that underpin Hubert 
Hermans’ dialogical self theory (DST) and Anthony Ryle’s cognitive analytic therapy 
(CAT). To this end, it can best be described as theoretical research. In decided to em-
bark on undertaking doctoral studies, this was however not my original plan. Prior 
to providing an account of the original plan, I must however refer the reader to the 
Shakespearian quote above. My interest in this quote lies in its closing statement ”the 
bill that writes them all alike: and so of men”. As psychotherapeutic models develop 
and make their own idiosyncratic theoretical integrations, terms and concepts used by 
the model undergo a process of change. As a result, different models may end up using 
terms and concepts that, to all intents and purposes, to the benign reader, sound the 
same. Without an understanding of the complexity that lies behind the integration of 
ideas from different psychotherapeutic traditions, without an idea of the methodologi-
cal principles that underpin these integrations, we run the risk of producing states of 
docta ignorantia (learned ignorance). It is evident, now with the gift of hindsight, that 
as I began to formulate ideas about undertaking some empirical research, that I was 
naively doing this from a place of learned ignorance.
I recall the opening flourishing statement to my research proposal, which read, 
”as yet we have only a rudimentary knowledge of the dialogical self/mind”. I was of 
course at this stage (six years ago), blissfully unaware of just how ”rudimentary” my 
own knowledge was. I stirred up my own zeal and fervour for the project by citing 
Stiles (1997) reference to the “cognitive fallacy” of information processing, stating 
that this continued to repudiate the role of otherness and multiplicity of self, and that 
it continued to refute “person awareness” (Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001). The flaw, as I 
was to come to see it later, did not necessarily lie here. 
My interest lay in the voice metaphor and the theoretical tenant that voices, ”can 
speak and act rather than being passive information or memories acted on by a mono-
lithic central agent” (Detert, Llewelyn, Hardy, Barkham & Stiles, 2006). The inspira-
tion for my empirical research was drawn largely from the paper ”Dialogical Sequence 
Analysis and the Zone of Proximal Development as Conceptual Enhancements to the 
Assimilation Model (Leiman & Stiles, 2001). In order to achieve an in-depth under-
standing of case material I planned to use my own casework proposing a naturalistic 
2case study design that adopted heuristic principles to research a CAT case. The key 
questions proposed were:
1. Can dominant voices in dialogue with other internalised voices be inden-
tified in clients presenting with psychological distress, and if so, how are 
these dominant voices related to that distress?
2. Assuming that working within a cognitive analytic therapy (CAT) frame-
work creates change in the client’s intrapersonal dialogue, how can these 
changes be described?
3. Is there evidence to suggest the internalisation of new “voices” and evi-
dence to support the idea of new I-positions being experienced by the 
subjective self?
The clue to the flaw alluded to lay in question three. Having trained as a practitioner in 
CAT I was to some degree familiar with CAT’s concept of a dialogical self. I had been 
intrigued by this concept, and as a result, had undertaken meanderings to inform 
myself a little more. I became aware that the concept “dialogical self” was also used 
in Hermans’ dialogical self theory and I naively assumed that both Hermans and Ryle 
meant the same thing. With further reading, I became aware that although the same 
term was used to describe a concept of multiplicity of the self in each of the models, 
they did not necessarily mean the same thing. To return now to my proposal in ques-
tion three, I had made the error of assuming that Hermans’ concept of I position was 
the same as the concept of role in CAT. This meant of course that whilst the aim of 
my research might have been a reasonable proposal that required further tweaking, 
my knowledge of the conceptual systems underpinning CAT’s concept of a dialogical 
self was sadly lacking. There lay an even greater deficit in my knowledge of those 
underpinning Hermans’ account.  
In the interest of pursuing empirical research, orthodox psychology’s sense of sci-
entific rigour tends to be given preference, and as a result, there is little time devoted 
to the study of conceptual systems. I had little understanding of the complex task that 
lay ahead. Soon however, it became clear that I had indeed entered a complex field and 
using an analogy associated with my opening quote, I was by this time a little like a 
dog with a bone, and I was reluctant to let the project go. Thus was the beginning of 
my foray into theoretical research.
Theoretical research is to a large degree an unmapped territory, therefore in the 
complex field of the ‘dialogical self’, I had no set map or theoretical research study 
manual to follow. In applying the more philosophical tradition of understanding the 
development of concepts, this thesis sets as its method historical awareness and re-
flexivity.  It is in essence a study of the conceptual systems comprising DST and CAT.
In order to study the role of dialogicality in consciousness and human activity in 
each of the models, I had to attempt to uncover the ‘forgotten past’ of DST and CAT. 
Leiman and Stiles (2002) state “each term or concept used within each approach has 
developed meanings that are dependent on other elements of the approach” (Leiman 
& Stiles, 2002, p. 68). My research aim was therefore to undertake a historical analy-
sis of all the elements that comprised DST and CAT. If meanings were dependent on 
all the other elements, the research task was to construct a clearer understanding of 
3each model as a conceptual system prior to the point where they integrated Bakhtin’s 
concept of polyphony. Both Hermans and Ryle use Bakhtin’s concept of polyphony to 
apply a voice metaphor to their conceptualisation of the organisation of self-processes. 
This theoretical research concentrates on providing an account of the develop-
ment of each model; it maps the path of each idiosyncratic integration, reflecting on 
the meanings that unfold, as each new concept became re-accentuation (Sullivan, 
2012).  In order to set the scene, it is helpful to provide a brief description of both men, 
as each had a unique journey, with different influences, that shaped their approach 
to understanding human beings.  
Hermans is a Dutch psychologist, currently emeritus professor of psychology at 
the Radbound University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands. His career in psychology spans 
over forty years. Educated in two schools of thought, the European philosophical 
tradition and American empiricism, his work involved a process of cross fertilisation 
between differing traditions. 
Ryle was originally a general practitioner (GP), as a humanist caretaker for his 
practice population he was to develop an interest in the epidemiology of psychologi-
cal distress.   Later in his career, he became the Director of Sussex University Health 
Service and went on to become a Consultant Psychotherapist at St Thomas’ Hospital in 
London.  He too, was to become immersed in developing a cross fertilisation between 
opposing traditions.  Due to these cross fertilisations between opposing traditions, 
Hermans and Ryle developed alternative views of the self, both eventually developing 
a concept of a dialogical self.   
 As a researcher, Hermans began his academic career by structuring psychometric 
tests for assessment. Following in the footsteps of Windelband he used nomothetic 
and idiographic principles to develop valuation theory as an idiographic approach, 
going on to construction of the self confrontation method (SCM) as a nomothetic re-
search tool. The SCM is a research tool that understands human consciousness from 
a first-person point of view. 
As a practicing GP, Ryle became interested in studying the epidemiology of psy-
chological distress.  As a family doctor, he began to think in terms of mother-baby 
and/or husband-wife pairs, this sparked an interest in the influence of relationships 
concerning the development of psychological distress. Aiming to empirically inves-
tigate the meaning of subjective phenomena, Ryle modified Kelly’s repertory grid, 
renaming this the dyad grid once he adopted reciprocal roles as the elements of the 
grid. The dyad grid was a research instrument designed to enable a phenomenologi-
cally informed analysis of the intersubjective nature of human consciousness. 
Aiming to bridge the gap between assessment and change, there was a need to 
develop an understanding of the process of reflectivity, this lead Hermans to his nar-
rative turn.  Hermans adopted Mancuso and Sarbin’s (1983) narrative translation of 
James’ ‘I’ and ‘Me’ distinctions in which the ‘I’ had been reframed as the author with 
the empirical ‘Me’s’ as narrative figures/actors. This enabled Hermans to develop the 
idea of a pluralistic self. With the inclusion of Bakhtin’s concept of polyphony, and 
the dialogical turn that led to valuation theory being renamed dialogical self theory, 
Hermans became fascinated with relatively autonomous authors and the dialogicisa-
tion of “sleeping characters”. 
4Ryle became interested in the sequencing of action and temporality, this led to his 
cognitive turn. His rudimentary dialogical understanding that contained the hypoth-
esis that the human infant sought reciprocation was almost lost. His own critique of 
his focus on sequentiality was that there was no adequate emphasis concerning the 
role of relationships. Ryle tried to resolve this by reintroducing concepts from object 
relations.
Both models were to, following the inclusion of Bakhtin’s concept of polyphony, 
conceptualise the self as a purely dialogical phenomenon. However, the meaning of 
this understanding is dependent on all other elements that comprise each approach. 
I have therefore entitled this thesis, “How does Dialogical Self Theory appear in the 
light of Cognitive Analytic Therapy? Two approaches to the Self” in order to describe 
the process of re-accentuation (Sullivan, 2012) in each model. 
I provide, in the first chapter, a brief biographical account of Hermans’ early aca-
demic career. This sets the scene to consider the development of valuation theory 
and provides an account of Hermans’ research methodology the self-confrontation 
method (SCM). The second chapter discusses Hermans’ narrative turn and considers 
how this results in a shift from the SCM as a research methodology to a therapeutic 
technique. Chapter three considers in detail, Hermans’ dialogical turn. This results 
in a change to the unitary authorship given to the reflecting I during the narrative 
turn. With the inclusion of Bakhtin’s concept of polyphony Hermans is now able to 
describe a pluralistic self, in addition he describes the process of decentralisation 
of the self, introducing the concept of I-positions and the mind as an open system. 
The fourth chapter introduces Ryle, once again there is a brief biographical account 
provided discussing the development of Ryle’s career. An overview of his career is 
required in order to understand the context in which CAT developed. Ryle’s original 
cross fertilisation of theory involved an integration of object relations theory with 
Kelly’s personal construct theory; from this, he was able to develop an understanding 
of human reciprocity. Chapter five is an account of the cognitive turn in CAT where 
Ryle develops ideas of sequentiality. The impact this has on Ryle’s original account 
of human reciprococity is discussed in detail.  Chapter six considers Ryle’s return 
to focus on the role of human relationships and in particular it maps the develop-
ment of Ryle’s multiple self-state model. Having relinquished his earlier stress on 
the sequential patterns of action Ryle begins to focus on the impact of negative life 
experiences and the impact this has on the developing self.  Chapter seven provides 
an overview of the contemporary ideas in DST where the cultural-anthropological 
inclusion is reviewed. In chapter eight the Vygotskian and Bakhtinian addendums 
to CAT come under review. Chapter nine discusses points of convergence and diver-
gence between both models, in particular it considers the process of re-accentuation 
of the Bakhtinian concept of polyphony.   
52 The Forgotten Past of 
Dialogical Self Theory
If you would understand anything, observe its beginning and its development.
Aristotle
In casting a backwards glance to look at the development of any given psychological 
theory, we can acquaint ourselves with important aspects that have become clouded, 
obscured or even forgotten in the process of the movement towards the development 
of a contemporary understanding. To reacquaint ourselves with these echoes from the 
past from a new position in existence and realign new understandings with that which 
is contemporary, hopefully enables us to gain greater clarity. Hermans, in his attempt 
to address the complexity of self processes, and later in his theoretical development, 
the multiplicity of self, developed a psychological theory which was to eventually be 
named as dialogical self theory. My quest, in this opening chapter, is to attempt to il-
luminate my backward glance; this necessitates a return to focus upon the nidus from 
which dialogical self theory sprang. 
In what follows, I will attempt to offer an account of the historical development of 
dialogical self theory, or DST. The theoretical construction of the DST is complex; it 
involves a multiple overlapping of disparate theoretical concepts.  Hermans describes 
the result of this juxtaposing of differing theoretical concepts as a “composite concept” 
(Hermans & Kempen, 1993, p. xx). Some understanding of these conceptual domains 
is required in order to map the historical development of DST but in addition, to obtain 
a degree of perspicacity. A complex fusion of theories and concepts can lead to a tran-
scendental level of understanding; however, it can also lead to a degree of confusion 
resulting in misunderstanding and misuse of the theory.     
The first phase discussed in this chapter, will describe the development of 
Valuation Theory as an idiographic approach and the construction of the self con-
frontation method as a nomothetic research tool.  
2 .1 BAC KG R O U N D
The origins of DST appear to be linked with Hermans’ earlier work. In his early aca-
demic career, throughout the 1960s and 1970s Hermans was involved in constructing 
psychological tests to measure achievement motivation and fear of failure.  Because of 
this work, the Achievement Motivation Test for adults (Hermans, 1968, 1970; Hermans, 
Petermann & Zielinsky, 1978) and the Achievement Motivation Test for children 
(Hermans, 1971, 1976, 1983; Hermans, Ter Laak & Maes, 1972) were constructed. 
6Concerning achievement motivation, Hermans considered the individual’s ability 
to excel in task situations from a dual perspective, both from the individual’s own po-
sition but also from the position of a designated other. The test also addressed anxiety 
that was construed as either debilitating or facilitating. 
With roots firmly entrenched in structuring psychometric tests for assessment 
Hermans described a sense of separation, perceiving himself to be a partisan involved 
with assessment but detached from the process of change. In the mid-1970s Hermans 
described a growing sense of discomfort with this partisan position longing not only 
for more professional contact with clients but also describing something of a quest to 
gain insight into the client’s world. Hermans describes himself as being inspired by a 
need to reconcile study of the individual with the aim of using this insight to contrib-
ute to the person’s life. (Hermans, Fiddelaers, de Groot & Nauta, 1990).  
Being immersed in his early academic career in both Western empiricism and 
European philosophy Hermans was to take note of the debate started by Windelband a 
neo-Kantian German philosopher, in his treatise “History and Natural Science” (1894). 
Formulating two distinct and separate means of increasing knowledge, Windelband 
coined the terms nomothetic and idiographic. Windelband concluded that one form of 
knowledge might be gained through the observation of objective phenomena. Through 
observation, similarities between objective phenomena could be noted and identified; 
moreover; these similarities could then be quantified into abstract, universal princi-
ples that resulted in the formation of generalised understandings. These generalised 
understandings were postulated as being a form of knowledge that was applicable to 
the natural sciences. In contrast, for Windelband idiographic knowledge described 
a different intellectual tendency that pertained more to the individual’s attempts to 
understand the meaning of subjective phenomena as experienced as a unique and 
distinct entity, this in turn was considered applicable to the humanities. Windelband 
concluded that both means of acquiring knowledge were essential in order to obtain a 
greater understanding, thus a nomothesis-idiography distinction was necessary. As a 
result, Windelband supported the idea that philosophy should engage in dialogue with 
the natural sciences rather than continue to appropriate in an unquestioning manner, 
natural sciences methodologies (Windelband, 1894).
Drawing on his early background in the development of psychological tests, where 
achievement motivation had already been considered from a dual perspective, cou-
pled with a desire to gain insights into the individual’s understanding of their sub-
jective experience, Hermans concluded that any new research methodology required 
both nomothetic and idiographic research strategies. In order to formulate this new 
research methodology a theory of self that incorporated both nomo-concepts and 
idio-concepts was required.
2 . 2 VA LUAT I O N T H E O RY
Based on a need to develop an idiographic theoretical understanding, Hermans’ task 
was to assemble a theoretical description of the process of meaning construction. This 
idiographic approach needed to describe the self-reflective capacities of the individual 
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to lead to the development of valuation theory. 
Valuation Theory, (Hermans, 1987a, 1987b, 1988, 1989; Hermans & Van Gilst, 1991; 
Hermans & Van Loon, 1991) is a forerunner of Dialogical Self Theory; it includes a 
range of theoretical ideas ranging from medieval philosophical concepts but also in-
cludes nineteenth and twentieth century psychological theories.  Trying to convey an 
accessible account is therefore not an easy enterprise. In order to try to provide a clear 
account I will present crucial theoretical ideas and describe how these concepts were 
used by Hermans to construct valuation theory.  As an idiographic approach, valuation 
theory does not attempt to provide a rationalistic or indeed an entirely individualistic 
account of human experience; instead, a phenomenological understanding of meaning 
construction is postulated.
In order to acquaint myself with valuation theory I will elaborate by attending 
to theories that precede Hermans work, in other words attend to my own backward 
glance to address the questions that were perhaps significant for Hermans, questions 
such as what creates human consciousness, the development of knowledge and the 
perception of self. From my reading of Hermans’ work, it seems that the main con-
cepts of valuation theory represent a mixture/juxtaposition/integration of Merleau-
Ponty’s understanding of the self as an organised process, Allport’s phenomenological 
and functional understanding of self  and James’s conception of an I-me distinction. In 
what follows, I will briefly outline the relevant theoretical hypothesise made by each 
of the theorists named above in terms of their contribution to the valuation theory.
2.2.1 A study of essences
In the pursuit of the study of perception, consciousness and conscious action Merleau-
Ponty refutes the earlier Husserlian idea that consciousness is the result of a corre-
lation between noesis (acts of thought) and noema (intentional objects of thought). 
Human consciousness for Merleau-Ponty arises in the primacy of perception thus 
consciousness fundamentally requires a physical body. Consciousness is a process 
that is not disassociated from nature, the environment or the human body, rather 
consciousness is intricately entwined and mutually engaged. There is an existential 
unity, a primordial involvement with the “flesh” (chair) of the world that results in 
an ambiguous from of perception, the corporeal body experiences all perspectives 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962). Rather than adhering to the Cartesian idea of an onto-
logical dualism of mind and body for Merleau-Ponty there is no conceptualisation of 
a subject-object divide, instead he postulates the idea that there is a nexus of mean-
ingful relations among objects where each object reflects the other. To comprehend 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological understanding I must elucidate further on my 
comments regarding his ideas of an ambiguous form of perception. 
In Merleau-Ponty’s thesis consciousness is not defined as a representative function 
or a function that contains an innate power of signification, instead, consciousness is 
defined as perceptual consciousness which carries with it an innate ability to develop 
spontaneous action from sensory data. The ability to perceive involves the mutual 
engagement of the human body, consciousness and the world where incomplete per-
spectives are given at specific moments in time. Snapshots are received containing 
8the nexus of all meaningful relations that impact upon and impinge on our perceptual 
existence. Although incomplete, these snapshots contain a myriad of possible views. 
This openness to all possibilities, combined with reflective experience facilitates con-
scious understanding that transcends experience and reason allowing us to establish 
an enhanced view of reality.   
Merleau-Ponty’s conceptualisation of perception, consciousness and conscious ac-
tion perhaps resonated with Hermans who hoped to develop further his understand-
ing of what motivated human behaviour. Moving on from his early academic work, 
Hermans became interested in escaping from his partisan position; this necessitated 
the development of an idiographic conceptualisation to construct a theory that crossed 
the theoretical divide between assessment and change. Disillusioned with the pre-
vailing use of nomothetic research it was Hermans aim to follow Windelband and 
continue to use both nomothetic and idiographic research methodology, structuring 
a means of dialogue between both methods. Hermans desire to enhance the efficacy 
of psychological treatment and use insights gained to enhance the individual’s life 
meant that Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of self had to be grounded in a theory and 
research strategy/tool that addressed both nomothetic and idiographic methodology. 
Perhaps in the quest to adhere to Windelband’s philosophy and engage in further 
dialogue with natural science, Hermans found an ally in Gordon Allport (1897 – 1967), 
an American psychologist who along with Hermans had been exposed to two schools 
of thought, one being Western empiricism and the other being European philosophi-
cal thought.  
2.2.2 The shaping of personality: Internal and external forces. 
Before beginning to undertake his postgraduate studies at Harvard University, Allport 
travelled in Eastern Europe, meeting with prominent figures of the day such as Freud. 
He was somewhat disillusioned with Freud’s reliance on the forces of the unconscious 
and historical experience on shaping the individual’s personality (Cherry, n.d.). In 
addition, he identified limitations in behaviourism where it was postulated that the 
environment and the human organism interacted in stimulus response loops imbuing 
the tabula rasa with learned patterns of behaviour. Hence, Allport was to conceptu-
alise forces related both to the environment and the human mind. Phenotypes were 
postulated as being the external forces related to the environment where as genotypes 
were internal forces of the mind related to intelligence and the individual’s capacity 
to use information retained in the mind to influence their behaviour or interaction 
with the environment. In essence, these forces are the preliminary momentum behind 
personality, however, the true genesis of personality arises in social interactions, and 
this is succinctly described in an early paper. (Allport & Allport, 1921)
Robinson Crusoe, alone on a desert island, undoubtedly displayed a very meas-
ureable degree of intelligence in his adaptation to his environment. It was only with 
the advent of Friday, however, that his personality could stand forth in its full signifi-
cance. (Allport & Allport, 1921, p. 7)
Allport was indeed to go on and bring personality forth to its full significance 
throughout his academic career; he concluded that the concept of self had to be at 
the forefront of psychological theory.  Combining a phenomenological and functional 
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forces associated with the organisation of personality to define two terms related 
to fundamental human orientation to life/environment/events. The first term was 
named “opportunistic functioning” (Boeree, 2006, para. 5) and the second term coined 
was “propriate functioning” (Boeree, 2006, para. 6). Opportunistic functioning being 
characterised as being driven biologically, was reactive and past-orientated. Propriate 
functioning was psychologically future-orientated and most importantly used as a 
means of expressing the “proprium”, Allport’s word for the self (Boeree, 2006, para. 
7).  In the process of developing a sense of self, Allport postulated the idea that as well 
as fundamental human orientation to life/environment/events that the individual’s 
interaction in a social milieu led to the development of unique and individual disposi-
tions or traits.  Allport’s work on personality traits or individual dispositions included 
both nomo-concepts and idio-concepts. Allport concluded that social and biological 
factors jointly influenced the development of personality traits. Personality traits were 
viewed as being unique to the individual and described as a dynamic organisation, 
with a sense of mental wellbeing viewed as the result of the integration of all the dif-
ferent aspects into a composite whole.  As the self developed, Allport described indi-
vidual personality dispositions as generalised neuropsychic structures that remained 
consistent. Holding the view that these neuropsychic structures were unique to the 
individual, Allport favoured idiographic research methods.  Adopting idiographic or 
qualitative research methods, Allport focused on the here and now, believing that hu-
man motives had little to do with historical experiences. Using the concept of propri-
ate functional autonomy (Allport, 1960) Allport developed a categorisation of values 
(Allport, Vernon & Lindzey, 1962). The following are the six values constructed:
1.  The theoretical - a scientist, for example, values truth. 
2.  The economic - a businessperson may value usefulness. 
3.  The aesthetic - an artist naturally values beauty. 
4.  The social - a nurse may have a strong love of people. 
5.  The political - a politician may value power. 
6.  The religious - a monk or nun probably values unity. (Allport, Vernon &  
Lindzey, 1962)
Hermans utilises Allport’s concept of value in his own theory but does not restrict the 
values to enduring and stable personality characteristics. Hermans see personality 
characteristics as simultaneously consistent and inconsistent. Hermans includes in 
his theoretical base concepts of the individual’s personal meaning and their personal 
histories. The concept of value is therefore enhanced and reformulated by juxta-
posing Merleau-Ponty phenomenological understanding of self and Allport’s concept 
of “value” to become “valuation” where valuation “is seen as a process of the self” 
(Hermans, 1987a, p. 10). 
Inspired by and drawing from Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ideas, Hermans 
utilises the phenomenological understanding of the active element of consciousness 
and reflective experience to reformulate Allport’s concept of value to valuation where 
the concept of valuation incorporates the act of meaning making. Grounded in a phe-
nomenological understanding, the interpreting self is mutually engaged in the experi-
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ence through the corporeal body, the world, the activity of consciousness and reflec-
tive experience with any given event with an ability to transcend both experience and 
reason and attribute meaning to the event. 
There is an implied association within Hermans’ concept of valuation that dif-
fers from Merleau-Ponty’s refusal of correlating noesis (the act of apprehending) and 
noema (the object apprehended) as valuations can be both regarded as unity of the act 
of valuing and equally, its object.  It would seem that following Hermans’ initial in-
spiration by Merleau-Ponty’s work that a liberal Merleau-Pontyan reading of Allport’s 
concept of propriate functional autonomy and the resultant development of Allport’s 
categories of values, enabled Hermans to postulate values as intentional objects that 
are construed in the act of valuation.   In essence, Hermans’ first integration can be 
seen as a composite utilising both Merleau-Ponty and Allport theories to address  not 
only a combination of nomo-concepts and idio-concepts but moreover, construct a 
theory that also includes a spatio-temporal orientation and has a phenomenological 
and an historical perspective on self as a process in constant flux. 
This first integration and reformulation of Merleau-Ponty and Allport’s theoretical 
ideas resulted in Hermans’ concept of valuation. A further theoretical concept was 
required in order to bind these theories together. Furthermore, as alluded to earlier, 
a new theory of self aimed at bridging the gap between assessment and change had 
to be able to measure a point, an instant moment in time whilst at the same time be 
able to explore and map change. 
2.2.3 Intentionality in the stream of consciousness
The third strand in Hermans’ valuation theory/concept is inspired by the work of 
William James (1842 – 1910). James had already addressed the question of human 
identity providing a phenomenological account in his paper “Does ‘Consciousness’ 
Exist?”, (James, 1904). James’ account describes human consciousness as a function 
rather than a separate and distinct entity. Self is seen as having no ontological origin 
per se but is rather understood as a creation through relations and intersections of 
“pure experience” (James, 1904, p. 477) within the stream or pulse of consciousness 
that results in the verification of a unified concept of self.
Valuation theory, already embedded in a phenomenological understanding of self 
had further theoretical issues to address. In addition,  through earlier integration, 
where Hermans postulates values as intentional objects that are construed within 
the act of valuation, the dialogue between construer and the construed was already 
very close to James’ understanding of the reflective dialogue between I and Me. By 
this association, an opportunity for further integration arose with Hermans describ-
ing valuation as interplay between the concepts of self as discerned by James (1890), 
namely ‘I’ (self-as-knower) and ‘Me’ (self-as-known). Hermans concludes, 
In line with James’ (1890) formulations, I see the concept valuation as a select-
ing, and organizing process of the self-as-knower. At the same time, it refers 
to the constitutes of the self-as-known as the object or result of this process. 
Therefore, anything a person finds to be of importance in his life or her life 
situation can be conceived of as a valuation. It is anything that has a per-
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sonal value or meaning as a result of a self-reflective mind – a dear memory, 
a difficult problem, a beloved person, a relevant goal, an unreachable idea, a 
disturbing dream, or an influential talk with a friend. A valuation is both the 
self-reflective activity and the object of it. (Hermans, 1987a, p. 10) 
By including James’ theory Hermans is able to position Merleau-Ponty’s ideas about 
experience as lived time (and the importance of historical experience) alongside 
James’ idea of time as an intrinsic feature of consciousness. Time as an intrinsic 
feature of consciousness is discussed in James’ paper “The Stream of Consciousness”, 
(James, 1892). Inherent in James’ hypothesis is the idea that states of consciousness 
may endure but once gone the state of consciousness cannot be recaptured in an iden-
tical form. In addressing the question of intentionality, James agrees with the notion 
that the objects of thought per se will not produce the same reaction. James describes 
this as ”a piece of metaphysical sophistry to suggest that we do not” (James, 1892, p. 2). 
Yes, we may indeed get the same ”sensation” (James, 1892, p 2) from any given object, 
what is important for James however is the impression that the object leaves in rela-
tion to the sensation of the other objects we hold in conscious awareness at the same 
time. So, not only interested in issues of temporal stability, Hermans is also interested 
in addressing the process of change, Hermans also introduces James’ I-Me distinc-
tion in order to account for self-reflection, the process through which valuations are 
generated, but in addition to highlight the role of temporality in the process of change. 
Having juxtaposed and reformulated a range of concepts from earlier theorists, 
Hermans develops an idiographic approach, namely valuation theory, by retaining 
Windelband’s philosophy, Hermans uses this idiographic approach to engage in dia-
logue with the natural sciences, the construction of the self-confrontation method is 
developed as a nomothetic-idiographic research tool.  
2.2.4 James’ self-feeling
In order to account for role of affects in Hermans’ self-confrontation method later in 
the text, an illustration/explication of James’ theory of self is required, and in par-
ticular the relevance of the Jamesian concept of “self-feeling” (James, 1890, p. 305) . 
A salient quote from James is required to highlight the impact of intentional objects. 
To have a self that I can care for, nature must first present me with some objects 
interesting enough to make me instinctively wish to appropriate it for its own 
sake, and that out of it to manufacture one of those material, social or spiritual 
selves…that certain things appeal to primitive and instinctive impulses of our 
nature, and that we follow their destinies with an excitement that owes noth-
ing to a reflective source. These objects our consciousness treats as primordial 
constitutes of its Me. (James, 1890, p. 319)   
The self is extended to objects that are seen as primordial constitutes of the self-
as-known, and as such are objects of meaning and value with an inherent ability to 
produce a degree of excitement. Through extension of the self towards these objects, 
and the manufacture of material selves, social selves and spiritual selves, the self 
12
creates an affective connotation engendering a capacity for self-love, self-seeking and 
furthermore, when combined with an awareness of an individual existence,  acquires 
a drive for self-preservation.
James suggests that feelings inform the individual about how the objects, as such, 
relate to each other as the constituents of Me, or as objects with personal significance. 
Intentional objects are ”felt objects” for the consciousness, or the I that reflects over 
them.
What we cleave to, those object out of which we manufacture our empirical selves 
can be ”both a burden as well as a pride” (James, 1890, p. 311). In James’ hypothesis, 
we create and re-create our self-feeling. In order to be true to certain constitutes in 
our empirical selves, we aspire to fulfil the perceived goals of those objects that form 
part of our empirical selves whilst at the same time deciding which empirical selves 
to cast off, James refers to this as the ”selective industry of the mind” (James, 1890, 
p. 310). The empirical selves cast off fade to insignificance, whilst those we cleave 
to develop a materiality and we invest in their ”fortunes” (James, 1890, p. 310). In 
Jamesian thought, our self-feeling is created by the ”failures” (James, 1890, p. 310) 
and ”triumphs” (James, 1890, p. 310) in attaining our specific goals regarding these 
empirical selves. The judgement of either failure or triumph is dependent on the ratio 
that exists between ”pretensions” (James, 1890, p. 310) and ”successes” (James, 1890, 
p. 310). Pretensions are in essence the aspirations that engender and form particular 
aims and goals, whilst successes are self-explanatory, namely the realisation of these 
goals. Formulated by James as a fraction, where pretensions are the denominator 
with success as the numerator these ratios are influenced by the hierarchal structure 
of the spiritual selves, the social selves and the material selves. It is in essence for 
James an intricate dance where inherent in James’ hypothesis are the moral gener-
alities brought into being by the acts of others, for it is these moral generalities that 
will influence the perceived degree of worth applied to any of the possible empirical 
selves. The dance involves the exclusion and denial of certain selves and the appro-
bation of others, moreover; the materiality, the verisimilitude that arises from those 
empirical selves we cleave to, and our ability to fulfil their perceived characters, cre-
ates self-feeling. Furthermore, self-feeling is altered by temporality, James reminds 
us of the importance of ”a feeling of and, a feeling of if, a feeling of but, and a feeling 
of by” (James, 1892, p. 29). Hermans uses James’ understanding of not only the reflec-
tive dialogue between I and Me which engenders self-feeling, but also the Jamesian 
concept of ratio and temporality in relation to self-feeling in order to characterise 
the affective quality of valuations. The concept of self-feeling is used by Hermans 
to clarify the relationship between the process of valuation, where valuations are 
regarded as intentional objects, and affective experience where affective experience 
becomes part of the organisation of self. 
In addition to positioning the Jamesian concept of self-feeling with valuation 
theory, Hermans also employed Freud’s pain-pleasure principle by grouping affect 
terms into positive and negative clusters. However, affect is not formulated in the 
classic Freudian terms of biological energies and instinct theory but instead used in 
a Jamesian spirit to suggest that affect is embedded in mental processing. 
This hypothesis regarding the nomothetic nature of affective domains enables 
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Hermans to construct a dialogue between nomothetic and idiographic perspectives 
within a single research instrument. The self-confrontation method was “designed 
as a means of studying the relationship between valuations and affects and the way 
in which both variables are organised in a structured whole”, (Hermans, 1987a, p. 13). 
2 . 3 S E L F - CO N FR O N TAT I O N M E T H O D (S C M)
The self-confrontation method or SCM (Hermans, 1976, 1985 1987a, 1988, 1989) is a 
research instrument designed to study the relationship between valuations that are 
generated by an individual, alongside nomothetic affective constituents that are pro-
vided by a trained interviewer. The self-confrontation method, in its conception and 
design, is the antithesis of psychological objectification of the human subject. In the 
process of reflecting upon the relationship between valuations Hermans states that 
the individual must function as “the I who studies the Me in collaboration” (Hermans 
& Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 33). In essence, in the spirit of collaboration and shared 
responsibility this is a method designed to facilitate and enhance self-reflection, hon-
ing the individual’s self-reflective capacities towards self-confrontation and change. 
In order to provide a comprehensible account of the SCM, there is a requirement 
to have a degree of insight into how Hermans has structured a dialogue between 
idiographic and nomothetic research principles. A more detailed understanding of 
Hermans’ concept of affect that provides the nomothetic perspective of the method 
was required before I was able to address the nuts and bolts that constitute the meth-
od. The Jamesian perspective of a particular self capable of organising heterogeneous 
affective experience into an organised whole, outlined above, provides the point of 
departure.  
In order to create a nomothesis-idiography distinction in the SCM Hermans ap-
plied the concept of affect in order to provide the nomothetic perspective of the 
method. The idiographic aspect was based on the understanding of valuations as the 
personally significant objects of consciousness in the Jamesian fashion.  Affect was 
formulated as a way of characterising the interconnectedness of these two separate 
but related ways of construing meaning. If valuations are a cognised expression of 
personal experience then the nomothetically construed affective components asso-
ciated with that valuation will reflect its personal meaning.  As a nomothetic and 
idiographic research methodology the SCM utilised statistical measures to identify 
related idiographic valuations by statistical associations of affect terms enabling the 
individual configuration of valuations to be made explicit. 
Over ensuing years, as a research method, further use was made of the nomo-
thetic component of the SCM, first with the introduction of the discrepancy between 
generalised affect and idealised affect. In the SCM these general modes were added 
as valuations in the valuation matrix in order to permit the assessment of the affects 
that contributed to the general or ideal sense of being.  Generalised affect was used 
as a yardstick for idealised affect reinforcing the earlier positive negative valences as 
a measure for sense of wellbeing. Research findings indicated some contrasts in the 
function of the affective components. These findings resulted in the theoretical inclu-
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sion of the concept of an existential basic duality of self formulated as a latent-mani-
fest distinction. It is at this conjecture that interest turns to using research findings to 
develop a hypothesis about the structure of personality. Through further computation 
of affective indices ”general types of valuations” (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995, 
p. 73) were hypothesised, these consisted of a typology of six valuation types, 
1. Success, autonomy, perseverance
2. Aggression, anger, opposition
3. Love and unity
4. Unfulfilled longing, loss
5. Powerlessness and isolation
6. Strength and unity
The nomothesis-idiography distinction of the original SCM becomes somewhat am-
biguous at this point. Focus on the hypothesised basic motives results in further for-
mulations of generality pushing the SCM as a research method in a more nomothetic 
direction. 
2.3.1 Self from a general motivational point of view
Defining affect as the nomo-concept and requiring a nomothetic research instrument 
Hermans and his colleagues made use of the distinctions universally found in psychol-
ogy and psychotherapy regarding the range of affect experienced by human beings. 
Echoing Freud’s pleasure-pain principle, these affective terms had previously been 
categorised into either positive or negative terms. Since the early construction of the 
SCM in 1974 there have been a number of affective lists used by Hermans and his col-
leagues, these vary from lists comprising over 30 affective terms to reduced lists of 16 
affective terms depending on the research subjects and the context of the research. 
In the ensuing years between 1974 and 1985, where the SCM was used as a research 
instrument with a variety of cases, a range of findings came to the fore during cluster 
analyses. Computation of a range of affect indices highlighted some contrasts in the 
function of the affective components. As a result of these affective contrasts, two basic 
motives were detailed. These are defined by Hermans as the (S motive) self-enhance-
ment (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 16) and the (O motive) a desire for contact 
and union with others (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 16). The assumption that 
there were two basic motives driving the latent affective layer of valuations is based on 
Hermans and his colleagues reviewing the literature of earlier thinkers who had treated 
the concept of self from a general motivational point of view.  
2.3.2 The latent-manifest distinction 
Reviewing the literature Hermans cites an array of theorists who support the concept 
of an existential basic duality of self. These range from his near contemporaries to 
ancient philosophers such as Heraclitus whose philosophical ideas were based around 
the dictum that there is the coexistence of opposites and that everything is in a state 
of flux. For the purposes of clarity, I will however confine myself to presenting the 
crucial theoretical ideas used by Hermans to illustrate his elaboration of two basic 
motives, the S-motive (striving for self-enhancement) and the O-motive (longing for 
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contact and union with the other).“They are basic in the sense that they are considered 
to represent implicit or unconscious elements of human experience and be universal 
across time and space” (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p.16)  
These theorists are namely Andras Angyal (1902 -1960) a Hungarian psychologist, 
systems theorist and self theorist, and David Bakan (1921 -2004) a North American 
psychologist. 
Angyal postulates the development of personality and the birth of individuality as 
requiring ”a double orientation of self-determination - self-surrender” (Angyal, 1951, 
p. 4). In order to develop an essential nature the individual must embrace the tension, 
or a movement between both these positions. On one hand, there is a requirement 
for the human subject to interact, assimilate and master the environment. This in-
teraction with the environment creates within the individual a desire for superiority, 
acquisition, exploration and achievement these are collectively named by Angyal as a 
desire for autonomy (Angyal, 1965). The contrasting desire is defined as an innate mo-
tivation to merge with the environment, engage with something beyond self, defined 
by Angyal as homonomy (Angyal, 1965). Furthermore, Angyal equates homonomy 
with an innate affective capacity, namely an innate desire and longing for love. Angyal 
postulates that a degree of flexibility is required between autonomy and homonomy 
for a well functioning personality. Angyal describes personality as a unified dynamic 
organisation, a Gestalt, this is highlighted in the following quote.
These two tendencies of the human being, the tendency to increase his self-
determination in his expanding personal world, and the tendency to surrender 
himself willingly to a superordinate whole, can be summed up by saying that 
the human being comports himself as if he were a whole of an intermediate 
order. By this I mean a ”part-Gestalt” like, for example, the cardiovascular sys-
tem, or the central nervous system, each of which is a whole, an organisation 
of many parts, but at the same time a part with regards to its superordinate 
whole, the body. The human being is both a unifer, an organiser of his immedi-
ate personal world, and a participant in what he conceives as the superordinate 
whole to which he belongs.(Angyal, 1951, p. 2)
Duality is central to Angyal’s theory; events can always be seen from two perspectives.
Postulating an understanding from a dual perspective, dates back to Hermans’ 
early work, in order to reinforce this theoretical juxtaposition Hermans also uses 
Bakan’s concept of duality of the human existence. In the first instance this appears 
to be done to support Angyal’s thesis, however it is also utilised to elaborate on the hy-
pothesis that one motive can at times predominate over another. By making this fur-
ther distinction around the possibility that societal and cultural values can influence 
the degree of predominance of one basic motive over another, Hermans was also in a 
position to juxtapose and validate this theoretical inclusion regarding basic duality of 
the self with concepts of the self gaining momentum in North America. This will be 
considered in more detail when addressing the integration of the narrative paradigm 
into valuation theory. Returning to Bakan, Bakan’s concept of agency (Bakan, 1966) 
that refers to the individual’s need for separation, self-assertion, self-protection and 
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self-expansion is aligned to Angyal’s concept of autonomy. The Bakanian concept of 
communion (Bakan, 1966) describes a need to be at one with other organisms and is 
aligned with Angyal’s concept of homonomy.  
The latent-manifest distinction although exclusively a theoretical distinction 
serves a number of purposes, Hermans notes that it “transcends the Western cultural 
bias towards self-esteem” (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 25) as a motivational 
component in human activity. Hermans directed his attention towards the phenom-
enon of self-enhancement, taking note of Rosenberg’s (1979) comments regarding the 
link between the principle of reflection and self-enhancement. What is important to 
Hermans is the ”flexible movement”(Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 25) be-
tween the S motive and the O motive. Methodologically the latent-manifest distinction 
is used within the SCM to enhance the process of self-reflexivity between contrasting 
experiences. It is thus postulated to be a heuristic conceptual tool “for deepening the 
differentiation and articulation of the affective properties of the valuation system” 
(Hermans, 1987a, p. 6). This theoretical turn and methodological structure crosses 
the divide between assessment and change. The very process of self is influenced as 
the basic motivations behind meaningful valuations are brought forth into greater 
awareness. Inherent within the conceptual framework is the assumption that the ba-
sic motives are embedded in mental processing. Furthermore, the affective aspects of 
these basic motives will have a regulatory function concerning the creation of stability 
or disruption. This regulatory function in essence, leaves the system open, which in 
turn enables the possibility of change to the content and structure of new valuations 
formed from dialogue between opposing positions. 
2 .4 T H E PR O C E D U R E I N T H E S C M 
Prior to presenting a detailed account of the procedural steps contained within the 
SCM it is helpful to summarise Hermans’ phenomenological understanding of self as 
an organised process, or a dynamic relationship between a reflecting I and the valua-
tion as its (primordial) intentional objects. Valuations are described as the organising 
processes of self, reflecting the phenomenological understanding of the unity of noe-
sis and noema. Within valuation theory personality characteristics are seen as both 
consistent and inconsistent. Imbedded in the concept of valuation is the belief that 
valuations provide a degree of continuity over space and time. Hermans’ hypothesis 
is based on the belief that reorganisation of the self can only take place in the pres-
ence of a degree of stability. The research method is therefore designed in the first 
phase to facilitate making explicit the configuration of personal valuations of the self, 
thus enhancing awareness and stability. When configurations of valuations are fully 
brought into conscious awareness then the affective modalities associated with any 
given valuation can also be brought to awareness. Once attention is given to affective 
modalities, and affect becomes the object of self-reflection, then the affective experi-
ence can become part of the reorganisation. The SCM involves repeated self-reflection 
and therapeutic intervention.   
The SCM is iterative in nature; it is comprised of a number of phases and sub-phas-
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es.  Each phase and sub-phase dovetails with its predecessor, with the accumulative 
understanding gleaned during each phase informing the next. Firstly, an assessment 
is undertaken to ascertain the content and structure of the valuation system. This is 
followed by the validation/invalidation phase, which can be repeated more than once 
eventually moving towards evaluation of the system. Evaluation is in essence a re-
assessment that occurs following the validation phase.   
2.4.1 First cycle/phase
The first phase involves a series of questions aimed at constructing and eliciting indi-
vidual valuations. This is achieved by a trained interviewer, who adopts a therapeutic 
and collaborative stance sitting side by side with the interviewee asking in total twelve 
open questions related to the past, present and future as well as personally meaning-
ful relationships to individuals and social groups. 
The SCM does not operate on a question and answer format. Questions are asked 
to stimulate self-reflection with the aim, in the first instance, being to collect a series 
of personal valuations. Valuations become containers and carriers of all that is sig-
nificant and has meaning for any given individual, Hermans reports that typically 
most individuals will have between 15-40 valuations (Hermans, 1987a). Following 
whatever period of self-reflection required it is the interviewer’s task to encourage the 
interviewee to formulate concise valuations. In other words, stimulate recognition of 
the objects that are known to be the components of oneself and to aid the experienc-
ing subjective self to enunciate clear statements in relation to these objects. Ideally, 
these valuations should form complete sentences; however, incomplete phrases or 
single words can be acceptable.     
The next stage of phase one involves another task of self-evaluation in which 
the person is asked to rate every valuation against a set list of affective terms. The 
following table shows the extended list of affective terms constructed by Hermans 
and Hermans-Jansen (1995). The list of affective terms is used during the affective 
exploration phase of the SCM. 
Table 1. Extended List of Affect Terms. Adapted from ”Appendix 2” by J. M. Hermans & Els 
Hermans-Jansen, 1995, Self-Narratives: The Construction of Meaning in Psychotherapy p. 277. 
Copyright Guilford Press. Reprinted with permission of the Guilford Press.
Positive Affect (P) Negative Affect (N) Self-Enhancement (S) Desire for Others (O)
Joy Powerlessness Self-Esteem Care 
Satisfaction Anxiety Strength Love 
Enjoyment Shame Self-Confidence Tenderness 
Trust Self- Alienation Pride Intimacy 
Safety Guilt 
Energy Loneliness 
Inner Calm Inferiority 
Freedom Anger 
Note. S = affect reflects self-enhancement, O = affect reflects desire for contact with others, 
P =  positive affect, N = negative affect.
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The result becomes the construction of a matrix.  The matrix is composed of vari-
ous indices highlighting scores for positive affect, negative affect, self-enhancement 
motive and desire for contact and union with others motive. In addition, the matrix 
can be used to highlight generalised feelings and idealised feelings, these can be elic-
ited by exploring the affective patterning of any of the above four indices. By engaging 
in further reflection and discussion, understandings may be developed around the 
possible differences in generalised feelings in comparison to idealised feelings in any 
of the four indices.  Furthermore, the degree to which these differences exist can be 
explored in relation to the elicited personal valuations.     
A Likert (1934) scale is used for each affective term with a score of 0 indicating 
that this affective term cannot be applied to the valuation, to a rating of 5, to indicate 
that the affective term is strongly associated with the valuation. Both a qualitative and 
quantitative analysis can be carried out on the data produced.
 Within this matrix, various computations are possible; the following represents 
some of the possible computations. The discrepancy between generalised feeling and 
idealised feeling can be used as a measure for sense of wellbeing.  In addition, cor-
relations can be made from the profiles of any specific valuations enabling a modality 
analysis. A modality analysis can be performed when there is a high correlation (usu-
ally .60 or above) between different valuations to increase development and insight 
into the message and meaning contained within a series of valuations. A number of 
valuations with a high correlation can be selected for further focus and self-reflection. 
The meaning distilled from a number of high correlation valuations can capture the 
quiddity of meaning of these collective valuations. Modality analysis is an illustrative 
means of demonstrating how the SCM also can be used to induce changes within the 
valuation system. 
2.4.2 Validation phase
Following completion of this phase, approximately one week later, both participants 
discuss the results with the interviewer making enquiries as to the possible impact 
of the SCM upon the individual. The interviewer is then able to use the information 
gleaned from the analysis of the data to facilitate further self-reflection. There is a 
spatio-temporal dimension to this discussion enabling an exploration between valu-
ation positions. Valuations pertaining to past, present and future are moved from 
positions of segregation and isolation into an arena where they can be reflected upon 
in relation to other meaningful valuations. This spatio-temporal dimension is indeed 
one of the unique qualities of the SCM as the interrelationship between past events 
and here and now difficulties can be brought into awareness. This enables a degree of 
illumination where previously less conscious aspects can be brought to the fore and 
examined with the possibility of increasing motivation for change.
The second phase is dedicated to the process of change, the metaphor for which is 
described by Hermans as “finding an entrance into the valuation system” (Hermans & 
Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 69).  Once a way in has been established, remembering that 
valuations emerge from a process of interaction with internal and external dimen-
sions, any relevant aspects can be subsumed. With this in mind, whilst aiding in both 
the formulation of valuations (phase one), or promoting the process of change (phase 
19
two), the therapist can introduce potential valuations to the individual undergoing 
an SCM investigation. A heterogeneous set of 35 proverbs, selected from a variety of 
artists, writers and philosophers were introduced. In addition, over ensuing years 
nonverbal material and symbols, e.g. art work and symbolic objects such as a tree have 
been introduced (Hermans & Van Loon, 1991). These non-verbal materials were used 
to supplement ”the valuation system giving it a new impulse (Hermans & Hermans-
Jansen, 1995, p. 65). It was concluded that “valuations evoked by symbols represent 
the embodied nature of human existence and function as routes towards new mean-
ing structures” (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 66). Therefore, in the second 
self-investigation (with the possibility of further investigations if required), client and 
therapist work side by side to go over initial questions and valuations produced. The 
following options are then considered:-
1. Modification – old valuations may be reformulated
2. Substitution – old valuations may be replaced with a new one.
3. Elimination – old valuations may be discarded altogether
4. Supplementation – additional valuations may be created
Studies to date, such as Hermans, (1985, 1987, 1989 & 1996) and Hermans & Hermans-
Jansen, (1992) would suggest that concerning valuations and associated affect, in-
dividuals typically only change parts of the system. Structure and stability remain 
central to a sense of self-continuity. Development and change are possible; any given 
interaction between the senses, the affective domain and the mind in relation to both 
the internal world and external world can lead to new valuations. However, weaker 
valuations or those with less personal meaning, or those that do not adhere to the 
current plot can be overwhelmed or discarded. 
Over time, if valuations are given a position within the valuation system, paired 
and tested alongside affective domains and basic motives, then there is the potential 
for them to gain more meaning and relevance. 
2.4.3 A brief illustration of the classic use of the SCM
In keeping with the theme of gradual/evolving illumination, I will now illustrate 
Hermans’ classic use of the SCM as both a means for assessing valuations as in-
tentional objects, their configuration and determining basic motivational structure. 
Before providing a case example from “The fugit amor experience in the process 
of valuation: A self-confrontation with an unreachable other” (Hermans, Hermans-
Jansen & Van Glist, 1987). I will provide a brief explanation of the origin of fugit amor 
and Hermans et al’s use of the metaphor of fugit amor.
 Fugit amor is one of the sculptures, thus part of the composition, making up 
Rodin’s depiction of Dante’s Gates of Hell as inspired by Dante’s “Divine Comedy” 
(written between 1308-1321); Hermans et al (1987) select the fugit amor sculpture that 
contains the figures of Paolo and Francesca de Rimini. This sculpture depicts a tale 
of forbidden love where moral codes have been transgressed. Francesca falls in love 
with her brother-in-law, when it is discovered that they are lovers, both are murdered. 
Following their deaths, the two lovers are forever consigned to hell in close proximity 
to each other but being unable to touch. Torment comes from an interminable longing 
for each other (Dante, trans, 2008).
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The metaphor of fugit amor was introduced by Hermans et al in response to aware-
ness, that in a number of cases, patterns of affect conflicted with valuation formula-
tions. The fugit amor metaphor is related to the affective indices. Hermans states that 
the formal structure of fugit amor contains two components, the first being related 
to the basic motives, namely the S motive and O motive where longing for the other 
is calculated to be greater than self-enhancement. Paradoxically, in response to an 
intense longing for other, the situation produces affective configuration in which the 
negative affect outweighs positive affect. 
When these discrepancies are brought to light in dialogue with the psycholo-
gist/psychotherapist, the new affective information can result in further integration 
of conscious and unconscious aspects of the valuations, thus extending or revising 
the system. In other words, the process involves the individual occupying both the 
position of subject and object with affective information being available from both 
these positions. The following is a case example from “The fugit amor experience in 
the process of valuation: A self-confrontation with an unreachable other” (Hermans, 
Hermans-Jansen & Van Glist, 1987).
We give here the example of a woman who had an implicit fugit amor in one of 
her valuations in the first investigation and who modified this valuation eight 
months later in the second investigation in the direction of a more congruent 
formulation. In the first investigation she made this statement:
1) ‘Mother is so inconsistent: she flirts from the role of lower class housewife 
to that of intellectual’            
 This formulation smacks rather of censorship of the parent rather than 
desire for contact and union. In the discussion following the investiga-
tion, the subject seemed completely unaware of a fugit amor experience in 
the relationship with her mother. Nonetheless, her attention was drawn 
to the special significance of the affects ‘caring’ and ‘love’ which she her-
self accorded a high position in relation to this particular valuation. She 
decided to pay special attention to the nature of future contacts with her 
mother. In the second investigation she explained that the old formulation 
no longer expressed the way in which she now perceived her mother, and 
she preferred to modify the old statement as follows:
2) ‘I wish my mother had been different; we could have shared so muc’. She 
now expressed a desire for an idealised mother, an image which is more 
congruent with the fugit amor experience. At the same time we see that 
the S-O and P-N differences are less pronounced. This may be a sign that 
the subject, after having confronted herself with the fugit amor aspect, 
assimilates this valuation so that it becomes less relevant in the course of 
time. (Hermans, Hermans-Jansen & Van Glist, 1987, pp. 477-478)
The fugit amor metaphor enables Hermans et al to validate their latent-manifest dis-
tinction. Ergo, the assessment of phenomenological expression in the form of valua-
tions under intense self-investigation, where the individual occupies the positions of 
both subject and object in relation to the basic motives, or the latent levels that can 
21
be brought to light by the psychologist/psychotherapist. In addition, the fugit amor 
metaphor allows Hermans to demonstrate the phenomenological origins of self, also 
it establishes the organisational aspects of the valuation system. The dynamic nature 
of the valuation system is further reinforced by Hermans’ use of Lacan’s philosophical 
concept of ”le manqué d’ etre” (Lacan, 1966), or deficiency of being where the object 
of desire is both present and not present at the same time, thus creating a constant 
dynamic experience. 
To sum up, the genesis of valuation theory arose from phenomenological under-
standings. Inspired by and developing these phenomenological ideas, Hermans was 
able to develop the concept of valuations as intentional objects with a structured 
process of self-reflection. By combining the idiographic generation of valuations with 
the nomothetic approach to evaluating them, the relationship between becomes ar-
ticulated, the SCM therefore provides an ingenious method that appears to reflect the 
Jamesian understanding of self-esteem. In the context of the SCM, ”general feelings” 
and ”ideal feelings” echo something of James’ concept of pretensions and successes. 
Hermans, through statistical analysis, utilises the concept of self-feeling to illuminate 
the relationship between the process of valuations as intentional objects and affec-
tive experience as part of the organisation of self. The reflecting I, when selecting 
valuations, is influenced by the ”feelings” that inform the I about the salient contents 
of empirical selves. Hermans thus demonstrates James’ hypothesis ”then so surely 
as relations between objects exist in rerum naturâ [sic], so surely, and more surely, 
do feelings exist to which these relations are known (James, 1892, p. 6). The latter 
half of James statement comes to life in the second phase of the SCM. In the second 
phase of the SCM there is planned facilitation of further self-reflection, it is here 
Hermans hopes to find an ”entrance into the valuation system” (Hermans & Hermans-
Jansen, 1995, p. 69). The possibility of change opens up, there is the potential for new 
valuations to emerge for it is with the extension of the self towards potential objects 
of meaning that are introduced by the therapist, new meaning structures emerge. 
In the process of introducing objects, objects of desire within consciousness have 
a reflective function and produce a degree of excitement or in other words, become 
”felt objects” for the consciousness. In conclusion, the SCM demonstrates the precise 
relations between the Jamesian I and its Me’s and is a useful procedure to perform 
phenomenologically informed analysis of consciousness.  The SCM, as a research tool 
understands human consciousness from a first-person point of view and continues to 
have a great potential to advance our knowledge of psychological development and 
the development of personality.  
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3 Research Methodology to 
Therapeutic Technique
The preceding chapter provided an overview of my understanding of Hermans’ con-
ceptualisation of valuation theory. In my reading of Hermans’ work, I have described 
valuations as intentional objects, formulated as carriers of the ”primordial constitutes” 
of the Jamesian ”Me”. Continuing in my attempt to address the forgotten past of the dia-
logical self, in this chapter, I will examine in detail the narrative reformulation of valu-
ations as the first of the dual theoretical transformations of Hermans’ original concept 
of valuation theory. A clear understanding of Hermans’ first transition is required in 
order to comprehend Hermans’ final movement towards contemporary dialogical self 
theory. In what follows, I will focus on the juxtaposition of new theoretical concepts 
with the original formulation of valuations, namely the inclusion of narrative theory.  
In keeping with the theme of attending to my own backward glance, and questions, 
that as stated in chapter one, were significant for Hermans, it is necessary to attempt 
to acquaint myself with the development of the narrative paradigm of knowledge. 
3.1 N A R R AT I V E T H E O RY: A N I N T E R PR E TAT I V E A PPR OAC H 
Arising in an era where there was an ongoing movement away from conceptualis-
ing the world, events and humanity in a manner principally grounded in Newtonian 
physics with its scientific principles of general laws, some theorists were beginning 
to adopt an interpretative approach (White & Epston, 1990). Rather than continue to 
apply a positivist-empirical conceptualisation, knowledge and understanding could 
be conceptualised as being relative. The genesis of meaning arose in social relation-
ships, dialogue and culture (White & Epston, 1990). In narrative terms, the genesis 
of meaning is conceptualised as ”narrative and action exist in a state of mutual inter-
dependence, as does the dialogue that spices and splices the disparate segments of 
”self-understanding” together” (Gergen & Gergen, 1991, p. 93)  
Continuing to pursue the quest for a theory of self aimed at bridging the gap be-
tween assessment and change, the process of reflectivity perhaps became more cen-
tral to Hermans’ model. However, before addressing this question I will first provide 
a brief description of the origins of narrative theory.  
3.1.1 Narrative as a means of organising human experience 
The discourse between psychology and a positivist-empirical approach is humor-
ously expressed by Billig (2008), in the introduction to his book ”The Hidden Roots of 
Critical Psychology”. Billig states, 
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Academic psychologists are extremely busy people. They have studies to de-
sign, data to analyse, papers to write. From all sides the journals keep rolling 
out new research reports. One must not slip behind. International congresses 
must be attended, sponsored workshops organised and opportunities for fund-
ing pursued. There is simply too much to be done. It seems unreasonable to ex-
pect psychologists to attend to exchanges between long dead figures. The past 
will have to wait for the peaceful, future moment that never seems to arrive...
Sometimes it is necessary to ask what the conventional views are overlooking: 
what is being concealed today by the histories that have been regularly retold? 
Is there something decisive that needs to be recaptured?” (Billig, 2008, p. 2)
A few pioneers have however managed to emerge from the melee of exigencies to 
engage psychology in a discourse with new or perhaps forgotten paradigms. Two such 
pioneers, who were involved in developing the narrative model in a more general 
theoretical context were Theodore Sarbin (1911 - 2005) and Jerome Bruner. Sarbin 
was an American Emeritus Professor at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and 
a prolific academic who investigated and disputed a number of orthodox views during 
the course of his academic career (Hevern, September, 2005).  Jerome Bruner was a 
pioneer of cognitive development and education (Smith, 2002). Bruner described two 
modes of thought, the paradigmatic mode and the narrative mode (Bruner, 1990), he 
continues to undertake teaching and research.  Sarbin was to adopt the concept of 
narrative as the root metaphor for psychology, with Bruner establishing the idea that 
meaning was the central concept to which psychology should begin to address its 
enquires. From these dual origins, the narrative model was to instigate a movement 
away from psychology as an applied science. 
One arena, in which the narrative model was adopted, was in the practice of family 
therapy. There were two individuals at the forefront in the formulation of the narra-
tive model of family therapy, they were Michael K. White (1948 - 2008), an Australian 
social worker and family therapist and David Epston a Canadian by birth who later 
became a fellow antipodean working in New Zealand. Epston originally studied so-
ciology and anthropology but later became an innovative social worker and family 
therapist (White & Epston, 1990).
Rather than adhering to a more positivist formulation where problems were at-
tributed to the dysfunctional aspects of the family (White & Epston, 1990), White 
and Epston instead attempted to apply an interpretive method. By applying an inter-
pretive understanding, they suggested that behaviour within the family system was 
linked to the meaning that members attribute to events/ family dynamics (White & 
Epston, 1990).   Seemingly inspired by Gregory Bateson’s (1904 - 1980), White and 
Epston describe their attention as being drawn to the role of temporality in therapy. 
Acknowledging Bateson’s conceptualisation of interpretation being associated with 
already known patterns of events, or maps (Bateson, 1972), White and Epston, through 
considering the text analogy concluded, ”however, the notion of narrative, in that it 
requires the location of events in cross-time patterns, clearly has some advantage over 
the notion of map. Narrative incorporates the temporal dimension” (White & Epston, 
1990, p. 3).
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Interpretation of events or the construction of meaning of ”lived experience” 
(White & Epston, 1990, p. 9), through application of the text analogy evolved into the 
conceptualisation of lived experience being expressed in a ”storied” (White & Epston, 
1990, p. 10) manner.  With this developing interest in narrative as a means of organ-
ising human experience, narrative discourse was understood as being an inherent 
human strategy in which not only could meaning be constructed, but also through the 
process of narrative reasoning, meaning developed and change occurred.
3. 2 H E R M A N S’ N A R R AT I V E T U R N : C H A N G E S TO T H E C L A SS I C 
CO M P O N E N T S O F VA LUAT I O N T H E O RY
It is with the narrative turn, and its reconceptualisation of the classic Jamesian ’I’ and 
’Me’ distinctions that we witness Hermans’ departure from classic valuation theory. 
By incorporating the narrative model, Hermans is able to open up the possibility of 
change within the process of assessment. To explicate this further I must first con-
sider the changes in meaning given to some of the classic components of valuation 
theory. These are specifically, the Jamesian understanding of self-feeling, the con-
ceptualisation of valuations and Hermans’ use of modality analysis within the SCM. 
Hermans et al describe James’ concept of self-feeling as the opening of a gateway 
to the less conscious aspects of the self. (Hermans, Hermans-Jansen & van Gilst, 
1987). Applying the narrative model expanded the way in which the Jamesian under-
standing of self-feeling could be understood. Mancuso and Sarbin (1983) and Sarbin 
(1986)  had already developed James’ concept of social self further applying a narra-
tive translation to James’ ‘I’ and ‘Me’ distinctions. The ‘I’ was reframed as being the 
author with the empirical ‘Me’s’ as narrative figures/actors. In Mancuso and Sarbin’s 
account, it is the ”Me’s” who act as protagonists in relation to the observing ”I”. The 
observing ”I”, as author, performs in essence a hermeneutic role, constructing mean-
ing from the narrative movement of the protagonists, meaning in turn provides form 
and structure to experience. Sarbin stresses the organising aspects of narrative. This 
is illustrated in the following quote.
The narrative is a way of organizing episodes, actions, and accounts of action; 
it is an achievement that brings together mundane facts and fantastic crea-
tions; time and place are incorporated. The narrative allows for the inclusion 
of actors’ reasons for their acts, as well as the causes of happening. (Sarbin, 
1986, p. 9)
Reframed as organising principles, the author and protagonists interpret their experi-
ences of being in the world as narrative action. The storied nature of human conduct 
results in meaning and action becoming inextricably linked; the stress is placed on 
aim-directed actions instead of object-orientated actions (Sarbin, 1986).  
With the stress now placed on aim-directed actions, this necessitates a change to 
Hermans’ use of the Jamesian concept of self-feeling.
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3.2.1 The moderation of general and ideal feelings
In chapter one, a description of these concepts was given in relation to Hermans’ ex-
ploration of affective patterns within the first cycle of the SCM. Hermans utilised the 
nomothetically construed affective components associated with any given valuation 
to reflect its personal meaning. It may be recalled that as part of the process, a matrix 
was constructed. In addition to specific valuations, general feelings and ideal feelings 
were included in the matrix as indicators of the self feeling.   
With the narrative turn, the concept of the existing proportion between general 
feelings and ideal feelings becomes less central to Hermans’ theoretical conceptu-
alisation.  The Jamesian understanding of self-esteem reflected in the use of general 
feelings and ideal feelings within the SCM, as stated in chapter one, echoed something 
of James’ concept of pretensions (James, 1890) and successes (James, 1890) ends here. 
It is no longer the impression (in Jamesian terms) that the object leaves in relation to 
the sensation of the other objects held in conscious awareness at the same time that 
is significant; instead, with the narrative reformulation, it is the lived experience and 
the sequencing of events, as interpreted through the consciousness of the protago-
nists that is of relevance. The existing proportion, as initially described by Hermans, 
between general feelings and ideal feelings is altered. The Jamesian concept of a 
hierarchical structure and moral generalities brought into being by the acts of the 
spiritual selves, the social selves and the material selves is replaced by the  interpreta-
tion of the reflecting/observing ’I’, this is achieved through narrative discourse with 
the protagonists.  
Although the reflecting/observing ’I’ remains fixed in the sense of the author, with 
the introduction of narrative discourse, there is a movement away from an internal 
monologue, the reframing facilitates a self capable of a dialogue with a significant 
degree of polyvocality and a capability to expand the temporal dimensions of the 
self. The capacity for narrative discourse expands the Jamesian understanding of the 
social-self and self-feeling. Self-feeling can now be conceptualised as being created 
and re-created through access to a more heterogeneous repertoire, a bricolage of 
perspectives become available in which to construct self-feeling. Meaning shimmers, 
the narrative discourse is dependent on the protagonists and the temporal position 
they occupy at any one time. To explicate this further, ”the narrative mode leads, not 
to certainties, but to varying perspectives. In this world of narrative, the subjunctive 
mood prevails rather than the indicative mood.” (White & Epston, 1990, p. 78). Self-
feeling is no longer about choice and potential, as originally formulated in Jamesian 
terms, but with the narrative turn, self-feeling is influenced by the interpretation of 
the action of the protagonists, which is dependent on the temporal position of the 
reflecting/observing ’I’ that in turn influences the meaning attributed to the action.
3.2.2 Valuations as self narratives  
The departure from classic concepts as originally formulated in valuation theory, con-
tinues with the change to the way in which valuations are conceptualised. In classic 
valuation theory, valuations can be both regarded as unity of the act of valuing and 
equally, its object. Hermans no longer clearly applies the original concept of valuation 
theory where valuations are described as intentional objects formulated as carriers of 
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the primordial constitutes of the Jamesian ”Me”, with the narrative turn, valuations 
are now seen as self narratives. 
Valuation clusters, grouped together by their affect create certain themes, 
Hermans’ states, ”the construction of a story is a way of organizing one’s interac-
tion with the world, and once this organisation has been achieved, a person finds 
his or her identity in the particular story.” (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 
47). When the changed capacity of the reflecting/observing ’I’ is coupled with the 
juxtaposition of the earlier latent-manifest distinction with themes found in sto-
ries, this creates a greater possibility of dynamic movement, defined as ”lacunae” 
(Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 62) in the organising system. This use of the 
tem ”lacunae”, which indicates a gap or a space especially within a book or a manu-
script, would appear to reflect Hermans’ narratization of valuation theory.  Hermans 
states that in a fully-fledged valuation system, the self is able to differentiate and 
integrate latent motives, thus human development is described as “a cyclic process 
of valuation” (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 199). With the inclusion of the 
narrative model, the science-related concept of valuation system was replaced by 
the narrative concept of plot.
3. 3 T H E N E W N A R R AT I V E FU N C T I O N O F M O DA L I T Y A N A LYS I S
In addition to the changes to Hermans’ use of self-feeling and the reformation of 
valuations as self-narratives, with the narrative turn, the modality analysis of the 
valuation matrix gets a new function.
The affective components of valuations in the original model provided informa-
tion regarding the latent basic motives for any given individual. It may be helpful at 
this point to reiterate the components contained within the matrix (phase one of the 
SCM), these are indices highlighting scores for positive affect, negative affect, mo-
tive for self-enhancement and desire for contact and union with others. Following the 
narrative turn, the latter two aspects, namely the self-enhancement motive (S) and 
the contact and union with the other (O), are linked to two basic themes in collective 
stories (Hermans, 1988 & Hermans & Van Gilst, 1991), namely heroism and love. Citing 
both the Goya study (Hermans, 1988) and the Narcissus study (Hermans & Van Gilst, 
1991), these basic motives play a role in organising the events of lived experience 
into an organised whole. In the modified approach, as affective terms are compared 
across a range of valuations, specific affective modalities, at certain times, may have a 
dominant impact on the system as a whole. As a result, certain commonalities, namely 
ones desire for unity with one’s self and with another becomes themes and plots that 
unfold. Hermans’ states,
That is, the modality analysis takes us to the heart of the self-confrontation 
method because it is the most direct route to a theme that plays a major role in 
the ordering of the client’s life in a particular period (Hermans & Hermans-
Jansen, 1995, p. 58)
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3.3.1 Changes to Hermans’ original research methodology 
Having now established three modifications to Hermans’ original model, namely the 
Jamesian understanding of self-feeling, the alteration of the concept of valuations, 
where valuations are now seen as self narratives, and the new function of modality 
analysis within the SCM, I will now consider how these inclusions impacted upon 
Hermans’ original methodology. Namely, how it changes from a research methodology 
to a therapeutic technique. Hermans’ concludes,
Therefore, a systematic strategy is needed for the realizing a transition from 
assessment to change in such a way that the client is motivated to explore 
alternative stories  or part stories in order to promote the valuation process as 
a whole. This implies an invalidation of existing parts of the valuation system 
and a validation of those parts that are modified or even new. (Hermans & 
Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 47)
It seems that the conceptual transition from valuations to self-narratives stimulated a 
more interventionist approach to the SCM. In order to accommodate this conceptual 
shift, Hermans added a set of reflective processes to the structural framework of the 
SCM. These additions resulted in inclusions to the second phase of the SCM, it may 
be recalled that the second phase is dedicated to promoting the process of change, the 
inclusions were an additional three processes named attending, creating and anchor-
ing. They were included following the integration of the narrative model and were 
employed to address the newly formulated spatio-temporal quality of valuations as 
self-narratives. Within the SCM procedure, the three processes can be seen as sub-
phases during which reflective actions are directed at different domains of experience 
and action. 
3.3.1.1 Attending
During this phase, clients are instructed to have an increased sensitivity to their ex-
isting self-narrative and the ongoing stream of events in their everyday lives. Within 
this heightened state of sensitivity they are encouraged to promote a new dialectic 
relationship between past, present and future events.
Due to the inclusion of the narrative model, perspectives, as they unfold from a 
position of past, present and future may create narrative discourses with specific 
themes. The aim of attending is to increase the client’s sensitivity to the availability 
of a more heterogeneous repertoire. The function of the attending phase is to bring 
into conscious awareness predominating basic motives, and within this identify spe-
cific dominating themes or patterns. Particular identified themes can now be brought 
to awareness on a regular basis opening up the possibility of change. Hermans and 
Hermans-Jansen succinctly describe this link between assessment and change in 
these terms, ”when confronted with such similarity, the client is challenged to explore 
the valuations in their dynamic relationship so that they can become freed from their 
isolated positions.” (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 45).
At this point in the dynamic narrative discourse, the process of reflection-in-ac-
tion and tensions within the system are central to Hermans’ theory. Hermans and 
28
Hermans-Jansen state that during this phase, it is essential that clients understand 
that specific events do not have meaning within themselves, that there are in essence 
numerous interpretations. 
The therapist encourages exploration on spatio-temporal dimensions by asking 
a series of open, empathic questions in order to ascertain possible exceptions to the 
rule. These questions differ from the original questions in the SCM. The purpose of 
the new series of questions in the attending phase is to focus attention on ongoing 
events as movement in space and time, initially triggering reflective activity. It is also 
essential that events are contextualised, and that following contextualisation of these 
events that further reflection is then undertaken in order to broaden perspectives.  
The identification of basic motives, namely the self-enhancement motive and self 
for other motive is also central to the attending phase. This illustrates how concepts 
from the previous phase are now placed in the new, narrative context.  Clients are 
encouraged to attend to how the basic motives relate to their everyday lives and en-
couraged to recognise any affect associated with passing events. Hermans’ states, in 
practice,
The discussion invites the client to focus on the fundamentals of the valua-
tion system. Valuations that have a greater variety on the manifest level may 
show clear similarities from the perspective of the latent level, thus suggest-
ing that they have a common motivational base. The client may detect that a 
great many valuations show a relative dominance of affect referring to self-
enhancement over affect referring to contact and union. Seeing that this is 
a structural characteristic of the valuation system as a whole may motivate 
the client to address this imbalance and to look, with the assistance of the 
psychologist, for ways to strengthen the contact and union part of the system. 
(Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 45)
In ”Self-Narratives: The Construction of meaning in Psychotherapy”, the authors 
(Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995) provide a case example; the case is of a 28 year-
old woman, Linda. Linda experiences serious problems in her relationships, espe-
cially with work colleagues. In the attending phase, it is concluded that the theme is 
”always trying to be the best” (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 46). For Linda, 
when examinations of seven of her selected valuations are carried out, this suggests 
that both the self-enhancement motive (S) and the contact and union with the other 
motive (O) affect is rather low. During modality analysis, Linda’s interpretation is ”I 
can feel this tension in my body...Sometimes my muscles are so tense that I can’t do 
anything...Through being so goal orientated, I lose contact with myself” (Hermans & 
Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 57).
As we can see from the above quote, attending to basic motives and the impact of 
new events on affective states, affective nuances are brought more to the foreground 
and interject upon the senses and the mind forming potentially new meanings and 
thus (with Hermans continuing to use original terminology) new valuations. As re-
flective beings, perpetually receptive to lived experience, events are construed by 
Hermans as novel happenings. An ”interpreting self” (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 
29
1995, p. 18), however, is required before meaning can be attached to any happening. 
Any given valuation, may contain a range of events, which have been condensed into 
a single unit of meaning (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995).
As we can now ascertain, the new function of the modality analysis is the estab-
lishment of an interpretative/interventionist approach. This is described as a ”sum-
mary of interpretations” (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 58). The intervention-
ist, or aim-directed nature of the SCM is aptly described in the following quote:
The modality analysis also illustrates how the assessment process itself can 
lead to change. The client, moving from one set of valuations and their inter-
pretations to the next, gradually articulates some common themes and es-
tablishes some order in his or her experiences. As the contours of the central 
theme become clearer, the change process gains direction, and eventually the 
client and psychologist arrive at a point where they can translate the guiding 
theme into concrete behavioural steps to be incorporated into the client’s daily 
life (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 58) 
The new function of the modality analysis dovetails with the second reflective process 
added to the structural framework of the SCM.
3.3.1.2 Creating
It is during the creating phase that reflection is linked to action. New ways of behaving 
or initiating events are actively encouraged with a hierarchy of events being agreed 
between therapist and client. This imposes a more interventionist, coaching quality to 
the creating phase with the introduction of the “principle of feasible steps” (Hermans 
& Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 51). In order to prevent old generalised valuations from 
being reinforced and validated, the aim of the creating phase is to open up the pos-
sibility of a reworking of current valuations, which in turn increases the chance of 
optimal outcomes, where there is an increased ability to create new events not con-
tained within the current plot. However, the new events are focused on important 
themes and the basic motivations embedded in the client’s narrative. Hermans gives 
the following example,
The client who is struggling with the theme of failure and is accustomed to 
defining his of her own actions as invariably inadequate may be invited to try 
out new actions that are critical from the perspective of this theme (Hermans 
& Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 51)
It is perhaps important to recall at this point that valuations have now been super-
seded by themes and plot as the ontological process of the self. 
Furthermore, the creating phase also allows for a “standstill” (Hermans & 
Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 52) intervention where old valuations are possibly modified, 
or there is the genesis of new valuations that are formed around the experience of the 
meaning of change. In this intervention, the affective assessment can be used repeat-
edly. The routine list of affective terms is used to check the affective significance of 
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any new valuations. These affective indices can then be evaluated with regards as to 
how they contribute to the enhancement of either of the basic motives. It seems that 
the standstill intervention represents an insertion of the original self confrontation 
method, which introduces a snapshot of the revised valuation matrix at a particular 
moment in the creating phase. The standard technique of relating valuations with the 
basic motives fine-tunes the client’s self reflection by implying the possible conse-
quences of each motivational direction in relations to current dominant themes, and 
ultimately the narrative structure of self.   
 This collaboration around new ways of initiating events and behaviour gives the 
action a relational flavour. Hermans discusses two particular points about the rela-
tional aspects of the creating phase. One is the importance of the act of telling or nar-
rating an account of the action to another individual. This is followed by highlighting 
how the act of narrating the action to another contributes to the meaning constructed 
around the new action. The second aspect mentioned by Hermans is the importance 
of the imaginal presence of the therapist during this creating phase, when trying out 
new ways of acting. 
In the process of ”finding an entrance into the valuation system” (Hermans & 
Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 69) new protagonists may be introduced in the form of 
imaginal figures.
When, for example, the usual position of a client is organised around a theme 
of powerlessness, the construction of an imaginal position (e.g., a wise adviser 
or guide) may bring the client into direct contact with another theme that is 
central to the valuations of the imaginal position. In this way a different voice 
may bring about actions that are otherwise beyond the reach of the usual 
valuation system and may thereby enrich the validation/invalidation process 
(Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 115)
3.3.1.3 Anchoring
The aim of the anchoring phase is to work towards stabilisation of the new valuations 
into the system. This involves not only repeating the new actions but also developing 
new themes through these actions. It is important that new actions be carried out in a 
variety of situations. If there is relapse into old patterns of behaviour then an investi-
gation into why this occurred is conducted in order for further learning to take place. 
In addition, not only is the client encouraged to conduct further self-investigations but 
the client’s significant others may also be recruited to engage in self-investigation if 
they have in any way influenced the return to old behavioural patterns. Before fur-
ther self-investigations are conducted, the client is allocated enough time in which to 
practice new behaviours.
The addition of these shared reflective processes to the structural framework of 
the SCM result in a change to Hermans’ original method. In my reading of Hermans’ 
work, the inclusion of the interpretative approach and his adoption of the narrative 
frame were included to enable the practical shift from the SCM as a research-orien-
tated method to an interventionist approach. It would seem that narrative metaphors 
of ‘self as a motivated storyteller’ and ‘retelling one’s story’ are adopted by Hermans 
as rhetorical expressions in the context of the SCM.
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3.4 CO N C LU D I N G CO M M E N T S
The adoption of these narrative metaphors as rhetorical expressions in the context of 
the SCM, transformed the original conception of valuations and ways by which their 
configuration now could be formulated. 
As demonstrated throughout this chapter, the addition of the narrative model re-
sults in the enforcing of thematic elements as well as a temporal dimension upon the 
valuation system. With the narrative turn, temporality becomes central to the process 
of constructing an understanding of human experience. 
It is now that the narrative concept of plot becomes central to the tension between 
stability and change. The function of the plot is to organise events into a coherent 
whole, rather than separate, disparate chronological events/experiences. As, theo-
retically the ’I’ has the capacity to interpret and author the protagonist’s narratives 
through the process of reflection-in-action, Hermans describes a general feature of 
narrative as a “dialectic relationship between event and plot” (Hermans & Kempen, 
1993, p. 25). In this formulation, the narrative concept of plot is then aligned with the 
completed totality of valuations. This however imposes a strong temporal element 
within the valuation system. Whilst the idea of self-narrative theme and plot as salient 
organising structures provide a degree of continuity over space and time, the dialectic 
relationship between new events may create new plots. As we have seen, in the at-
tending phase of the SCM, in the first instance, the individual will have a bias towards 
selecting themes that match existing plots. However, the SCM, now as a therapeutic 
interventionist strategy, in which the imaginal presence of the therapist is deemed 
important, or, indeed with the introduction of imaginal figures, the dialectic relation-
ship between event and plot becomes the point in which loopholes can be created in 
which change can occur.  
Not only does, temporality become central to the process of constructing an un-
derstanding of human experience, temporality and reflection-in-action now become 
central to the process of change.   
With the narrative translation, there is no great significant conceptual shift in 
the ’I’ as the reflecting subject of experience and action. The juxtaposition with nar-
rative concepts results in mainly terminological modification of the I as an author. 
The changes are more marked in the original valuation concept of new terminology 
focusing now on thematic elements and plot.  The narrative terminology also impacts 
upon, and changes the function of the SCM as a research tool to perform phenomeno-
logically informed analysis of human consciousness, successive iterations of the SCM 
become a ‘retelling of the story’. 
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4 The Expanded Dialogical 
Imagination
In chapter three, I will discuss Hermans’ second transition, namely the theoretical 
shift from valuations as self-narratives (following the first transition) to valuations 
as referential objects of shifting I-perspectives/positions in Bakhtinian utterances. 
It is with Hermans’ second transition that the task of providing a clear concep-
tual account becomes increasingly difficult. In order to maintain a clear account, 
not only acknowledging the “forgotten past of the dialogical self”, but in order to 
trace and capture the developmental transitions from the process of self-reflection 
to Hermans’ postulation of an expanded dialogical imagination, I will discuss the 
change from valuations as narratives to valuations as Bakhtinian utterances. When 
valuations were contextualised as lived experience being expressed in a storied 
manner, Hermans retained the concept of the author as a unitary I, in the sec-
ond transition Hermans reformulates authorship by adopting the metaphor of the 
polyphonic novel. With this reformulation the I has the capacity to adopt multiple 
positions, the I is no longer a centred unitary I reflecting over (in Jamesian terms), 
the Me’s. The change is also apparent in the name of the new conceptualisation. 
Valuation theory has now become dialogical self theory.  
It is with the appointment of Bakhtin’s concept of polyphony alongside the jux-
taposition of narrative theory that we complete the evolutionary process of valua-
tion theory into dialogical self theory. It is once this evolutionary stage is complete 
that Hermans’ term I- positions becomes fully imbedded as a theoretical concept. 
Moving from internalisation theorists, who start from the premise that the act of self-
reflection is an internal dialogue occurring between thoughts Hermans’ final tran-
sition, as stated above, results in thoughts/valuations being defined in Bakhtinian 
terms as utterances. Drawing conclusions in chapter two regarding the change to 
the basic theoretical structure of valuation theory following the approbation of nar-
rative concepts, valuations could still be described as intentional objects within the 
storyline of a self-narrative. Thus, at this point, the basic theoretical structure of 
valuation theory was only marginally changed. In however adopting the metaphor of 
the polyphonic novel, where the I is now able to adopt multiple positions, this does 
result in changes in respect to the relationship between the I and the referential 
objects of reflection. 
Hermans follows a path, which is in essence, a narrative means to a dialogical 
end. In chapter three, I will explore my understanding of how Hermans abridged the 
concept of self-narrative with the Bakhtinian concept of the polyphonic novel. In the 
process of mapping some of Hermans’ further theoretical juxtapositions as he devel-
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ops dialogical self theory I will discuss the changes to Hermans’ original theoretical 
structure. I will also comment on how the second transition impacts upon Hermans’ 
research methodology. 
With the narrative turn, temporality became central to the process of construct-
ing an understanding of human experience and thematic elements became central to 
both the stability of narrative identity and the possibility of reconstruction of narra-
tive identity.  With valuations now being construed as referential objects of shifting 
I-perspectives/positions, perhaps the question of space was now becoming as signifi-
cant as the question of time.  
4.1 T H E P OW E R O F I M AG I N AT I O N
During the narrative turn, the self-enhancement motive (S) and the contact and un-
ion with the other motive (O), were linked to two basic themes in collective stories 
(Hermans, 1988 & Hermans & Van Gilst, 1991), namely heroism and love. Hermans’ 
states, ”whereas romantic love can be conceived of as a longing, with a mythic shad-
ings, for contact and union, heroism is to be understood as a mythic form of self-
enhancement” (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 216)
On a developmental trajectory, Hermans and Hermans-Jansen conclude that im-
agination has a central role to play throughout childhood and adolescent in the de-
velopment of a narrative identity (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995). That which is 
absent can become accessible through the power of imagination, imaginal figures can 
embody heroism/the self-enhancement motive or love/ the contact and union with 
the other motive, moreover; the power of imagination has a spatial capacity. Hermans 
makes further theoretical juxtapositions at this crux.   
To expand his conceptual use of imagination Hermans introduces Vico’s concept 
of “ingenium” (Hermans & Kempen, 1993, p. 5) which suggests that imagination is a 
force behind the formation of civil history (Vico, 1709/1990). With this inherent crea-
tive force, imagination becomes a powerful tool in both the process of stability and 
change.  
For Vico, imagination equates to historical memory. Vico aspired to utilise philol-
ogy in order to explain the origins of philosophy, and through doing so, postulated an 
account of imagination as an embodied phenomenon (Costelloe, 2012). This is founded 
on Vico’s conceptualisation of primitive human beings as innate artificers forming 
a civil history through collective reactions to natural phenomena. Shotter aptly de-
scribes Vico’s idea of humans as innate artificers. 
But to understand what he means here - by saying that the early people 
were, by necessity, poets (Greek poitetes = one who makes, a maker, an ar-
tificer) - we must, I think, divide the process of making involved into two 
parts: i) The first is to do with the forming what Vico calls a sensory topic, 
the original possibility of everyone in a group being able to feel the same 
movement within themselves in the same way again. And ii) The second is 
to do with the forming of what he calls an imaginary universal, a corpore-
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al image which is ’rooted’ in the sensory topic and which ;’shapes’ its first, 
socially shared, determinate form of responsive expression in relation to it. 
(Shotter, 1996, p. 5) 
Imagination therefore has sensory roots that develop into collective archetypes. 
These collective archetypes become encapsulated in mythology. Mythology is central 
to Vico’s paradigm, Vico states, ”accordingly, the first science we must study is my-
thology, meaning the interpretation of myths: for all pagan histories have mythical 
origins” (Vico, 1744/2001, p. 44). In the following quotation, Vico addresses the epis-
temological significance of collective practices that form the common basis of truth.
We observe that all the barbarous people and civilized nations of the world, 
despite their great separation in space and time and their separate founda-
tions, all share these three customs: all have some religion, all contract solemn 
marriages, and all bury their dead. And in every nation, no matter how savage 
and crude, no rites are celebrated with more elaborate ceremonies or more 
sacred solemnities than those of religion, marriage and burial. Now according 
to Axiom 13, whenever uniform ideas originate among peoples unknown to 
each other, they must have a common basis in truth. (Vico, 1744/2001, p. 120)
In order to avoid the ”dangerous reefs of mythology” (Vico, 1744/2001, p. 56), Vico 
advocates the appliance of his New Science postulating the notion that myths contain 
poetic archetypes. ”These archetypes were imaginative categories or universals, to 
which (like ideal models or portraits) men could assign all the particulars species that 
resemble them”(Vico, 1744/2001, p. 93).It seems that Vico restated Aristotle’s charac-
terization of the path from sensations to linguistic meanings, as outlined in the first 
lines of “On interpretation” (Aristotle, 350 B.C.),
Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the 
symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men 
have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these 
directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our 
experiences are the images. (Aristotle, 350.B.C.)
In distinction from Aristotle, for whom propositions formed the expression of uni-
versals, Vico emphasised archetypes and imaginative categories poetic allegories as 
the ideal models of the collectively shared meanings or universals (Vico, 1744/2001). 
Therefore, for Vico the meaning of the myth is based on true poetic allegories 
and as such, the meaning of the myth is based on identity rather than analogy. It is 
only, with the development of vernacular speech, that a number of corollaries ensue, 
namely the devices of speech as metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony. With 
these devices comes an ability to construct analogy. ”These expressions became figu-
rative only later, as the human mind developed and invented words which signified 
abstract forms, that is generic categories comprising various species, or relating parts 
to a whole.” (Vico, 1744/2001, p. 162)
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Ingenium is Vico’s concept of the faculty that renders possible the transforma-
tion from sensual forms to collectively shared imaginative universals and eventually 
to invented words. Inherent in ingenium’s capacity for poitetes lays the creation of 
language; therefore, ingenium is both poetic and rhetorical. It is with the rhetorical 
creation of language that Vico postulates the active and creative capacity of humanity 
to gain degrees of knowledge, for it is through the rhetoric of language that points can 
be argued and judged, and it is only by these means that knowledge can be formalised. 
Hodges (1996) gives the following description.
The first - ingenium, an innovative cognitive power, is a human way of know-
ing that includes the actual in a particular context and the extraordinary with 
the concrete. It combines sense perception with the imagination to open up 
and reveal the world. The second definition is from Grassi - the human ca-
pacity that enables words or senses or ideas to have ”adaptability, acumen and 
’instantaneousness’” (Heidegger 20). The third layer is a cognitive ability that 
links a person perceptually with others and with the natural world. A person 
who uncovers a space for ingenium may generate new ways of inventing or 
interpreting discourse, problems, or ideas” (Hodges, 1996. p. 86)
Going back to Hermans, it is with the introduction of Vichean concepts that the first 
schism occurs, with movement from a unitary concept of self, moving towards decen-
tralisation of the self and the concept of a multiplicity of self. Hermans appears to use 
Vico’s ingenium as a devise to resolve a number of theoretical issues. 
For example, Hermans appears to use ingenium as a device, to reconcile the dif-
ferences between the American pragmatists and French structuralists. Hermans 
states, ”for the structuralists, language is above all a play of signifiers, whereas for 
the pragmatists language is a set of practices by which embodied agents establish 
shared frameworks of ongoing activity” (Hermans & Kempen, 1993, p. 32). Moreover; 
and ultimately central to my task to try to articulate a clear conceptual account, Vico 
is used by Hermans as a rhetorical device to lay the groundwork to introduce Jaynes’ 
(1976) concept of mind space. Perhaps, loosely applying Vichean term, we could de-
scribe Jaynes as using philology accompanied by introspection, the study of language 
and metaphor to construct hypotheses concerning the development of human con-
sciousness. 
 Before this state of consciousness was achieved by humanity, Jaynes discusses an 
early, primitive capacity postulating the idea that human mentality was composed of 
two parts, these two parts were split into a decision making part and a part that fol-
lowed, collectively, the two parts are described as the bicameral mind (Jaynes, 1986). 
In Jaynes’ hypothesis, the bicameral mind had a capacity to make decisions but was 
not a functioning conscious mind; decisions were directed by voices/auditory hal-
lucinations that were obeyed without question. This type of mentality was however 
unsustainable, as societies changed the bicameral mind broke down, out of which the 
phoenix of human consciousness arose from the ashes. 
Jaynes discusses a number of factors that contributed to the hallucinatory voices 
diminishing, as well as societal change Jaynes concludes that once the word could be 
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written as well as spoken, that it then became possible to achieve a spatial distance 
from hallucinatory voices. 
As physical beings in the real world, the spatial quality of the world became ac-
cessible through vocabulary/lexical fields. Jaynes describes this spatial quality of the 
world as then developing into psychological fact used for problem solving. At the 
core of Jaynes’ hypothesis however lies metaphor, for Jaynes metaphor is not merely 
comparison, but through the use of repeated metaphor arising from the real, physical 
world, a point of illumination is achieved, a capacity to see things from a new perspec-
tive. At this point, we reach the dawn of human consciousness, Jaynes states,
We have said that consciousness is an operation rather than a thing, a re-
pository, or a function. It operates by way of analogy, by way of constructing 
an analog space with an analog ”I” that can observe that space, and move 
metaphorically in it. It operates on any reactivity, excerpts relevant aspects, 
narratizes and conciliates them together in a metaphorical space where such 
meanings can be manipulated like things in space. (Jaynes, 1976, pp. 65 - 66) 
With the dawn of consciousness, the next feature of consciousness for Jaynes is the 
analog ’I’. For Jaynes this is not a self or an object of consciousness, he alludes to a com-
parison with Kant’s (1781), transcendental ego. With an ability to move in mind space 
the analog ’I’ gives birth to a third feature of consciousness, described by Jaynes as 
narratization (Jaynes, 1986).  Narratization is central to Jaynes’ paradigm, Jaynes states,
Consciousness is constantly fitting things into a story, putting a before and 
after around any event. This feature is an analog of our physical selves moving 
about through a physical world with its spatial successiveness, which becomes 
the successiveness of time in mind space. And this results in the conscious 
conception of time, which is spatialized time in which we locate events and 
indeed our lives. It is impossible to be conscious of time in any other way than 
as a space. (Jaynes, 1986, p. 8) 
It seems evident that Hermans continues to use narrative as his pivotal point, utilis-
ing Jaynes’ ideas regarding the narrative development of human consciousness to 
bring the external physical world into the abundant inner experience of a conscious 
state. Jaynes’ concept of mind-space introduces the idea of a functional space without 
boundaries, an open arena for conscious self-reflection. Moreover, with the introduc-
tion of Jaynes’ concept of mind space, temporality, in the narrative sense, is no longer 
central to Hermans understanding of the development of human consciousness. It is 
no longer the “dialectic relationship between event and plot” (Hermans & Kempen, 
1993, p. 25) that is central to the tension between stability and change; rather, with 
Hermans reformulation of Jaynes’ analog ’I’, it is the ability of I- positions to move in 
metaphorical space. 
By using Vico’s concept of ingenium, with its inherent qualities of poetic logic and 
rhetoric as a rhetorical device, and Jaynes concept of mind space Hermans is able to 
expand his previous understanding of self. It is at this junction, where perhaps self 
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can now no longer be conceptualised a unitary closed entity, that Hermans must now 
postulate the self in pluralistic terms and find a way to theoretically describe the hu-
man mind as an open system. 
4. 2 M OV E M E N T TOWA R D S T H E P O LY PH O N I C S E L F
The scene is now set for Hermans to introduce Bakhtin’s ideas regarding a specific 
type of artistic thought contained within the polyphonic novel. The Bakhtinian meta-
phor of the polyphonic novel suggests that contained within the text of a polyphonic 
novel, both the narrator and the characters of the piece are able to converse on equal 
terms; the text thus has a quality of many-voicedness. Polyphony, in essence imbues 
each character with an independent, distinctive voice. This has great significance 
as the I-object relationship now becomes embedded with a voice/s. Often described 
as the retreat of the omniscient author, the characters are no longer represented as 
objects but are fully fledged subjective beings with a distinct consciousness and thus 
a high degree of independence.  Through this Bakhtinian idea, Hermans is now able 
to postulate an animate, existent dialogue between author/s and character/s, both as 
autonomous subjectivities. Moreover, Hermans is able to postulate a multiplicity of 
authors extending the narrative concept of a single unitary self to a pluralistic self.  
With the retreat of the omniscient author, there is a further retreat of the pre-
viously enforced temporal dimension upon the valuation system, emphasised by 
the chronological conception of emplotment, and a return to a stronger emphasis 
on spatial relations. In order to address the more prominent focus on spatialization, 
Hermans uses Polkinghorne’s two-dimensional characterisation of emplotment to 
bridge the gap.  Hermans makes the following statement.
As Polkinghorne (1988) proposed, a plot combines two dimensions, one chron-
ological, the other nonchronological. The chronological dimension shows that 
the story is made up of events along the line of time. The nonchronological di-
mension emphasizes that events form a configuration so that, scattered though 
they may be, they form an organized whole. In other words, emplotment not 
only liberates a narrative account from the pure time sequence, but also allows 
for a construction in which stories and their implied meaning units are treat-
ed as parts in an organised whole. The principle of juxtaposition (Bakhtin, 
1929/1973) is a form of configuration in which the notion of space is given 
priority over time. This means that the chronological ordering in terms of a 
beginning, middle and an ending is not the final word of emplotment. The 
constructive activity of emplotment allows for a juxtaposition of events, in 
which the original time sequence is changed in the service of finding new 
configurations. (Hermans, 2001, p. 341)
The unitary authorship given to the reflecting I during the narrative turn, engaged 
as it was in the process of reflection-in-action, is no longer embedded in the narrative 
action, at this point imagination and voice amalgamate to become I-positions.
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4.2.1 I-positions: The pluralistic self and the mind as an open system
During the second transition Hermans changes his core theoretical metaphor from 
the person as a motivated storyteller, this is no longer viewed as an adequate means 
to define the complexity of the narrative self. At this stage, following the path of a 
narratively constructed concept of a dialogical self, based on Jaynes’ concept of mind-
space, a functional space without boundaries, Hermans formulates the term imaginal 
landscapes of the mind (Hermans & Kempen, 1993). It is within this terrain, with the 
terrain of the landscape used to provide a description of the human mind as an open 
system, that movement is able to occur between imaginal figures within perceptual 
space. In addition, the landscape alludes to a suggestion of an expansion of the human 
mind, this is deemed to facilitate a form of intersubjective exchange between both 
internal and external positions, it is also used as a means of explaining the spatio-
temporal abilities of I-positions.
We conceptualise the self in terms of a dynamic multiplicity of relatively au-
tonomous I positions in an imaginal landscape. In its most concise form this 
conception can be formulated as follows. The I has the possibility to move, as 
in space, from one position to the other in accordance with changes in situation 
and time. The I fluctuates among different and even opposed positions. The I 
has the capacity to imaginatively endow each position with a voice so that dia-
logical relations between positions can be established. The voices function like 
interacting characters in a story. Once a character is set in motion in a story, 
the character takes on a life of its own and thus assumes a certain narrative 
necessity. Each character has a story to tell about its experiences from its own 
stance. As different voices these characters exchange information about their 
respective Me’s and their worlds, resulting in a complex, narratively struc-
tured self. (Hermans, Kempen & Van loon, 1992, pp. 28 -29
The I carries an innate capacity to give voice to a myriad of positions, bring to life 
characters in the imaginal landscape with relatively independent, fully functioning 
subjectivity. Due to the relatively autonomous nature of I-positions each contains 
a unique and distinctive self-narrative. The network of positions are deemed to be 
constantly in dialogical exchange, giving the expanded human mind the ability to 
collude, agree, or validate any given positions or equally to challenge, question or in-
terrogate positions. Through this subject-to-subject relationship that is hypothetically 
contained within any given I-position, new positions are formed. 
There are two very significant processes by which meaning is created, namely 
the activity of imagination (Hermans & Kempen, 1993) and the network of positions 
(Hermans & Kempen, 1993).
The imaginal space is populated by positions.  And as imaginal space is side 
by side and interwoven with perceptible space, imaginal positions are strong-
ly interconnected with perceptible positions…..The meaning of my mother is 
much more determined by the position she has in an imaginal space, in which I 
see myself related to her as a child, adolescent, and adult. These memories and 
39
imaginations are certainly not restricted to the position of hers and mine……
the meaning of my mother, or any significant person, has to me is deeply 
influenced by a network of positions in which she and I participate…..by the 
activity of imagination – they are brought together, and in their juxtaposition 
they form a meaningful pattern.  (Hermans & Kempen, 1993, pp. 166 - 167)    
With the inclusion of the Bakhtinian metaphor of the polyphonic novel to the narra-
tive conception, Hermans postulates self as consisting of multiple positioned narra-
tive figures or actors, in a vast array of positions in dialogue with a subjective author. 
In the process of authoring, new stories/meanings/positions are constantly created.
4.2.2 Decentralisation of the self (Self and I-positions)
The quintessence of Hermans’ formulation of I-positions can possibly be distilled 
down to two components, specifically the authorial position/s and their identification 
with “voices”.  Consciousness and differing levels of consciousness are now addressed 
directly through the process of dialogicisation. Hermans notes the historical and cul-
tural origins of the Western self’s collective voice defining this as a centralised collec-
tive voice influenced by Descartes’ Cogito. Hermans’ comments “as a result of a strong 
centralisation, so typical of our Western collective voice, some positions never receive 
enough attention to be included as part of the self” (Hermans & Kempen, 1993, p. 163)
The shift towards decentralisation of the human mind seems to entail the way by 
which Hermans postulates human activity. Activity is seen as a concerted action of the 
I-positions mediated by the synthesizing quality of the self (Hermans & Kempen, 1993). 
Hermans moves radically towards decentralisation of the human mind. However, it 
seems that he does not get rid of the self as a superordinate concept in the model.   
Although each position within the self has a degree of autonomy and stability it 
may or may not be irreversibly altered during the process of dialogical exchange. It 
is the synthesizing quality of self (Hermans & Kempen, 1993) that seems to moderate 
the otherwise completely decentred dialogue between the I-positions. Hermans cites 
centripetal and centrifugal forces, another import from Bakhtin’s (1981) theory, as 
being central to this synthesizing activity of self. Rather than a disparate collection of 
I-positions Hermans postulates that relatively autonomous positions have an inherent 
ability to act as a community. This is explained in the following manner,
The centrifugal force refers to the tendency of the different parts to maintain 
and increase their autonomy: The lover wants to love, the critic to criticize, 
the artist to express, and the achiever to excel. As long as these characters 
are involved in their activity, they are not concerned with the strivings and 
longings of the other characters. Their intentions require a certain degree of 
autonomy. The centripetal forces, however, attempts to bring these tendencies 
together and to create a field in which the different characters form a com-
munity. (Hermans & Kempen, 1993, p. 93)  
Hermans uses the concept of I-positions to describe the synthesizing activity of self, 
rather than an integrated whole, Hermans defines self as a community. Centripetal 
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and centrifugal forces maintain the perception of unification between multiple parts 
resulting in an overall sense or illusion of integration. 
Merely an illusion of integration, Hermans postulates a perpetual dialogical strug-
gle, setting the scene to introduce a new metaphor in order to illuminate the syn-
thesizing capacities of the self, Hermans now aligns himself with the Heraclitean 
thought.  Relinquishing Western scientific thoughts association with Aristotelian 
logic, Heraclitean thought is related to analogic processing where the coexistence of 
opposites is postulated (Hermans, 1993). Hermans juxtaposes Heraclitean concepts 
with the idea of multiple authors, but in addition uses the activity of imagination 
alongside the spatial capacities of I-positions. By juxtaposing with Bakhtin’s concept 
of polyphony I-positions are able to give voice to their story, action is now a result of 
the dialogue between internal and external positions and an exchange between domi-
nant and subordinate positions. The metaphor of ”composer” (Hermans & Kempen, 
1993, p. 96) is used to explain the synthesizing capacity of self. 
The organisation of self is therefore attributed to a postulated meta-position/s. The 
self is now conceptualised as a purely dialogical phenomena and superordinate Self is 
considered to be a (special) position (Hermans & Kempen, 1993) that acts as a centre in 
which to compose dialogical juxtaposition (Hermans & Kempen, 1993). Hermans states, 
A meta-position is not to be considered the ‘centre’ of the position repertoire 
or an agentic force that guarantees the unity and coherence of the self in ad-
vance. It should be noted that a meta-position is always bound to one or more 
internal and external positions (e.g. the psychotherapist) that are actualized 
at a particular moment and in a particular situation and that is a dialogi-
cal phenomena. This implies that, depending on time and situation, different 
meta-positions can emerge. Moreover, as each position has its horizon, also a 
meta-position, although it may permit meaningful linkages between a variety 
of positions, has its limitations and is far from a ‘God’s eye view’. These limi-
tations follow from the assumption that a multiplicity precedes any unity or 
synthesis of the self. Unity and coherence are considered a goal rather than a 
given (Hermans & Kempen, 1993). (Hermans, 2004, p. 24)
With the dialogicisation of each I-position, “as different voices these characters 
exchange information about their respective Me’s and their worlds, resulting in a 
complex, narratively structured self” (Hermans, Kempen & Van loon, 1992, p. 28). 
Hermans is now able to describe “two spatially separated people in communication”, 
(Hermans, 2004 p. 15).   This of course raises the question; can all positions have a 
voice? Hermans seems to affirm that this is the case. Moreover, there seems to be 
other-derived voices, which Hermans introduces when discussing the inherent pro-
cess of exchange and power. Exchange and power between multiple I-positions are 
intrinsically linked, Hermans states,
Disagreement, between two parts of the self is not taking place in a ‘free in-
ternal space’. Instead, societal and cultural norms are reflected in the internal 
dialogue and, by implication, in the relative dominance of the conflicting or 
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alternative voices. Groups, institutions, and cultures are represented in the 
self as ‘collective voices’ (Bakhtin 1929/1973) that directly influences its bal-
ance of power. (Hermans, 2004, p. 17)   
The dialogical struggle of the characters that are bound together at any given point in 
time and space within the community in the open landscapes of the mind influence 
the dynamic movement and composition of self.
4. 3 C H A N G E S TO T H E R E S E A R C H M E T H O D O LO G Y
It is at the point of the second transition that Hermans’ original research methodology, 
the self-confrontation method (SCM), with its reliance on valuations as the organising 
process of self becomes to all intents and purposes relegated to a secondary position. 
Hermans alignment with I-positions, with the hypothesis that each individual posi-
tion has relative autonomy, combined with the focus on the relations and dialogical 
exchanges between each relatively autonomous I-position results in the need to adopt 
another research methodology.  As a methodological framework, the personal position 
repertoire (PPR) acts as scion to Hermans’ original self-confrontation method (SCM). 
Before providing an account of the PPR, I will first return to the ”forgotten past” con-
cerning Hermans’ early empirical studies. 
4.3.1 Empirical studies on imaginal figures during the 1970s and 1980s 
In Hermans’ early empirical work there appeared to be a rudimentary dialogical un-
derstanding, through Hermans’ enduring interest in the use of imaginal figures to 
stimulate a dual perspective in the SCM, this seed of duality continued to grow leading 
Hermans to eventually take a dialogical turn. In order to map this path I will briefly 
discuss the role imaginal figures played in Hermans’ early studies. 
Over the course of almost two decades, Hermans’ empirical studies were suggest-
ing that imaginal figures influenced both repetitive, monological dialogue, or facili-
tated innovative dialogue. 
 In his original conceptualisation of valuations as intentional objects, (still at 
this stage working from a more Jamesian understanding of the I/Me distinction), 
within the self-confrontation method throughout the 1970s and into the  late 1980s 
(Hermans, 1976, 1985 1987a, 1988, 1989), Hermans made use of an imagined I to 
articulate emotional configurations. This enabled emotional configurations to be 
gleaned from another perspective/position other than the one currently experi-
enced by the individual. As these empirical studies evolved and data were gathered, 
Hermans was to develop the use of imaginal figures with further additions to his 
research methodology. In 1995, the following sets of prompts to elicit valuations 
were added to the SCM:
Is there, in your world, an imaginal figure that plays an important role in your 
life? What kind of role does this figure play? Is this figure for example.
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• Somebody whom you admire and who interacts in some way with you in 
your mind?
• Somebody with whom you converse in your mind?
• Some kind of advisor?
• A guardian spirit?
• An enemy who threatens you?
• A monster that may swallow you?
• A human being that manifests itself in the form of an animal?
• Somebody who speaks to you from the future?
• An imaginal lover?
• A picture or statue that becomes alive?
• A dead person who is still present? (Hermans & Hermans-Jensen, 1995, 
p. 104)
4.3.2 The personal position repertoire
The Personal position repertoire (PPR) is described by Hermans as a methodological 
framework that can act as a transtheoretical research tool to study the organisation 
and reorganisation of both the multiple aspects of self and the construction of mean-
ing (Hermans, 2001). 
The first phase of the PPR involves the construction of a matrix of both internal 
and external positions. A pre-constructed list of approximately 50 internal positions 
and 40 externals positions is given to the client. The client is then instructed to high-
light positions that resonate with aspects of the self, or positions that are deemed 
to have some relevance or meaning in their life. In addition, clients are at liberty to 
formulate and name their own significant positions.  Following on from this selection, 
a matrix is constructed.   
Phase two involves the use of a five-point Likert (1934) rating scale to assess how 
the client experiences degrees of prominence, both in a positive and negative man-
ner between internal and external positions. This can range from no sense of affili-
ation at all in either an emotionally positive or negative direction to a distinct sense 
of affiliation between certain internal and external positions. These data are placed 
into a “matrix of internal positions (rows) and external positions (columns) with the 
prominence ratings (extent of prominence) in the entries” (Hermans, 2001, p. 326). 
The matrix thus highlights how some internal positions may have a high degree of 
prominence in relation to some external positions but not to others; this is described 
by Hermans as exemplifying the contextualised nature of the process of positioning. 
Hermans considers the ”dynamic and spatial quality of the process of positioning” 
(Hermans, 2001, p. 330), patterns of positioning will be influenced by interpersonal 
interactions experienced in the individual’s relational history. 
With a capacity to be self-reflective, I-positions are able to make personal evalu-
ations; these in addition can be influenced by societal prescriptions and expectations 
inherent within internalised social positions. Hermans makes a distinction between 
social positions in relations to personal positions, (both are seen as internal positions). 
Social positions are described by Hermans as being equivalent to social roles, these 
roles can be viewed as powerful positions with ability to impact upon and influence 
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personal positions. Although subjected to a degree of evaluation from internal social 
positions, internal personal positions, as stated above, possess the ability to make 
personal evaluations, therefore they can choose to either collude or act in opposition 
to social positions. The matrix facilitates insight into the complex and contextual pat-
terns between noted significant positions. 
Furthermore,  with regards to organisation of the system as a whole, Hermans 
notes the significance of having opposite pairs of positions stating that these are not 
only opposing linguistic structures, but that opposites are essential to the process 
of meaning construction. Therefore, the analysis of ratings and correlations of sig-
nificant positions needs to be evaluated in relation to the ratings and correlations 
of their linguistic opposites concerning social positions. If negative correlations are 
discovered during analysis between personal positions, these personal positions are 
deemed to be in opposition with one being in the foreground of the self-system when 
the other is in the background. Hermans describes the PPR in the following manner. 
So far, the position repertoire is described as a methodological elaboration of 
the spatial nature of the dialogical self. The underlying assumption is that space 
is basic to voice and dialogue and even precedes these capacities, both from an 
ontogenetic and from a phylogenetic point of view. (Hermans, 2001, p. 333)
The earlier notion that narrative structures provide coherence to experience has been 
supplanted by dialogical relationships. However, it seems that Hermans wants to con-
nect the PPR with the earlier formulations underlying the SCM. He constructs a hi-
erarchy of the process of organisation to suggest that I-positions occupy the highest 
level, with valuations, or meaning units occupying the next level, with affect deemed 
to be at the lowest level of organisation. Hermans’ hierarchy of organisation is thus 
defined in the following way.
The I can be located in different positions (highest level) and is able to tell 
from each position, a specific story about the Me belonging to that position, 
thereby expressing different meaning units (middle level), which each have 
their specific affective connotations (lowest level). (Hermans, 2001, p. 337)  
What appears to emerge is a hybrid research methodology utilising Hermans’ earlier 
phenomenologically informed research method with a change to terminology to ac-
knowledge the spatial nature of the dialogical self. 
The position matrix address the multiplicity of self, each author’s and character’s 
voice. However, Hermans concludes that in order to understand the stories and mean-
ing from each relatively autonomous I-position, each position will have a number of 
valuations and meanings unique to their associated Me/s. Once significant positions 
are identified from the position matrix, methodologically there is a return to the for-
mat of the SCM. Open questions are asked to stimulate self-reflection from the per-
spective of each of the significant positions, the aim, in the first instance, is to gather 
a series of personal valuations. Valuations are once again viewed as containers and 
carriers of all that is significant for each position. With a firm hypothesis regarding 
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the multiplicity of self it would seem reasonable to assume that typically most posi-
tions would have somewhere between 20-40 valuations. 
The earlier SCM format of self-evaluation is used in order to rate every valuation 
against a set list of affective terms, following which a matrix is constructed. As be-
fore, the matrix is composed of various indices highlighting scores for positive affect, 
negative affect, self-enhancement motive and desire for contact and union with others 
motive. Data produced during analysis are used to identify possible conflicting posi-
tions, but also to understand that this adversarial aspect may be highly contextual-
ised, as Hermans states, positions cannot be generalised into good guys and bad guys, 
any position can be good or bad depending on the specific situation (Hermans, 2001).
The PPR provides the therapist with information about I-positions and their re-
lationship configurations. Acting as the alter-ego the therapist can use this informa-
tion to influence a dominance shift or reversal enabling meta-positions to facilitate a 
re-organisation of self.   
It may be concluded therefore that it is a combination of the meta-position/s and 
the societal dimension or collective voice available at any given moment that influ-
ence the quality of the linguistic negotiation and degrees of power held by any given 
collection of voices. Within the society of self conceptualised by Hermans, external 
position/s, social position/s and internal position/s all collectively reside in the open 
landscape of the mind. As a new external position, the therapist can act as alter-ego 
by using information gleaned from the PPR to influence the nature of the dialogical 
struggle, from this process new positions can be actualised. Hermans demonstrates 
this using the case of Nancy, a 47 years woman, here a new ”independent position” 
(Hermans, 2001, p. 338) becomes actualised. The therapist as a new external posi-
tion acts as alter-ego/composer working with personal valuations from Nancy’s Child 
Position, the authorial voice of the Child Position tells a tale of ”unbridled desires and 
demands”  (Hermans, 2001, p. 338). The data produced during analysis suggests that in 
the current context the Child Position jeopardises Nancy’s future, this insight results 
in the search for and actualisation of a new position, namely the independent position. 
In summary, the PPR addresses the society of the self (Hermans, 2001), and as 
such, it views the main process of organisation as being primarily related to enabling 
all the voices, or potential voices to be heard within the community. Therefore, new 
actualised positions, alongside their independent valuations are brought into the com-
munity. Positions that are seen to be problematic in relation to functional change 
are brought into the foreground of the system alongside newly actualised positions, 
valuations, now interestingly described as voices, are elicited from each position. 
Dialogue is encouraged with other identified external positions in order to facilitate a 
dominance reversal. However, this raises the question of ”who” is expressing a value 
assessment concerning the referential object of the utterance.  Finally, taking the 
hierarchy into account, as part of the process of organisation and re-organisation, 
Hermans postulates that new positions may become actualised, and under these cir-
cumstances “internal and external positions interact in the innovation of the self” 
(Hermans, 2001, p. 338).
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4.4 VA LUAT I O N S A S R E FE R E N T I A L O B J E C T S O F S H I F T I N G 
I - P O S I T I O N S TO VA LUAT I O N S A S VO I C E S (BA K H T I N I A N 
U T T E R A N C E S)  
It is with the approbation of the Bakhtinian metaphor of the polyphonic novel and 
the introduction of the notion of shifting positions of self-reflection that classic phe-
nomenological understandings become muted and reflection upon intentional ob-
jects becomes clouded. The I-object relationship has now become embedded with 
the voice/s carried by any given I-position/s. This shift seems to occur as Hermans 
focuses on the creative activity of voices in dialogue. Hermans’ particular selection of 
polyphony and translation of Bakhtin’s work that results in him adopting a dialogical 
approach to experience-based enquiry ultimately leads to this movement away from 
classic phenomenological understandings, as the idea of subject object reciprocation 
becomes muted by Hermans’ fascination with relatively autonomous authors and the 
dialogicisation of sleeping characters. 
Hermans is essentially interested at this point in the dialogue of the mind (as an 
open system) with its self. Aligning himself with a Platonic stance, the process of or-
ganised judgement is now given the means by which to voice judgements, Hermans 
(2004) cites the following quote by Blachowicz.  
I have noticed that, when the mind is thinking, it is simply talking to itself, 
asking questions and answering them, and saying yes or no. When it reaches a 
decision – which may come slowly or in a sudden rush – when doubt is over and 
the two voices affirm the same thing, then we call that it judgment. Theaetetus 
189e – 190a; quoted by Blachowicz. (Blachowicz, 1999, p. 184)
However as reflection upon intentional objects has become clouded as these objects 
have  become embedded with the voice/s this is no longer a process of judgment but 
an experience brought about by voices in agreement or disagreement. When reflection 
upon intentional objects becomes clouded in this manner, what remains absent is the 
question of in relation to what or whom, or an indication of the counterposition of the 
object.  Hermans has used Bakhtin’s concept of polyphony to upgrade the concept of 
valuation as an intentional object, taking as his pivotal point Bakhtin’s statements 
with regards to the relationship between the author and the hero “For the author the 
hero is not “he” and not “I” but a full-valued “thou”, that is another full-fledged “I” 
(Bakhtin 1973, p. 53). Bakhtin’s concept of utterance has become aligned with this 
relationship between the author and the hero, and as a result, one person is equated 
as two or more persons in dialogue. 
 Bakhtin maintained the subject object understanding in his theory of utterance; 
the voice expressing the speaker’s semantic position does so in reference to the ref-
erential object of speech. This results in a degree of dissonance between dialogical 
self theory (DST) and the personal position repertoire (PPR).
As Hermans has capitulated theoretically to subject to subject exchange the re-
search methodology outlined within the PPR does not fully achieve a dialogical ex-
change as each position is invited to reflect on its own valuations. Even taking into 
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account the centrifugal aspect of the lover who wants to love which is balanced by 
the centripetal force of the meta-positions in the mind, whilst the ”aboutness” of the 
valuation contained within the utterance may in some way remain identifiable, the ”to 
whom” of the utterances remains eclipsed.             
The hierarchical structure consisting of a superordinate voice, or meta-positions, 
valuations (now seen by Hermans as Bakhtinian utterances) and affect associated 
with the latent and manifest content appear to sum up the referential content of any 
given I-position. Sullivan and McCarthy comment on Hermans’ “attempt to decompose 
the self into constituent self-positions” (Sullivan & McCarthy, 2005, p. 629), I would 
echo this statement but add the caveat that this also extends to Hermans conceptu-
alisation of voice/s.  When one now considers Hermans’ description of valuations as 
voiced utterances of a semi-independent I-position/s and tries to take into account 
the referential content of I-positions, this leaves no room for a postulated interlocutor 
as it were whom the utterance is directed to. Instead the utterance springs forth as, 
metaphorically speaking, a goddess of wisdom (Athena) bursting forth from Zeus’ 
head. The double directedness of Bakhtin’s conceptualisation of utterance has become 
lost as the utterance is solely the creation of the autonomous I-position.  Utterance as 
a triadic relationship between the author, addressee, and referential content remains 
unarticulated in the model. 
Although on a theoretical level within DST I-positions are described as having a 
dialogical relationship to each other there remains the question of the semantic posi-
tion to the referential object.  In the following quote, Bakhtin discusses the necessity 
of the semantic position to the referential object,
In a hidden polemic the author’s word is directed towards its own referen-
tial object, as any words, but now every utterance that refers to the object is 
constructed in such a way that in addition to its object-directed meaning, a 
polemic blow is struck at the alien word referring to the theme, at the other’s 
statement of the same object. The word that is directed towards its object col-
lides with another word within the object. ( Bakhtin, 1984, p. 195)
In a step towards reducing the degree of dissonance between dialogical self theory 
(DST) and the personal position repertoire (PPR), Hermans’ research methodology 
would have to be modified. If the procedure were to focus on one valuation (refer-
ential object) and be revised by requesting that the client now enter into different 
I-positions to formulate their ideas about the selected referential object, perhaps this 
might be achieved by utilising a two, or multiple chair technique. Using this type of 
technique, clients could be instructed to enter into different I-positions in each chair, 
addressing the same valuation (referential object), this would serve the purpose of 
facilitating the externalization of the internal polyvocal dialogue related to the valu-
ation (referential object). 
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5 The Development of Cognitive 
Analytic Therapy
Every heart sings a song, incomplete, until another heart whispers back.
Plato
The first three chapters of this thesis focus on the theoretical and methodological 
transitions made by Hermans as he developed valuation theory into dialogical self 
theory. This led in the concluding chapter, (chapter four), to an emphasis on how 
reflective actions of intentional objects or valuations transformed as Hermans be-
came increasingly absorbed in the relatively autonomous nature of subjective au-
thors and the dialogicisation of sleeping character, to become relatively autonomous 
’I-positions’. In my fourth chapter I will discuss the development of Cognitive Analytic 
Therapy, henceforth CAT by Dr Anthony Ryle. This will present an alternative view 
of the self as this will be required as it is my subsequent aim to distil further the role 
of dialogicality in consciousness and human activity. 
  In the process of addressing the ”forgotten past” of dialogical self theory, in my 
closing remarks, I concluded that in dialogical self theory the intersubjective and re-
ciprocal nature of a truly open and authentic dialogue was lost.   Taking this further 
forward, dialogical self theory does not provide us with a clear conceptual account 
of the intersubjective nature of human consciousness and the intersubjective nature 
of human agency. The primary inspiration for, and theoretical origin of CAT, have 
a different ”forgotten past” to Hermans’ valuation theory. Whereas Hermans began 
by considering self-processes from a dual perspective, Ryle conceptualisation was 
primarily based on the notion of reciprococity, using as its starting point the innate 
object-seeking nature of the human infant and the relational interactions with inter-
nalised objects postulated by object relations theorists.  
In subsequent chapters, namely chapters 6 and 7, I will address the interplay, dur-
ing phased transitions and integrations in CAT between monological approaches and 
dialogical approaches, in addition discuss how CAT, through these transitions, devel-
oped a specific view of intentionality as semiotically mediated subject object recipro-
cation. Following the integration of essentially monological approaches and concepts, 
CAT was later to juxtapose object relations theory to activity theory and in addition, 
formulate an understanding of the impact of semiotics in relation to the development 
and maintenance of human consciousness and intentional activity. However, the first 
task is to provide an overview of the dialogical understanding that developed dur-
ing the first theoretical integration. In this chapter I will therefore confine myself 
to providing a historical overview of the early theoretical development of the CAT 
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model, and reflect how in the inception of integration of Kleinian object relations 
theory with Kelly’s personal construct theory, that CAT, even in its infancy, adopted 
a rudimentary dialogical understanding.  By doing so, CAT adopted a specific stance 
to intentionality as subject object reciprocation. 
5.1 T H E D E V E LO PM E N T O F A N E W A PPR OAC H
Ryle was originally a general practitioner (GP), who later in his career became the 
Director of Sussex University Health Service and went on to become a Consultant 
Psychotherapist at St Thomas’ Hospital in London. 
I have been fortunate in as much as Ryle has been able to provide me with some 
autobiographical information regarding the development of his approach. In the 
course of providing this information, Ryle commented upon the influences inherent 
within his family tradition. In the field of medicine, Ryle’s father, also a physician, 
during the course of his own medical career, developed an interest in the epidemi-
ology of disease. Ryle was to follow in this tradition; however, he was to develop an 
interest in the epidemiology of psychological distress.  
As a family doctor, Ryle commented that it was impossible for him not to begin to 
think in terms of mother-baby and/or husband-wife pairs, this sparked an interest 
in the influence of relationships concerning the development of psychological dis-
tress within his practice population. In addition to the provision of medical care, as a 
family doctor, Ryle provided basic counselling to his patients outside surgery hours. 
Donning this mantle Ryle began to attend lectures and workshops and investigated 
psychological theories. With no previous training in counselling or psychology, Ryle 
had no theoretical template on which to base his conclusions, instead he began to as-
similate concepts and ideas that made sense of his clinical experience. As a humanist 
caretaker for his practice population Ryle’s aim was to develop a psychological ap-
proach that did not involve long-term treatment and the development of an approach 
that was accessible to all.    
Ryle does not view himself as a judicious theory builder; however, on gaining a 
small window into Ryle’s family tradition it becomes impossible not to describe it as 
a tradition based on the questioning and challenging of conventional approaches. 
This is evident not only in his father’s approach to medicine but augmented by the 
work of his uncle, Gilbert Ryle. Gilbert Ryle, a Professor of metaphysical philosophy 
at Oxford who in his own philosophical writing challenged the dogma of Cartesian 
dualism (The Concept of the Mind, Ryle, 1949), Gilbert Ryle was also later to influ-
ence his nephew’s writing. Although Ryle’s uncle Gilbert did not directly influence 
his early work, cradled in this tradition, it is hard not to hear echoes of question and 
challenge to conventional approaches. Ryle states, ”psychoanalysis was a dominant 
cultural force and dominated psychotherapy training and could not be ignored but 
had to be translated before it could be accepted or challenged. Translation exposed it 
confusion.” (email communication from Dr Ryle, 06/06/11) 
Although the primary intent was to treat psychological distress, in order to do so 
a theory was formed, Ryle provided an aperture through which the intersubjective 
nature of human consciousness could begin to be viewed.  
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In retirement, Ryle continues to teach and undertake research. It has been Ryle’s 
aim throughout his career to address the “Tower of Babel” (Ryle, 1982. P. 1) approach 
to psychotherapy and provide a common language for all psychotherapies. 
In an attempt to work towards an effective means to understand the complexities 
of the human condition and human interactions, Ryle tried not to confine himself to 
what he felt were reductionist accounts of models of humanity. Ryle was to adopt a 
social phenomenological position. Through the inception of CAT, Ryle embraced a 
model of humanity that took into account the unique individual interpretation given 
to experience and our perception of the qualities of these experiences, including em-
bodied, emotional, cognitive, cultural and social experiences. In essence, Ryle con-
siders experience in its collective and accumulative entirety. Through mediation of 
our experiences with others, meaning is formed and shaped, Ryle concludes that, 
collectively, all these experiences become internalised. If these experiences remain 
in an unintegrated form, Ryle states that this contributes to restricted and confined 
attentional process and limited or distorted activity that perpetuate or maintain psy-
chological distress. A citation, directly from Ryle articulates this further.
In the first place, one has to recognise the persistence into adult life of el-
ements of these unrespectable feelings, more or less imperfectly concealed 
beneath the later acquired, more ”civilized” values. In the second place, par-
ticular experiences at these early stages, such as privation, the failure of the 
mother or mother-substitute to respond sensitively to needs, or the failure of 
parents to acknowledge and encourage the child’s growing capacity for au-
tonomy may be embedded as unspoken, unrecognised basic assumptions in 
the subsequent scripts organizing the self and relationships. This can lead to 
restrictions on, or distortions of, the means available for the pursuit of ordi-
nary and appropriate life aims. (Ryle, 1982, p. 55)
In order to fully comprehend Ryle’s first theoretical integration one must to some 
degree hold a Janus-like view as it involves a complex nexus of echoes from the past 
with a gaze very much extended towards a future hope for an effective approach to 
psychological distress. However, for the remainder of this chapter, in order to illumi-
nate the gateway to the non-dogmatic stance and innovative approach taken by Ryle 
in his integration of object relations theory and personal construct theory, I must first 
of all confine my gaze to Ryle’s very early work in the 1960s to the late 1970s. 
5.1.1 Overcoming the Demons: An Account of Human Reciprococity
Pertaining to the individual’s unique position in existence, Ryle is primarily con-
cerned with finding an empirical means of studying the meaning of subjective phe-
nomena, especially in relation to interpersonal processes. Pivotal to Ryle’s social phe-
nomenological stance and the psychodynamic influences that permeate his clinical 
work, Ryle retains a focus on the impact of the individual’s infantile experiences in 
relation to his/her adult way of being in the world. With a belief in the idea that all 
psychological theories contain possible areas of relevance, whilst also noting the re-
ductionist tendencies to either focus on behaviour or experience, or indeed divorce 
thinking from feeling, Ryle is keen to retain what he describes as the ”creative impact 
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of psychoanalysis on psychology”, (Ryle, 1975, p. 53). To bring to the fore the quintes-
sential nature of Ryle’s approach, I will employ the well know idiomatic expression of 
”not throwing the baby out with the bath water”. Indeed, the early experience of the 
infant is retained, but Ryle rejects the classic psychoanalytic account of anxiety being 
related to the non-gratification of desires or attacks of the death instincts. Anxiety for 
Ryle is linked to the infants struggle to remain in existence. However, before I provide 
further commentary on Ryle’s translations of psychodynamic thought, I must return 
to address some classic accounts of object relations theory.  
5.1.2 An intrapsychic world of conflict
Sigmund Freud (1856 - 1939), an Austrian neurologist and founder of the psychoana-
lytic school of psychiatry had previously conceptualised an account of the oedipal 
phase of human development, however Melanie Klein (1882 - 1960), an Austrian psy-
choanalyst focused her attention on the pre-oedipal phase of the neonate’s develop-
mental path. Klein describes the main impulses associated with the pre-oedipal phase 
as love, associated with the life instinct and hate associated with the death instinct. 
These innate, biomental forces, named Eros (life instinct) and Thanatos (death in-
stinct in post-Freudian thought) are deemed to be in psychic conflict, and indeed, it is 
this psychic conflict that acts as the creator spiritus to the ego. Klein therefore confines 
her conceptualisation to the internal object representatives of life and death instincts 
by unconscious phantasies.
The intrapsychic system of the neonate, dominated and driven by innate biomen-
tal forces in opposition, when combined with object-relations with an external world 
results in an intrapsychic terrain divided into regions of terror interspersed with 
psychic regions of idealisation. The primary trauma of birth is associated with the 
death instinct (Thanatos); birth is also associated with separation anxiety and a fear 
of annihilation. To further compound these terrors, the physical world, and as a liv-
ing organism, the physiological requirements associated with maintaining life, all 
serve to further frustrate and terrorise the neonate. The experience of gratification 
and non-gratification are linked to the phantasy laden aspects of objects in the world. 
Klein concludes,
I have often expressed my view that object-relations exist from the beginning 
of life, the first object being the mother’s breast which to the child becomes 
split into a good (gratifying) and bad (frustrating) breast; this splitting results 
in a severance of love and hate. I have further suggested that the relation to the 
first object implies its introjection and projection, and thus from the beginning 
object-relations are moulded by an interaction between introjection and pro-
jection, between internal and external objects and situations (Klein, 1946, p. 2)
Conceptualised as a separate and distinct entity in the world, the human infant, tor-
mented by innate primordial fear strives to achieve psychic survival. Classic Kleinian 
depiction of the infant’s internal world is as Klein states, of a phantastical nature. 
On reading Klein’s own account it becomes difficult not to find one’s self drawing 
an analogy with Milton’s description of hell, where it is from ”the secrets of the hoary 
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deep” (Milton, 1667, p. 95) that the ”ancestors of nature” (Milton, 1667, p. 95) lie. For in-
deed, the infant’s early internal world is postulated as a chaotic and somewhat hellish 
psychotic terrain that the infant has to negotiate by primitive defences and protective 
mechanisms of splitting and projection. In addition, Klein endows the neonate with 
metaphysical sadism, thus making the negotiation even more challenging, due to the 
unconscious wish to spoil or destroy the good objects. It is thus the confluence of object 
relations and the phantasies of sadistic attack, resulting in repeated cycles of projection 
and introjections that eventually animate human consciousness enabling elaboration 
and further differentiation to occur. ”Introjection and projection are from the beginning 
of life also used in the service of this primary aim of the ego”(Klein, 1946, p. 6)
Klein called the very early stage, where infants are subjected to splitting of in-
ternalised objects and disintegration of the ego, the paranoid position. Later, influ-
enced by Fairbairn’s account of schizoid mechanisms in the personality, she adopted 
the term paranoid-schizoid (Klein, 1946). Eventually, forms of external gratification, 
when available, result in the paranoid-schizoid state being transitory. Klein deems the 
availability of external gratification necessary for normal development alongside suf-
ficient ego strength to enable the eventual assimilation of objects. However, the cycle 
of projection and introjections, where splitting of the object and fragmentation of the 
ego persist, can have an accumulative damaging impact preventing the infant mov-
ing from the paranoid-schizoid position to what Klein calls the depressive position. 
As stated earlier in the text, the paranoid-schizoid position is indeed creator spri-
tus of the ego and superego. As the ego develops and becomes stronger, it results in an 
expansion of infantile phantasies creating new defences that are more sophisticated. 
It is here we witness a shifting position of agency. With the availability of external 
forms of gratification and increasing ego strength, the infant is gradually able to in-
crease their tolerance to feelings of ambivalence. This initiates a subsequent shift in 
sense of agency and thus the infant’s sense of agency expands. An appreciation of the 
border between the internal and external object world comes into existence. This re-
sults in a radical modification to the nature of anxiety and, accordingly, the defences. 
Instead of being subject to persecutory anxieties, as in the paranoid-schizoid posi-
tion, the infant becomes capable of experiencing separation anxiety. Feelings of guilt 
and wishes to repair coincide with the growing sense of agency. All this makes the 
depressive position a specific developmental phase. On successfully working through 
these positions, Klein states:
Thus the foundations for normal development are laid; relations to people 
develop, persecutory anxiety relating to internal objects become more firmly 
established, a feeling of greater security ensues, and all this strengthens and 
enriches the ego. The stronger and more coherent the ego, although it makes 
much use of manic defence, again and again brings together and synthesises 
the split off aspects of the object and of the self. Gradually the processes of 
splitting and synthesising are applied to aspects kept less widely apart from 
one another; perception of reality increases and objects appear in more real-
istic light. All these developments lead to a growing adaptation to external and 
internal reality. (Klein, 1952, p. 75)
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In the quotation above, Klein mentions the mediating role of the manic defence 
in preserving the strength of the ego. As a combination of denial and idealisation, it 
is mainly used to protect the infant from the feelings of grief and emptiness that the 
possibility of an external object loss entails. Manic defences also create an illusory 
sense of self-sufficiency to ease the dangers of dependence that a growing sense of 
differentiation generates.
5.1.3 A need to remain in existence: A further extension of object rela-
tions 
As stated earlier, anxiety for Ryle is linked to the infant’s struggle to remain in exist-
ence. To be in existence the human infant requires an awareness of the external world 
plus an ability to perceive their internal experiences. Ryle’s position concurs with 
that of Dr William Ronald Dodds Fairbairn (1889 - 1964), a Scottish psychoanalyst. 
Fairbairn was concerned with infant development and formation of the structure of 
mental apparatus. Dissatisfied with mechanistic and biological accounts proffered by 
Freud, Fairbairn postulated his own theory of endopsychic structure and revised the 
Freudian concept of libido. Influenced by Klein, who first conceptualised the infant’s 
development in terms of internal object relationships, Fairbairn was to challenge 
Freud’s libido theory. Persuaded by Kleinian ideas on the object seeking nature of 
infants, Fairbairn was to conceptualise the “the object-seeking principle” (Fairbairn, 
1955). Fairbairn however does not confine the object-seeking nature of the infant to 
Klein’s internal objects associated with life and death instincts.
In the quote that follows from Fairbairn, the primary nature of both object-seeking 
and relational interactions with internalised objects is articulated with the object-
seeking nature deemed the primary aim, with pleasure-seeking now relegated to a 
secondary aim.
Explicit pleasure-seeking, [that is],..the relieving of...tension...for the mere 
sake of relieving this tension,...does, of course, occur commonly enough; but 
since libidinal need is object-need, simple tension-relieving implies some fail-
ure of object-relationships. The fact is that simple tension-relieving is really a 
safety-valve process. It is thus, not a means of achieving libidinal aims, but a 
means of mitigating the failure of these aims. (Fairbairn, 1952, p. 33) 
Moreover; in opposition to classic Freudian accounts Fairbairn articulates a relation-
ship between internalised objects and defines distinct and separate egos. In addition 
to articulating a relationship between internalised objects, Fairbairn also describes a 
relationship between the central ego (the ’I’), the libidinal ego and the aggressive ego 
(the internal saboteur). Fairbairn does not conform to the duality in Freud’s account, 
biomental forces are not singular and separate phenomena but rather, ”impulses” and 
”instincts” arise out of object relationships. Fairbairn states,
In a word ’impulses’ cannot be considered apart from endopsychic structures 
which they energize and the object-relationships, which they enable these 
structures to establish; and, equally, ’instincts’ cannot profitably be consid-
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ered as anything more than forms of energy which constitute the dynamic of 
such endopsychic structure. (Fairbairn,1952, p. 85)
  
Fairbairn concludes that on entering the world, the infant is in the first instance 
unable to distinguish itself as a separate being in existence. This primary identifica-
tion with objects, at this stage of development, results in feeling both satisfied and 
frustrated, depending on how the actual object meets the infant’s total dependency. 
When dependency needs are not met, the infant, being unable to distinguish itself as a 
separate being in existence experiences an existential crisis. To be extant and prevail, 
the infant must internalise the object that fails to satisfy its needs, thus the frustrat-
ing object enters the infant’s internal world. An internal world, first of all populated 
by bad objects that attack the ego/s then result in a need for the infant to internalise 
good objects to protect and defend the ego/s. Consequently, these satisfying objects, 
with an inherent ability to defend and protect become loved and desired. Due to the 
high dependency of the human infant at this stage of development, in its struggle to 
remain in existence, the infant forms a devoted allegiance to the satisfying objects.  
The dichotomous position that occurs during the dependence stage transforms as 
the infant enters the quasi independent stage where each internalised object splits to 
become two, one of which becomes the accepted object, the second becoming the re-
jected object. With the final phase of development, the infant can then reach a mature 
dependence with the ability of self-other differentiation. Developmentally, through 
these stages everything encountered by the infant is seen in terms of objects or part 
objects leading eventually to self-other differentiation.1 
The configuration of Fairbairnian endopsychic structures consists of a central, ob-
serving ego, this relates to a libidinal ego whose position is mediated by the exciting, 
desired object/s. In addition, the aggressive ego (or the internal saboteur), is medi-
ated by the rejecting object/s, which also relates to the central ego and libidinal ego. 
Fairbairn views all egos and their mediating objects as essentially operating in the 
unconscious, however the central ego transcends the unconscious having an ability to 
operate in pre-conscious and conscious realms.  In order to develop a conscious sense 
of self as a distinct and separate being in existence, the infant goes through repeated 
cycles of projection and introjections before they finally, internalise the objects of the 
external world. 
In the Fairbairnian reconfiguration of libido theory not only does this address the 
dualism in Freud’s early account, but in addition the id, (and indeed the paranoid-
schizoid position in Kleinian terms) is no longer seen as creator spritus. The central 
ego is the nidus out of which the other endopsychic structures are formed, these ad-
ditional endopsychic structures whilst not the primary structures are dynamic struc-
tures comparable with the central ego.
1 In the process of developing Freud’s libido theory through an object relations lens, Fairbairn also 
questioned Freud’s construction of the Oedipus complex. In Fairbairnian terms, the Oedipus situation 
arises in object relations. In the first instance, in relation to devotion to the loved object that in the quasi 
independent state becomes split, the infant has internalised objects in relation to both parents that are 
deemed to be loved and hated. This ambivalence is intolerable, and developmentally further splitting 
results in the infant equating one parental object with devotion, the other with rejection. 
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The object-seeking nature of the human infant, as conceptualised by Fairbairn, 
seems to be pivotal in Ryle’s first theoretical integration. This pivotal point, contain-
ing both object-seeking and object-relations results in the hypothesis that the human 
infant seeks reciprocation, with there being an inherent need for a reciprocal action 
in order to develop a sense of the self. 
Ryle seems to adopt the Fairbairnian reformulation of Kleinian object relations as 
the initiator of the infant’s internal world. Ryle comments that,
To grow from his early split relationship with the mother, the infant must 
abandon the fantasy of the ever-present good mother, and accept the mixed 
feelings implicit in this abandonment. Through his recognition of his mother 
separateness, he also achieves his own separation; this is the depressive posi-
tion as described by Klein. (Ryle, 1975 p. 55).
Adopting a social phenomenological position, Ryle was also influenced by the work 
of Harry Guntrip (1901 - 1975), an English psychologist who elaborated Fairbairn’s 
views. Guntrip held the view that in addition to the internalisation of external objects 
and the splitting of these objects, that distinctions of the self were associated with and 
formed within a social context. Therefore, for normal development to occur the social 
environment has also to contain objects of beneficence. Theoretically, Ryle is atten-
tive to the development of the distinctions of self, the social context in which the self 
develops is seen to be axiomatic to Ryle’s theoretical integration.  Ryle’s position is one 
where he concludes that all experience between the external world and the internal 
world, between distinctions of self and other are of significance.
It is therefore the theoretical conceptual extension of classic psychoanalytic thought 
and object relations that are of interest to Ryle.  Ryle’s ideas converge with Fairbairn as 
the architect of the extension of the object seeking nature of infants, and with Guntrip 
who describes the development of self within a social context. These extensions of clas-
sic psychoanalytic thought were to be reformulated further by using object relations 
notions to inform, what Ryle called common sense psychology (Ryle, 1975).  
5. 2 A CO M M O N P S YC H O LO G Y A PPR OAC H TO O B J E C T 
R E L AT I O N S
As stated earlier, it is not the Kleinian concept of anxiety associated with unconscious 
phantasies that Ryle maintains, but he recognises the value of reversible internal 
patterns associated with splitting and part objects, and moreover this process as the 
origin of distinctions of the self and genesis of how interpersonal phenomena shape 
human behaviour.  The kernel maintained by Ryle of object relations theory in many 
ways can be seen to be the source of inspiration for both the first, Kellyian and the 
later cognitive integrations. This is captured in the following quote from Ryle.
This process is the origin of discrimination but, if retained in this crude form, 
provides the basis for part object-relationships identified in later life. In these, 
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the individual seeks to reconstitute the pattern laid down by the early split, 
with the self variably deployed in the roles of needy baby, destructive baby, 
good mother, or depriving, attacking mother, and the other selected or induced 
to fulfil the appropriate reciprocal role. Out of this inner drama between part 
objects, comes the neurotic repetition-compulsion in which a series of stereo-
typic ’bit parts’ are played over again, reflecting the primitive patterning of 
split relationships in his inner world. (Ryle, 1975 p. 55).
Rather than internalised objects or part objects acting as homunculi, driven and mo-
tivated by innate biological drives, Ryle’s focus is directed upon the relational nature 
and interpersonal processes associated with the infant’s experience. In his paper, 
”Self-to-Self, Self-to-Other”, (Ryle, 1975), Ryle discusses concepts associated with 
common-sense psychology, rephrasing part objects and splitting. Within a common-
sense psychology approach, the self is seen as having an ability for one aspect of the 
self to relate, and through the process of relating, engage in some form of action or 
’doing to’ the other part. This is defined by Ryle as being to some degree a divided self. 
Reversible roles are devolved from both the providing and depriving aspects of 
the internalised objects. With a focus directed towards interpersonal processes, Ryle 
hypothesises ”parental bits” (Ryle, 1975, p. 12) and ”child bits” (Ryle, 1975, p. 12). These 
become internalised as a range of parent-child role reciprocations where interper-
sonal phenomena has been internalised to become intrapersonal phenomena influ-
encing the activity of the internal world. Now relational experiences, as intrapersonal 
processes, influence the ability of any given individual to care for or neglect them 
selves, this depends upon the perceived nature of these internalised part objects and 
the perceived nature of the splitting of these part objects. Therefore, central to the 
concept of reciprocal roles, in this paper Ryle reflects on a concept with its roots very 
much in objects relations theory, of dual images of the parent. In this account, there 
is a nascent description of a dynamic, dialogically constructed self, derived from the 
conception of partial objects and splitting. Holding dual images, both the good and bad 
internalised aspects of the parents is retained and thus shapes relationally motivated 
behaviour with others and toward oneself.  
During the first integration, Ryle does not question the idea of object relations 
theory that the bad aspects of the internalised other are projected outwards, Ryle 
utilises this aspect to suggest the idea that seemingly unacceptable aspects of the 
self remain to some degree unacknowledged by the conscious self. As in psychoana-
lytic thought there is a degree of dissociation between conscious and unconscious 
processes, for Ryle there can be a corresponding degree of dissociation between bit 
parts reciprocations. Here, psychoanalytic concepts, when combined with common 
sense psychology provide a further abstraction to the concept of a divided or multiple 
self. This provides a means for Ryle to account for the complications associated with 
a divided self.  Furthermore, by reconceptualising these dissociated aspects Ryle taps 
into an inchoate account of polyphony. Ryle states, 
If we understand these complicating factors, we can see that the person whose 
interpersonal behaviour is dominated by relationships of these inner parent 
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bits and child bits is in a complex trap. It is not that he has to recapitulate over 
and over again the exact parent-child relationship which predominates in his 
internal relationship with himself, but he is restricted to being (in the exam-
ple we have been considering) at one or other pole of a ’neglecting parent-
neglected child’ of a ’dependable adult-dependent child’ relationship, and is 
forced to get others to play one or other of these reciprocal roles with him. 
(Ryle, 1975, pp. 12-13) 
These conceptualisations inform Ryle’s clinical practice as he emphasises the need for 
the therapist to pay attention to the client’s transference invitations to play or enact 
the split-off bit parts. By bringing these bit parts into conscious awareness, this is 
seen as a means of illuminating self-limiting patterns of behaviour.  These bit parts 
have become dissociated in the first instance as this is seen as a means of reducing 
the conflict associated with potentially opposing aims linked to the parental bits or 
the child bits. Describing self as a multiplicity, Ryle comments that,
This central self is never entirely dominated by these remnants, and in most 
people  it is sufficiently strong for individuals to get free from these patterns 
imposed in childhood in the course of ordinary life and relationships; but 
where the central self is too weak or too beleaguered, the professional, by re-
sponding in the light of this amplified version of common-sense psychology, 
can be of crucial importance. (Ryle, 1975 p. 13)  
To understand why this may be the case for most people, but not for all people and 
articulate further Ryle’s conceptualisation of psychological distress, I will reiterate 
Ryle’s adoption of the Fairbairnian reformulation of Kleinian object relations, for 
it is this reformulation that is central to the question. In Fairbairn’s account, the 
libidinal ego and the internal saboteur are dynamic structures comparable to the 
central ego. It is a question of the degree of attachment that the libidinal ego and 
the internal saboteur have to their respective objects that in Fairbairnian terms 
address the question of the phenomenon of repression.  An inherent feature of the 
endopsychic structures is the relentless aggressive attitude taken by the internal 
saboteur towards the libidinal ego and its exciting object. This is explicated further 
by a direct quote from Fairbairn.
The truth is that, however well the fact may be disguised, the individual is 
extremely reluctant to abandon his original hate, no less than his original 
need, of his original objects in childhood. This holds particularly true of psy-
choneurotic and psychotic individuals, not to mention those who fall into the 
category of psychopathic personality. (Fairbairn, 1952, pp. 117 - 118)
Ryle concurs with Fairbairn’s concept of the phenomenon of infantile dependence, but 
in addition, along the developmental trajectory of central importance to Ryle is the 
nature of the interpersonal relationships experienced. When needs are unmet during 
this developmental trajectory, in whatever form, aspects of these experiences remain 
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unintegrated. Therefore the ongoing vicissitudes between parental bits and child bits 
when remaining in an unintegrated form can and do beleaguer the central self. 
The above in many ways bears witness to Ryle’s amalgamation of Kleinian ob-
ject relations and Fairbairn’s object-seeking principle and endopsychic structure 
(Fairbairn, 1955). Here, in the first integration there is movement away from a bio-
logically orientated understanding of psychological phenomena.  Here we see Ryle’s 
nascent understanding of intersubjectivity as the foundation block of human con-
sciousness. 
Now, Ryle is reframing a number of psychoanalytic concepts, and very much a sig-
nificant aspect of this reframing involves Ryle’s use of Kelly’s repertory grid method. 
This returns us to my earlier statement of finding an empirical means of studying 
subjective phenomena.
5. 3 T H E B E G I N N I N G O F T H E J O U R N E Y FR O M O B J E C T 
R E L AT I O N S TO T H E R E A L I SAT I O N O F O B J E C T I V E S 
The catalyst for Ryle’s first theoretical integration and source of fecundity for sub-
sequent integrations can be directly attributed to Ryle’s desire to study systemati-
cally subjective phenomena, framed at that time in object relations terms. In search 
for a research method, Ryle was drawn to the work of George Kelly (1905 - 1967), 
an American professor of psychology and educator. With a mindful awareness that 
all psychological theories contain something of relevance, Ryle was to utilise Kelly’s 
personal construct theory of personality with its scientific approach to subjectivity 
to empirically investigate psychoanalytic concepts. This empirical examination of 
psychoanalysis not only adopted a stance whereby the observer’s frame of reference 
was not the phenomena under investigation, studies undertaken by Ryle also resulted 
in theoretical integration, through integration new elements and nuances came to the 
fore. Ryle comments,
If personal construct theory is to fulfil this bridging role, I believe it has to 
come to terms much more fully than is now the case with the ways in which 
man is ’not altogether master of his fate’ and this means taking account of con-
tributions from both behaviourism and psychoanalysis. The challenge of psy-
choanalysis is, I believe, the larger one; psychoanalysis alone has an adequate 
approach to the task of understanding man’s personal history and personal 
creativity”.....This book, of course is not concerned with the ultimate clash or 
marriage between the theories, so much as with attempts at cross-fertilization 
at the level of detailed studies of individual cases. (Ryle, 1975 pp. 22 - 23). 
Drawing an analogy with the spagyric art of alchemy, we must first comprehend the 
base elements before addressing the transformation, or indeed cross-fertilization. In 
order to do so, I will provide an account of Kelly’s theory of personal constructs and, 
in addition, a description of the repertory grid methodology before discussing Ryle’s 
modification of Kelly’s repertory grid method.
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5.3.1 The dichotomous nature of thinking
In essence, Kelly’s personal construct theory provides a theoretical foundation for the 
conceptualisation of the cognitive processes of human beings as anticipatory agents. 
Adopting a constructivist position and combining this with a positivistic scientific 
stance, Kelly was to integrate Immanuel Kant’s (1724 - 1804) philosophical concepts 
with Hans Vaihinger (1852 - 1933), a Neo-Kantian German philosopher’s descrip-
tion of man’s hypothetical stance to reality, the ”as if” (Vaihinger, 1924) position. By 
integrating these philosophical ideas, Kelly was to postulate a theory of human ex-
periencing described as ”constructive alternativism” (Kelly, 1955, p. 3). Overcoming 
concretistic notions and classifications Kelly described human beings in terms of 
”man-the-scientist” (Kelly, 1955, p. 4). Thus, man was deemed an active being with an 
inherent ability to extract representations from the universe and to test those repre-
sentations against the reality of the universe. Motivated by predictive efficiency, Kelly 
articulates his description of constructive alternativism.
We take the stand that there are always some alternative constructions avail-
able to choose among in dealing with the world. No one needs to paint himself 
into a corner; no one needs to be completely hemmed in by circumstances; no 
one needs to be a victim of his biography. We call this philosophical position 
constructive alternativism. (Kelly 1955, p 15)
Kelly postulates that knowledge is acquired when a human subject is able to adopt the 
stance of a scientist and form hypotheses about the world they occupy. Indeed this 
scientific curiosity enables humanity to view freewill and determinism as inseparable 
aspects. 
Determinism and freedom are then inseparable, for that which determines 
another is, by the same token, free of the other. Determinism and freedom are 
opposite sides of the same coin - two aspects of the same relationship. (Kelly 
1955, p. 21)
Within personal construct theory, Kelly adopts what he describes as a ”fundamental 
postulate” (Kelly 1955, p. 46), by adopting this postulate Kelly is not required to con-
ceptualise an account of mental energy, movement is seen as the primary phenomena 
rather than being conceptualised as an epiphenomena. The fundamental postulate is 
defined as ”a person’s processes are psychologically channelized by the ways in which 
he anticipates events” (Kelly, 1955, p. 46).  
By adopting a scientific, and somewhat tautological stance, Kelly states that ”thus 
in scientific reasoning nothing antecedes the postulate”, (Kelly, 1955, p. 47). He takes 
as an axiom, a philosophical understanding that one must apply a certain veracity ”or 
ad interim statement of truth” (Kelly, 1955, p. 47) to the fundamental postulate.  Rather 
than conceptualizing an account of mental energy, within the fundamental postulate 
a second axiom is the pre-existence of some form of mental energy. Kelly’s primary 
concern is with the individual and the kinetic nature associated with the essence of 
being. Being is defined as a pure phenomenon, Kelly does not attempt to define being in 
terms of a biological or social phenomena and indeed uses psychology to conceptualize 
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”a person’s processes are what they are; and psychology, physiology, or what have you, 
are simply systems concocted for trying to anticipate them” (Kelly, 1955, p. 48). Kelly is 
therefore trying to apply a systemic understanding to subjective phenomena. 
Following a Euclidean path, Kelly presents these self-evident axioms to form a 
starting point from which further propositions arise leading to a hypothesis of the 
human mind as geometry of psychological space. Constructs are hypothesised as pos-
sessing a motion-form, the system as a whole has a directional aspect. In order to 
comprehend this directional aspect Kelly discussed the bi-polar nature of thinking. 
All constructs are assumed to be bi-polar in nature and become meaningful as ele-
ments are measured against aspects of similarity and contrast. This is where Kelly 
departs from classic logic, defining an intentional logic. Kelly proposes the idea that, 
Constructs are the channels in which one’s mental processes run. They are 
two-way streets along which one may travel to reach conclusions. They make it 
possible to anticipate the changing tides of events. For the reader who is more 
comfortable with teleological terms it may be helpful to say that constructs are 
the controls that one places upon life - the life within him as well as the life 
which is external to him. Forming constructs may be considered as binding 
sets of events into convenient bundles which are handy for the person who 
has to lug them. Events, so bound, tend to become predictable, manageable 
and controlled. (Kelly 1955, p. 126)
Kelly’s whole theory contains and is built upon the language of science; in his intro-
duction to personal construct theory Kelly states,
In this new way of thinking about psychology, there is no learning, no motiva-
tion, no emotion, no cognition, no stimulus, no response, no ego, no unconscious, 
no need, no reinforcement, no drive. It is not only that these terms are aban-
doned; what is more important, the concepts themselves evaporate. (Original 
italics). (Kelly 1955, p. xi).  
It is the dimensional/bi-polar nature of thinking postulated by Kelly, around which 
the repertory grid is structured, that in essence forms the innovative element. The 
repertory grid highlights both the current constructs, but in addition, also identifies 
perceived alternative constructs.
The Kellyian construct of the bi-polar nature of thinking appears to reinforce yet 
again Ryle’s amalgamation of Kleinian object relations. There would appear to be a 
parallel between the neonates psychotic intrapsychic split between idealised grati-
fication and non-gratification, in Kleinian thought this becomes the creator spiritus, 
for Kelly it is as stated above, the innovative element.
5.3.2 Abstraction of events
Kelly is seeking to understand subjective phenomena, there is recognition of an inner 
world, a world where man becomes his own mediator. Rather than adhere to the no-
tion of human behaviour as a direct result of the impact of inert objects in a stimulus-
response loop accessible to study through observation, Kelly is interested in ”seeking 
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out the regnant construct system in order to explain the behaviour of men” (Kelly 1955, 
p. 83). Kelly’s position coincides with that of William James where human consciousness 
is regarded as a function rather than a separate and distinct entity. Drawing on James 
conceptualisation of the self as having no ontological origin per se, Kelly concluded that 
in order to understand the geometry of the mind one has to map the terrain through 
which it flows. In order to map this terrain Kelly also concludes, as Windelband did 
before him, that an idiographic-nomothetic distinction was necessary.
In order to achieve an idiographic-nomothetic distinction in his own research 
methodology Kelly considers human behaviour, not in terms of quantitative predic-
tions but of ”abstraction or regnant construct of those behaviours” (Kelly 1955, p. 84). 
Repertory grids, as a research methodology enable a binary mathematical analysis 
of personal and interpersonal systems of meaning. Constructs are channels through 
which psychological processes can be extracted. Hence, Kelly is able to use nomothetic 
devices for idiographic purposes to study individual, subjective phenomena. 
Providing a very basic description, the repertory grid contains four aspects. The 
repertory grid will have a particular focus or topic, this will be related to a specific set 
of comparable elements associated with the topic. In turn, the elements will be associ-
ated with a set of constructs that make sense of the elements. Finally, the grid will rate 
the relationship between elements and sets of constructs. It will be the comparison 
of these relationships between elements and sets of constructs through which data 
can be expressed in a mathematical form. The grid is formed by placing the named 
elements in rows against the elicited constructs that are placed in columns. Each ele-
ment can then be rated, using a point scale as most alike, or applicable to a particular 
construct in relation to most unlike that particular construct. 
Originally named the role construct repertory test, repertory grids were used to 
elicit constructs in relation to emotionally significant others. This form of testing re-
quired at least three significant others. Within a triad formation, constructs could be 
elicited with regards to how one significant other was either similar to or contrasted 
with the other individual selected. Within a system containing both personal and sub-
sumed constructs, this research method was a means of articulating the individual’s 
constructs and perceived possible alternative constructs.
5.3.3 Kelly’s concept of roles 
To comprehend Ryle’s first integration an understanding must also be formed around 
Kelly’s concept of roles, for it is here that Ryle deftly undertakes a weft and weave 
approach to theory building. Kelly describes his concept of role as a course of activity, 
it is around this conceptualisation of activity that for Ryle personal construct theory 
and object relations theory have a point of convergence.
In order to live as social beings Kelly concludes that we must be able to access 
or subsume other individual’s constructs, we must have an ability to predict others 
behaviour. This aspect is addressed in Kelly’s ”sociality corollary”(Kelly 1955, p. 95). 
The ability to predict to some degree the behaviour of the other is central to Kelly’s 
concept of man as an active agent. The ability to subsume the other’s constructs and 
abstract a higher level of generality enables the individual to develop a particular role 
in relation to the other. In Kellyian terms, 
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A role is a psychological process based upon the role player’s construction of 
aspects of the construction systems of those whom he attempts to join in a so-
cial enterprise. In less precise but more familiar language, a role is an ongoing 
pattern of behaviour that follows from a person’s understanding of how others 
who are associated with him in his task think. In idiomatic language, a role 
is a position that one can play on a certain team without even waiting for the 
signals. (Kelly 1955, pp. 97 - 98).
When examined from a social phenomenological position, Kelly’s description of the 
sociality corollary, with its account of the impact of the other on the motion-form of 
the construct system (due to the effect of subsumed constructs), Kelly recognises the 
role of the other in the individual’s psychological struggle. It is indeed the Kellyian 
conceptualisation of ”role” (Kelly 1955, p. 95) that is to be of immense consequence in 
Ryle’s extension of Fairbairn’s conceptualisation of the object seeking nature of the hu-
man infant. To set the scene, in order to understand the magnitude of this theoretical 
conceptualisation on Ryle’s cross-fertilization, a lengthy quote from Kelly is required.  
Now, let us consider the case of the person who is construed by his neighbour 
in such a way that he is always expected to do certain things. Whenever he fails 
to perform according to their expectations he finds them acting as if he had 
threatened them. He has. Now he may start to fancy himself as an unpredictable 
person - unpredictable, that is, for other people. In that case he may go right on 
shocking the neighbours. His conceptualization of himself, at the same time, is 
markedly affected. In order to maintain his pose he may have to construe him-
self as a ”shocking” person. Thus, even though he rejects the expectancies of his 
neighbours as being invalid, he has had to construe himself in relation to those 
expectancies and has had to bring his behaviour under the reign of constructs 
which are carefully validated in reverse of his neighbours’ expectancies.
This kind of perverse conformity can frequently be observed in children. 
A child attempts to establish himself in relation to his parents. He may do this 
by being negativistic. Yet, in order to be consistently negativistic, he must see 
the world the way his parents see it. Only by doing so can he be sure to place 
himself at the contrast pole of each of their constructs. He winds up using the 
very same dimensional system his parents use. (Kelly 1955, p. 177)
Ryle’s conceptualisation echoes Kelly’s understanding of roles as a psychological pro-
cess, however whilst there are parallels, Ryle utilises object relations theory to con-
clude that there is always a reciprocal position in relation to any given role. Ryle states,
Much interaction is structured in ways which lead to predictability and a nar-
rowing of attention; for example in being a traveller to a ticket-collector, a 
shopper to a fishmonger, or a patient to a doctor, we regard the other, and 
expect to be regarded by the other, largely in terms defined by the reciprocal 
roles. (Ryle, 1975, p. 12)
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This distinction above developed from Ryle’s use and modification of Kelly’s reper-
tory grid technique by adopting reciprocal roles as elements. Although addressed in 
theory by Kelly in the above quotation the position of the other is essentially absent 
in his repertory grid technique. However with his modification, Ryle is able to utilise 
the dyadic grid technique to capture and make explicit the constructs of the other, 
thus defining a reciprocal position. 
5.4 RY L E ’S U S E O F K E L LY’S R E PE R TO RY G R I D T E C H N I Q U E
With an interest in empirically investigating subjective phenomena, especially in 
relation to interpersonal processes, one of Ryle’s early papers takes as its starting 
point the thesis set out by Maddison and Mackey (1966). In this paper, Maddison and 
Mackey (1966) undertake a study of the intrapsychic world of patients who attempt 
suicide, they discuss the ambivalently bound symbiotic relationships found to be part 
of the patient’s relationship repertoire.  In his paper, ”A Repertory Grid Study of the 
Meaning and Consequences of a Suicidal Act” (1967), Ryle applies the repertory grid 
technique to investigate the dyadic relationship of a 19 year old university student 
with her boyfriend. This young woman, with no previous history of psychological 
instability, had attempted suicide on the two occasions when left by her boyfriend. 
Investigating the dyadic relationship, both individuals were tested with the 19-year-
old woman’s first test being undertaken 10 days after her suicide bid.  Elements in the 
test were significant people in both partner’s nuclear and extended families. 
Ryle concludes that the repertory grid test provides an explanation of the intra-
psychic origins of the couple’s attraction towards each other, even although on the 
surface this appears to be a less than a satisfactory relationship for both parties. Ryle 
is also able to account for the interpersonal dynamic that contributed to the suicide 
bid. Moreover, the repertory grid technique is used to test predictions regarding the 
outcome of therapy.
In order to enhance the capacity of the repertory grid to focus on subjective phe-
nomena and interpersonal processes, Ryle produces a modified version of Kelly’s reper-
tory grid, calling this modified version a dyad grid (Ryle & Lunghi, 1970). The elements 
of the grid are no longer individuals, it is the relationship between pairs of individuals 
that Ryle directs his focus to, particularly those pairing ”likely to be of psychodynamic 
interest, e.g.  mother and father” (Ryle & Lunghi, 1970, p. 323). Ryle states that,
The main difference from the usual form of testing is seen when elements 
are displayed in terms of two principal components. The procedure displays 
how a given element may be construed differently in different relationships. 
Individuals will appear as both subject and object in each dyad, and the rela-
tive positions of reciprocal elements, i.e. John to Jill in relation to Jill to John, 
provides an indication of the reciprocal role relationship between them as 
perceived by the subject. (Ryle & Lunghi, 1970, p. 325)
Kelly’s research tool, following Ryle’s modification, essentially provides formulations 
of a quintessentially object relations nature. These include the structure and activity 
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of the inner object world plus the splitting of objects i.e. as dissociated, internalised 
object relations. It is now that we essentially witness the inception of a new paradigm 
of psychotherapy that was to later be named Cognitive Analytic Therapy. 
In his account of ”Frames and Cages: The Repertory Grid Approach to Human 
Understanding” (Ryle, 1975), Ryle, in his closing statement acknowledges the con-
tribution made by Kelly describing the repertory grid technique as a window to the 
self. By modifying the repertory grid technique to the dyad grid Ryle produces an 
idiographic-nomothetic research instrument where reciprocal relationships become 
the objects of deliberate self-reflection. Kelly’s concept of roles, when viewed through 
an object relations lens transforms into an intrapersonal phenomenon shaping human 
behaviour. The biography of the individual is not discarded, taking a social phenome-
nological stance Ryle is able to achieve cross-fertilization between personal construct 
theory and object relationships theory, psychoanalytic phenomena are lifted from 
biological and mechanistic accounts into a contextual framework.
5. 5 T H E E VO LU T I O N O F A N E W T H E O R E T I C A L M O D E L
In his critique of personal construct theory Ryle discusses certain phenomena such 
as ambivalence, repression and dissociation, which Ryle considers to be poorly ar-
ticulated within personal construct theory. In addition, the belief that the individual 
can be disengaged from their former experience is, in essence, the point of theoretical 
departure for Ryle. In a brief critique of Kelly, Ryle states,
His neglect of the social basis of language and of learning, his lack of atten-
tion to the developmental processes and his dismissal or incomprehension 
of phenomenology and of psychoanalysis (discussed by Holland 1970) are all 
evidence of limitations which cannot be ignored.(Ryle, 1975, p. 21)
In object relations theory these aspects are articulated, however, the biological and 
mechanistic account provided by object relations theory does not resonate with Ryle’s 
rejection of classic psychoanalytic accounts of anxiety being related to the non grati-
fication of desires. Identifying with Fairbairn, anxiety for Ryle is linked to the in-
fant’s struggle to remain in existence. Ryle retains Fairbairn’s conceptualisation of 
the object seeking nature of the infant, whilst at the same time placing theoretical 
value on the psychoanalytic concept of splitting. Splitting involves repeated cycles 
of projection and introjection of objects and part objects, when integrated with the 
Kellyian conceptualisation of the dichotomous/bi-polar nature of thinking, Ryle is 
able to articulate human ambivalence, repression and dissociation to form a new 
model. Through integration with object relations theory Ryle is able to articulate the 
activity of the inner object world in Kellyian terms.
Taking as a foundation stone Kleinian object relations, which contains an element 
of an early account of sign-mediated activity, in the process of cross-fertilization with 
Kellyian concepts, Ryle develops an understanding of human reciprococity. Moreover; 
with Ryle’s modification of Kelly’s repertory grid, the dyad grid became a research 
instrument whereby a phenomenologically informed analysis of the intersubjective 
nature of human consciousness can be undertaken. 
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6 Reciprocal Roles and 
Cognitive Sequencing, a Tale 
of Reciprocity (Dialogicality) 
Almost Lost?
In chapter five, I provided an account of Ryle’s development of a new theoretical para-
digm, which was eventually to be known as cognitive analytic therapy (CAT). In Ryle’s 
first integration, very much rooted in extracting from object-relations theory aspects 
that resonated with his clinical experience, Ryle appeared to highlight a rudimentary 
dialogical understanding that contained the hypothesis that the human infant sought 
reciprocation. Therefore, Ryle concluded that there was an inherent need for a recip-
rocal action in order to develop a sense of the self. However, as Ryle turns to cognitive 
approaches in his second integration, he develops ideas of sequentiality, creating a 
tension with previously formed notions of reciprocity.  
That which had already been cast in the theoretical crucible of the first integra-
tion, namely the fact that psychoanalytic phenomena had been reformulated making 
redundant the biological and mechanistic accounts of humanity previously proffered, 
human behaviour could now no longer be seen to be activated by biological drives. 
Ryle states,
The model proposed here represents a different view, emphasizing the human 
capacity for exploration and choice, and the human assumption of personal 
responsibility; it could, in that sense, be considered an existential position, al-
though it is not directly influenced by either Sartre or the existential analysts. 
It starts from the position that man is in the world and acts upon it, living a 
life that is aim directed, purposeful, or intentional. By intentional I mean that 
our lives are spent, consciously or unconsciously, in the pursuit of goals or in 
the defence of positions or values, rather than in random activity or in reining 
in, or giving expression to, instinctual impulses or drives. (Ryle, 1982, p. 11).    
Central to Ryle’s approach is the idea that the construction of self is of crucial impor-
tance in understanding human behaviour. Once again, continuing to retain the idea 
that all psychological theories contain possible areas of relevance, Ryle acknowledges 
the contributions made by behavioural and cognitive therapy.  He cites the work of 
individual’s such as Beck (1976), Bandura (1977), Försterling (1980) , Rehm’s (1977), 
Roth (1980) and Rotter (1978), however Ryle states that collectively there remains 
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”a general failure to consider the self in detail” (Ryle, 1990, p. 203). Moreover; al-
though Kelly’s repertory grid technique was used and modified by Ryle, Ryle states 
that Kelly’s theory was less influential, and indeed, in critique of the Kellyian con-
cept of ”man as scientist”(Kelly, 1955, p. 4), Ryle is clear concerning his own position 
questioning why as human beings we are such bad scientists (email communication 
from Dr Ryle, 06/06/11).  
Chapter six maps Ryle’s second theoretical integration. This is in essence an ac-
count of the process of human intentionality exemplifying and enabling the individ-
ual to organise and sequence their actions. Through the process of conscious organi-
sation the individual is then at liberty to embark on further exploration and choice. 
Chapter six thus becomes an account of sequential patterns of action in the world and 
in interpersonal relationships. Ryle states, ”the model itself is a cognitive one, inter-
preting ’cognitive’ in a broad sense as meaning to do with higher mental functioning, 
including emotion, and of the organization of action, and by no means excluding from 
consideration unconscious mental processes” (Ryle, 1990, p. 195).
 Indeed, as quoted by Ryle in chapter five, where he described psychoanalysis as 
a dominant cultural and psychotherapeutic force, cognitive approaches were now 
donning a similar mantle, these too could not be ignored. Ryle’s interpretation of 
’cognitive’ concepts springs from his critique, namely the failure on the part of cogni-
tive (and behavioural) therapy to consider the self in detail (Ryle, 1990). By now on an 
established path, studying the epidemiology of psychological distress, Ryle continued 
to search for theories in order to make sense of his clinical experience.  
The cognitive revolution (Johnson & Erneling, 1997) greatly influenced all human 
endeavours. Throughout history, there had already been a plethora of philosophical 
metaphors for the mind. New metaphors related to hard science and the cognitive 
revolution were firmly on the horizon, metaphors such as mind as a computer and 
mind as brain were very much to the foreground. The metaphor perhaps with the 
greatest influence for Ryle was that of the general problem solver metaphor, (Newell & 
Simon, 1972). In earlier work, Newell and Simon had broached the issue of the heuris-
tic thinking processes involved in human judgement and how this might be developed 
in artificial intelligences (Newell & Simon, 1958). From the 1950s onwards, models 
of man now considered the human individual to be active processors of symbolic 
information. Newell and Simon’s theoretical framework, when taken up by cognitive 
psychology suggested that all behaviour could be viewed as a function of memory, the 
control processes of the mind, and the rules represented within these structure and 
processes of the mind. Indeed, with an increasing emphasis on cognitive phenom-
ena Ryle turns to view humanity as an active processor of the symbolic information 
contained within mental representations. This enforced a change on how Ryle was to 
conceptualise human activity.
In my reading of Ryle’s work, he now begins to rely less on concepts translated 
from object relations theory and Fairbairnian notions of endopsychic structures and 
object-seeking libido turning towards the classic Freudian concepts of primary pro-
cess thought and secondary process thought. Being cognisant of the new dominating 
force in culture and psychotherapy, Ryle continued to try to execute cross-fertilization 
between cognitive concepts and psychoanalytic thought, this results in the juxtapo-
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sition of translated cognitive concepts with Freudian metapsychology. To explicate 
this conceptual shift it may be helpful to highlight some possible influences on Ryle’s 
thinking.    
6.1 PE R C E P T I O N , M E M O RY, I M AG E S A N D M E A N I N G : T H E 
FU N C T I O N I N G M I N D
Sir Frederic C. Bartlett (1886 - 1969), professor of experimental psychology, had un-
dertaken a series of experiments on perception and memory that resulted in the semi-
nal work, ”Remembering, A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology” (Bartlett, 
1932). In his summary, Bartlett comments on schematic determination and fixed se-
quences that confine man’s activities. Bartlett observes the role of historical experi-
ences in shaping these schema and sequences.  In order to elucidate why Ryle seemed 
to turn to the Freudian concept of primary and secondary thought processes, an ex-
tensive quote from Bartlett is required. Bartlett states,
Already the long struggle which results in the specialisation of the senses has 
attained its main ends, already the organism with which the psychologist is 
concerned has discovered how to utilise the past in such phenomena as those 
of lowered threshold, of chain and conditioned reflexes, of ’schematic’ deter-
mination, and in the sequences of relatively fixed habit. But these all neces-
sary in their way, still cramp and confine man’s activities. For in them all the 
past operates en masse, and the series is of greater weight than its elements. 
Moreover in many of them the past retains its constraining capacity in the 
form of relatively fixed sequences which cannot be readily broken.
If any marked further advance is to be achieved, man must learn how to resolve the 
’scheme’ into elements, and how to transcend the original order of occurrence of 
these elements. This he does, for he learns how to utilise the constituents of his own 
’schemes’, instead of being determined to action by the ’schemes’ themselves, func-
tioning as unbroken units. He finds how to ”turn around upon his own schemata”, as I 
have said - a reaction literally rendered possible by consciousness, and the one which 
gives to consciousness its pre-eminent function. (Bartlett, 1932, p. 301)
Indeed, it is Bartlett’s understanding of the pre-eminent function of mental sche-
mata in the process of consolidating habitual ways of acting and conscious reflection 
of those schemata in revising action patterns that seems to be of significance to Ryle. 
This ability of the human mind to remember past events, bring together memory, 
perception and emotional response to construct a sequence to events, with these com-
ponents amalgamating to enable the individual to construct meaning around personal 
experiences. 
Through conducting a series of experiments on remembering, Bartlett concluded 
that images produced in the mind have a function. As functional objects, Bartlett 
stated that images could be used as devices to facilitate access to the less accessible 
sections of schemas.  In essence, as functional objects images were viewed as possess-
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ing spatiotemporal qualities, they were described as having the potential to facilitate 
access to the meaning embedded in past schemas and ever changing conditions of 
the present. It is with Bartlett’s conceptualisation of this functional aspect of mental 
images that Ryle was led back to those phenomena that psychoanalysis had originally 
revealed, namely Freudian concepts of primary thought processes and secondary 
thought processes.
In order to continue to address, what in Ryle’s opinion, is a tendency for theories 
to offer a diminished account of man, Ryle appeared to recognise a fecund quality 
to Freudian concepts of the functioning of psychic apparatus. This function involves 
the identification that complex mental processes occur at an unconscious level and 
that there is a need for these mental processes to be organised. Freud postulates that 
this occurs on a developmental continuum, moving from drive-dominated, through 
prelogical and preverbal stages to eventually become secondary thought processes 
associated with logical, rational and abstract forms of thought, enabling an orientation 
to reality and an ability to become goal or aim directed.  
For Ryle, Freud’s account was insufficient, rather than biological drives, Ryle, 
during his first theoretical integration, concluded that it was the infant’s struggle to 
remain in existence that was of significance.  Ryle was to utilise cognitive concepts to 
redefine psychoanalytic metapsychology to provide an account of the processing of 
data obtained through perception of the infant’s external world, alongside informa-
tion obtained from their own internal experiences. 
Bartlett, working under the conviction that behaviourists had mistakenly dis-
missed consciousness, imagery and meaning, had addressed the question of imag-
es and their function in accessing schematically stored experience. By positioning 
Bartlett’s conceptualisation of the function of images with Freudian metapsychology 
the process of translating psychoanalytic formulations into cognitive language be-
came possible, and in addition, works towards the development of a common theory 
for psychotherapies. The quotation below describes this juxtaposition. Ryle’s states, 
The distinction between timeless non-logical associative primary process 
thought, said to be characteristic of the unconscious, and the secondary pro-
cess thought associated with the conscious ego, is sustained in the cognitive 
view in the distinction between thinking and imagery and thought-word 
thinking. (Ryle, 1982, p. 19).    
Whilst recognising the accessibility of cognitive ideas, Ryle also acknowledged the 
limitations in cognitive theory.  As highlighted earlier, Ryle concludes, ”no serious 
attention is paid to the structure of self or to who, or what, it is that rewards, pun-
ishes, measures the power of, or controls of the self” (Ryle, 1982, p. 37). Rather than 
Kleinian-Fairbairnian object relations, Ryle retains his interest in relations, however, 
it is the relationship between the individual’s cognitive structures and his/her experi-
ence of being in the world that was to become of central importance to Ryle. 
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6. 2 R E L AT I O N S H I P S ,  T H E D E V E LO PM E N T O F CO G N I T I V E 
S T R U C T U R E A N D H U M A N B E H AV I O U R : B U I L D I N G A M O D E L O F 
T H E S E L F 
Commenting on the model building propensities of man, Ryle discusses the work of 
Ronald David Laing (1927 - 1989), a Scottish psychiatrist. Laing states that the individ-
ual can be defined by their experiences, viewing these as the centre of orientation of 
the objective universe and in addition, that self-definition is achieved through behav-
iour. Laing describes social phenomenology as the science of my own experience and 
of other’s experiences (Laing, 1967). From this Ryle states, ”we can only know people, 
as we know the rest of the world, by way of our mental representations of them, built 
up out of our experience”, (Ryle, 1982, p. 8). In order to begin to construct an under-
standing of the organisation of  mental processes, and in an attempt to formulate an 
understanding of how these influence the structure of the self, Ryle turns to theorists 
who, in the 1960s took an unusual approach to understanding human behaviour.  
Ryle’s development of the concept of sequential patterns is influenced by the work 
of Miller, Galanter and Pribram. In their book, Plans and the Structure of Behaviour 
(1960), the above authors describe themselves as ”subjective behaviourists” (Miller, 
Galanter & Pribram, 1960, p. 211). Commenting later in the text on this seemingly 
absurd statement and juxtaposition, they make the following statement:
What matters to us far more than a name, however, is whether or not we have 
glimpsed an important aspect of human intelligence. Psychologists who have 
been content to describe the mind as though it were, in turn, nothing but a 
description of its own experience have scarcely noticed how sedentary they 
seem to others, especially to those who are more concerned with action and 
results. At first the behaviourists seemed to be the men of action. But the 
correction they should have supplied was somewhere lost in the rituals and 
taboos of objectivity. Eventually, they too slipped into a tradition of description 
until they differed from their colleagues only in the fact that the object they 
described was behaviour, not mind. (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960, p. 213)
Ryle’s interest lay primarily in finding empirical means to study the meaning of sub-
jective phenomena, therefore it would seem reasonable to conclude that the notion 
of subjective behaviourism would resonate with him in some way. Moreover; in the 
spirit of acknowledging the contribution made by conventional approaches, and in 
addition the tendency for Ryle to challenge these conventional approaches, perhaps 
now, almost 30 years on, I am in the position to be able to identify a fork in the road. At 
this crossroads one signpost is clearly marked key role of relationships with the other 
marked the organisation of action. Ryle is to follow the latter signpost in this integra-
tion, later; in the next integration, he however retraces his steps.
In order to map Ryle’s journey down this particular fork in the road I must return 
to address some classic accounts given by Miller, Galanter and Pribram in their book 
the Plans and the Structure of Behaviour (1960).  Utilising Newell, Shaw and Simon’s 
theory of human problem solving (1958), the unit of analysis developed by Miller, 
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Galanter and Pribram is the ”Test-Operate-Test-Exit”(1960, p. 27) model.   In order 
to contest descriptions of ”subjective stimulus and a subjective response” (Miller, 
Galanter, & Pribram, 1960, p. 18), these authors cite the unique capacity for human 
beings to create and manipulate symbols, and to link human verbal abilities to their 
planning abilities.  
For my purposes, there are two important elements contained within their unit 
of analysis, one being a plan, which is essentially a set of instructions that can be 
learned, with the second element being that of the image. In many ways the concept 
of plan is self-explanatory, however in order to ascertain the nuance of image I will 
provide a direct explanation given by Miller, Galanter and Pribram. 
The image is all the accumulated, organized knowledge that the organism 
has about itself and its world. The image consists of a great deal more than 
imagery, of course. What we have in mind when we use this term is essentially 
the same kind of private representation that other cognitive theorists have 
demanded. It includes everything the organism has learned - his values as 
well as his facts - organized by whatever concepts, images, or relations he has 
been able to master. (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960, pp. 17 - 18)
Moreover; in contesting descriptions of subjective stimulus and a subjective response 
Miller, Galanter and Pribram revive the concept of human intention. The authors link 
intentions to plans and individual values to images. In reviving intentions Miller, 
Galanter and Pribram refer to the Freudian work the Psychopathology of Everyday 
Life (1901) when addressing to the phenomena of forgotten intentions.
The most obvious thing to say about a forgotten intention is that the Plan that 
gave it life was not completed. The question that is basic to all others, there-
fore, is why one Plan was abandoned and another pursued instead. If we try 
to translate Freud’s dynamic explanation into the language of this essay, we 
must say that Plans are abandoned when their execution begins to produce 
changes in the Image that are not as valuable as we had expected. (This would 
be consistent with the Freudian view, but is not the only possible explanation.)
The diagnostic value of a forgotten intention is that it so often underscores a 
change in Plan that might otherwise have gone unnoticed. And the change in 
Plan, in turn, provides a clue to aspects of the Image that might not ordinarily 
be accessible to introspection. (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960, p. 69)
Utilising the work of these authors Ryle is able to begin to develop further his earlier 
cognitive translations. In the first integration, Ryle had modified Kelly’s repertory grid 
technique to form the dyad grid, as an idiographic-nomothetic research instrument 
the dyad grid is a tool that facilitates a conscious and deliberate focus and self-reflec-
tion on reciprocal relationships. Kelly’s concept of roles, when viewed through an 
object relations lens transformed into an intrapersonal phenomenon shaping human 
behaviour.  In the second integration however, sequentiality takes precedence, Ryle 
now turns to providing an account of sequential patterns of action in the world and in 
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interpersonal relationships.  In one way, turning to focus on sequentiality addresses 
Ryle’s earlier critique of the Kellyian concept of man as scientist. 
In Plans and the Structure of Behaviour Miller, Galanter and Pribram provide an 
information processing account of exactly why human beings are such bad scientists. 
To explicate this further a quote is required from the authors.
The discovery that two Plans are incompatible may require great intelligence 
and may completely revise the Image.
We see, therefore, that a person who is caught between conflicting Plans is 
in a somewhat different situation from the person caught between conflicting 
motives. He is almost necessarily unaware that his Plans conflict, whereas he 
may be painfully conscious of his incompatible desires. There is almost cer-
tain to be a large penumbra of confusion surrounding the incompatible Plans; 
the person seems to be deliberately frustrating himself, but cannot discover 
why. He knows something is wrong, but cannot discover what it is. These two 
Plans may be isolated from one another in such a way that it never occurs to 
the person to contrast one with the other. In severe cases the result may be a 
”dual personality”.
The problem of conflicting Plans is most difficult when the two Plans are 
quite pervasive and the total abandonment of either one of them is impossible. 
This kind of conflict is common among neurotic patients. (Miller, Galanter, & 
Pribram, 1960, p. 97).
When combining the influences upon Ryle, of the works of Bartlett, Miller, Galanter 
and Pribram, for Ryle it is now the sequencing or ordering of various schemata that 
comes to dictate the action taken. In order to continue to address infantile and child-
hood experience and to translate psychoanalytic notions into cognitive terms, Ryle 
endeavoured to provide a developmental account of mental processes in cognitive 
terms (Ryle, 1978) of the following issues. He does so by raising a number of questions,
1. What is the relation between a person’s cognitive structure, or his per-
sonal construct system in Kelly’s (1955) terms, and his behaviour in, and 
experience of; the world?
2. How is this structure derived and, specifically, how far and in what ways 
does earlier experience, especially infantile and childhood experience, 
and especially experience not accessible to conscious recall or descrip-
tions or expression in words, determine or limit the individual’s construc-
tion of his world? 
3. What procedures can help the therapist recognise and modify those con-
structions that are related to his patient’s difficulties? (Ryle, 1978, p. 587) 
In this example, Ryle utilises Kellyian concepts to combine an emerging cognitive 
model with psychoanalytic aspects of infantile experience, resulting in the articula-
tion of the concept of ’construction’ in terms of a procedural sequence. 
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6. 3 S C R I P T S A S M E N TA L PR O C E SS E S
Taking as a baseline, the cognitive notion that mental processes are stored sche-
mata, Ryle discusses combinations of schemata defining these as scripts. Ryle adopts 
Shank and Abelson’s concept of scripts (1977).  In Shanks and Abelson’s conceptuali-
sation, scripts are described as being structures that contain appropriate predefined 
sequences, which become activated within a certain framework or context.  Scripts are 
in addition associated with social roles, and scripts are composed from the particular 
view of a specified role. At this juncture, Ryle returns to object relations theory,  seen 
through an object relations lens, scripts are not only a means for organising action in 
the world, but by articulating this concept within an object relations context, Ryle is 
able to formulate scripts as intra-psychic sequences which influence behaviour, ex-
perience and self-to-self relationships.  Ryle states that scripts ”may either organise 
action in the world or be concerned with self-evaluation and self-judgement” (Ryle, 
1982, p. 12). There are both higher-order and lower-order scripts. Ryle defines tactical 
scripts as being concerned with ”small-scale acts or events” (Ryle, 1982, p. 12), strategic 
scripts as defining aspects of personality such as sex roles, career choice, political atti-
tudes (Ryle 1982), which can be contextually shaped and self-identity scripts associated 
with self-definitions, general values and life aims (Ryle, 1982). 
With the cognitive turn, and the formulation of scripts as intra-psychic sequences, 
not only influencing behaviour and experience, but also influencing self-to-self re-
lationships, Ryle now articulates his common sense psychology approach to the self 
(as a self divided) as particular scripts are associated with the parental bits of self or 
the childlike aspects of self. This radically transforms Ryle’s early ideas concerning 
reciprococity, for now we have a theory of the sequential patterns of relationships 
rather than a conceptualisation that embraces a phenomenologically informed analy-
sis of the intersubjective nature of human consciousness. In addition, Ryle restates 
the Kleinian notion of projective identification in cognitive terms.
In cognitive terms, the process of projective identification involves the following:
(a) The script for self-control and self-judgement is based upon the child’s 
conceptualization of the control and judgement initially exercised over 
him by his parents. 
(b) The script determining self-other relationships in adult life may show 
persistence of features based on his early relationship of self-parent, ei-
ther repeating the recalled relationship or a polarized, compensatory al-
ternative version of it.
(c) In such recapitulations in adult relationships, the self may occupy either 
the child or the parent’s pole of the reciprocal relationship. 
Projective identification represents conceptual confusion in so far as self-other 
discrimination is blurred. This is self-maintaining inasmuch as the projected 
aspect of the self is not consciously acknowledged, at least as long as the other 
is prepared to play the reciprocal role. (Ryle, 1982, p. 61).
In this newly formulated context, the self may be viewed as a repository of cognitive 
structures, early infantile patterns of thought may remain to some degree unintegrat-
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ed and thus, impact upon or interfere or beleaguer the potentially functional aims and 
actions of the central self. At this point, I am continuing to use Fairbairnian concepts, 
however in my opinion, the cognitive juxtaposition was to some degree to become the 
”cuckoo in the nest”. As a result, Ryle’s earlier integration of the Fairbairnian concept 
of a central self was to go through a cognitive radicalisation. By focusing on patterns of 
action, Ryle was to return to a view more grounded in seeing the dynamic organisation 
of the self as contained within the individual’s mental representations.  Ryle states, 
The self can be conceived of as the highest and most general set of memories, 
understandings, and procedures. The meanings of situations and events are 
understood, and the selection and evaluation of lower-order aims and actions 
occur, through reference to this overall cognitive structure. There is more to 
the self, however, than this: the self is also self-observing. (Ryle, 1982, p. 54).
Due to the nature of human existence and the idiosyncratic way in which as individu-
als we perceive our life experiences, and in addition, the divided aspect of self, the self 
may have to manage a series of conflicting aims or operate under restrictive strategies. 
A model to understand these restrictive strategies or conflicting aims is required in 
order for attention to be brought to bear.   A model whereby one can ”turn around upon 
his own schemata” (Bartlett, 1932, p. 301), bring into conscious awareness patterns of 
thought to be reflected upon.
While consciousness is neither possible nor necessary for most mental pro-
cesses, by allowing us to reflect upon our intentions and upon the assumptions 
and acts involved in carrying them out, it offers another level of experience 
and a further opportunity for learning. When we can reflect on what we as-
sume, and on how we act, we can modify our assumptions and our actions. 
(Ryle, 1982, p. 16). 
With the conflicting aims of a divided self, Ryle now articulates a sequential proce-
dure regarding the organisation of action. This is to lead to reciprocal roles being 
renamed as ”reciprocal role procedures” (Ryle, 1985, p. 3).
6.4 T H E PR O C E D U R A L S E Q U E N C E M O D E L: T H E O R G A N I SAT I O N 
O F AC T I O N
In the first integration, Ryle was able to articulate the activity of the inner object 
world in Kellyian terms, use Fairbairnian notions to formulate an understanding 
of the infant’s early struggle to remain in existence.  Progressing from the primary 
struggle to remain in existence, in the second integration, Ryle directs his attention 
to constructing a model of how subjective beings act and understand their place in 
the world. There is certainly a move towards the presentation of a ”simplified model” 
(Ryle, 1982, p. 12), however this belies the complexity involved in social judgments 
and actions (Ryle, 1982).
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It is a simplified model, leaving out for example, consideration of short-term 
versus long-term memory, and not distinguishing the different roles of world 
[sic] and image, or of logical and associative relationships in memory. (Ryle, 
1982, p. 12).
During these developments Ryle seems to aim to avoid complex description of uncon-
scious events, instead he attempts to provide a structure within which the individual 
can choose how to perform, the model also accounts for an ability to judge any given 
performance. Ryle states, 
The execution of an aim-directed act involves a series of scripts or schemata, 
and I propose to call such a series a procedural sequence and, hence, the model 
as a whole is called the procedural sequence model, or PSM for short. (Ryle, 
1982, p. 12).
The PSM involves the following seven stages:
1. Define aim.
2. Consider general assumptions:
 (a) Possibility and necessities of situation.
 (b) Capacity to pursue aim.
 (c) Consequences of pursuing aim; judgements of self and others
3. List possible action plans.
4. For each plan consider
 (a) Can it be carried through?
 (b) Consequences of carrying it through?
5. Choose plan and act.
6. Consider in retrospect:
 (a) How effectively was the plan carried through; are modifications re-
quired to improve performance?
 (b) Consequences of carrying the plan through.
7. Evaluate the whole sequence; reaffirm or revise the aim and/or the as-
sumptions.
 (Ryle, 1982, p. 13).
Within the PSM, Ryle articulates three classifications of neurotic patterns that pre-
vent the reorganisation of scripts and thus the reorganisation of aims. These are 
namely, ”traps, dilemmas and snags” (Ryle, 1982, p. 24). Ryle develops a clinical tool 
called the psychotherapy file, this gives descriptions of each of these neurotic pat-
terns, in summary these are:
1. Traps - thinking and acting in a manner that results in a vicious circle 
which reconfirms restricted neurotic patterns
2. Dilemmas - polarised narrow options or false choices
3. Snags - relational dynamics where others are perceived as thwarting 
our capacity for change or our perception of potentially damaging others 
through our own pleasure or success, due to associated feeling of guilt we 
sabotage our potential for  pleasure or success
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 In order to prevent a lengthy description, (collectively) problems are deemed to pos-
sibly occur at any of the seven stages formulated within the PSM. Ryle provides an 
overview and description of each of his three classifications, in order to demonstrate 
this I will quote directly from Ryle’s description of traps, Ryle states.
A clinically familiar example of a trap is a phobia. A simple model of phobic 
behaviour is that the false perception of danger in the situation or object for 
which the phobia is felt (PSM 2a), linked with the sense that there are no 
means adequate to cope with it (PSM 2b), leads to the abandonment of aims 
involving facing the situation. If an attempt is made to overcome the fear but 
the execution fails (PSM 6a) or leads to symptoms of fear and panic (PSM 6b), 
the assumption of danger and of incompetence (PSM 2) are heightened, rein-
forcing the initial perception of danger. Repeated experiences of this sort have 
the further effect of redefining the self as a phobic person, and this can lead to 
the abandonment to confront the feared situation (PSM 7). The identity of the 
self as phobic, once established, may colour a number of the strategic relation-
ship scripts enacted by the individual; this can be seen as a form of secondary 
gain from the symptoms, to use the psychoanalytic term. (Ryle, 1982, p. 25).
The above quote provides an insight into the possible levels of interruption to the 
process. This passage also contains the idea of the interplay between tactical, strate-
gic and self-identity scripts, when a repeated trap experience eventually leads into a 
generalized self-definition as a phobic person. 
In reality, Ryle acknowledges this can be dependent on a number of highly indi-
vidual factors, such as beliefs around degrees of self-efficacy or locus of control, or 
indeed conflict with personal values or basic assumptions to name a few. The other 
patterns that prevent the reorganisation of scripts and thus the reorganisation of aims 
are as follows, Ryle states,
At the strategic level, dilemmas are concerned with the terms of relationships 
and with their associated costs. Such dilemmas can usually be seen to be de-
rived from childhood and family roles; they are manifest in adult relation-
ships, where mutuality would be appropriate, often representing the imposi-
tion of roles appropriate to parent-child interactions. Common examples may 
be summarized as follows. If dependent, then submissive; either dependent 
or in control; if caring then submissive. Issues of this sort frequently link up 
with cultural notions about the appropriate male and female differentiations. 
For example, a woman brought up in the old tradition, which could be sum-
marized as ”if feminine, then passive” will have difficulty in feeling feminine 
while being assertive. People restricted by such dilemmas often select part-
ners prepared to play reciprocal roles or they will endeavour to mould their 
relationships within their familiar terms. (Ryle, 1982, p. 30).
Continuing to explain interruptions to the reorganisation of scripts and reorganiza-
tion of aims, Ryle defines snags as the ”Subtle Negative Aspects of Goals” (Ryle, 1982, 
p. 31). Ryle states,
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Internal snags are the consequences of self-identity scripts that deny one the 
right to pursue one’s aims or be oneself. Their effects are often manifest in 
widespread prohibitions on success or enjoyment, and their existence is sel-
dom recognised by the individual restricted by them. It may take some time for 
a therapist to discern the operation of internal snags: this recognition may be 
through seeing the way in which the patient dismantles, or arranges to pay for, 
or be punished for, the gains made in therapy. (This is the negative reaction of 
psychoanalysis). The existence of snags of this sort should be looked for where 
such dismantlings, punishments, or restrictions are seen to recur. There are 
common antecedents of such snags in the patient’s history which can alert the 
therapist to look out for them. Many are derived from the child’s omnipotence, 
which can lead him to assume unrealistic responsibility for illness, deaths, or 
failures of other family members. (Ryle, 1982, pp. 31 -32). 
 
The conceptualisation of a dilemma as a neurotic pattern retains something of Kelly’s 
personal construct theory, in addition, due to Ryle’s modification of Kelly’s repertory 
grid they also contain something of a relational and reciprocal nature, originating 
in early parent-child interactions. Snags on the other hand appear grounded in psy-
choanalytic understandings as they are linked mainly to sources referring to uncon-
scious guilt and oedipal prohibitions, with the cognitive juxtaposition they now refer 
to unconscious self-identity scripts associated with the omnipotent stage of childhood. 
Traps, imported from behavioural therapy are action orientated. These neurotic pat-
terns were originally clinical formulations assimilated by Ryle from three separate 
traditions. In essence, they could be described as a disparate collection of classifica-
tions, which perhaps raises the question concerning how well they conform to a model 
based on sequentiality
6. 5 S E Q U E N T I A L A R T I C U L AT I O N O F R E L AT I O N S H I P S 
Ryle’s rudimentary dialogical understanding postulated during his first integration 
is superseded in his second integration, the key role of relationships, or putting it 
another way, the importance of otherness, clearly gives way to the organisation of 
action. With the monological turn, therapy addresses the modification of previously 
stored ”procedural sequences” (Ryle, 1982, p. 12) and how these influence and shape 
human behaviour, and in addition, how these procedural sequences influence a sense 
of identity.
In the process of endeavouring to research the archaeology of the development 
of CAT, as part of that process, conceptual strands in other theories become identifi-
able. In the process of developing the PSM, Ryle utilised the cognitive ideas of the 
storage, retrieval and organisation of memories to link the neonate’s early experience 
to the organisation of the self, this was juxtaposed with Freudian metapsychology 
where Freud identified complex mental processes. On a developmental trajectory, 
once reaching the secondary thought process level, an orientation to reality occurred, 
resulting in intentionality and the ability to ”turn upon his own schemata” (Bartlett, 
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1932, p. 301) i.e. self reflection. The PSM was developed as a tool that the individual 
could utilise to reflect upon their intentions. 
With the conceptualisation of the PSM there is a marked shift from an object rela-
tions informed understanding of the intersubjective nature of human consciousness 
to perhaps what might best be described as more problem solving, goal-orientated 
cynosure. Intersubjectivity as the primary phenomena becomes clouded and diluted, 
when commenting on Ogden’s paper ”The concept of internal object relations” (Ogden, 
1983), Ryle states, ”in these ways, his agencies of mind are described as having experi-
ences and seeking relationships, rather than as being mental processes serving to or-
ganize contradictory strands in the person’s experience and action” (Ryle, 1985, p. 2). 
It is with the pull towards organisation of the contradictory strands that there is an 
enforced conversion from Ryle’s rudimentary dialogical understanding. Rather than 
a reciprocal action it becomes the aggregates of schemata, or scripts formed around 
the individual’s early relationships that become internalised patterns or rules, which 
are described by Ryle as ”the equivalent of the psychoanalytic superego” (Ryle, 1982, 
p. 12). Perhaps rather than innate biomental conflicts played out between internal 
demons, as would be conceptualised in Kleinian thought, the ”ghost in the machine” 
(G. Ryle, 1949, p. 17) is now the metaphors related to hard science. Ryle’s rudimentary 
dialogical understanding becomes overshadowed. This reification of the process of 
storage, retrieval, organisation and regulation of experience seems to be a direct re-
sult of Ryle’s aim to reduce the confusion ”between the products and contents of mind 
and a description of how minds function”, (Ryle, 1985, p. 2). Ryle’s earlier tentative step 
towards a rudimentary dialogical understanding and the conceptualisation of a mul-
tiplicity of self is to all intents and purposes essentially rebounded into monadology. 
The early conceptualisation of a divided self now, if taken literally as the equivalent of 
the psychoanalytic ego,  begins to suppress authentic reciprococity, instead of interac-
tion, or in other words, a between phenomenon, reciprococity becomes a reshuffling, a 
reorganisation of schematic, or in the terms of the PSM, procedural mismatches. Ryle 
discusses the process of self-judgement as schematic mismatches,   
Our judgement of the meaning of our life is considered by relating our per-
ceived qualities and actions to a personal theory of values or, to put it more 
generally, by matching the self as perceived with the ideal self. How we feel 
about ourselves reflects discrepancies (schematic mismatches) between the 
self as perceived and the ideal self. This ideal self represents those values 
we personally identify with; but how we view ourselves and how we would 
like to be viewed are based historically upon the perceived responses of oth-
ers, notably of those who cared for us before we could talk and before we 
can remember. In this way, our first mirror, providing the foundations of our 
self-awareness, was held up to us long before we could be aware of self. (Ryle, 
1982, p. 55).
We now see the emergence of a new quality to Ryle’s conceptualisation of the com-
mon psychology approach to the divided self. By articulating higher-level mental 
procedures, Ryle is also concerned with personal meaning and judgements. However, 
the self as perceived and the ideal self, involved in the process of self-judgement and 
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meaning making, due to the cognitive and schematic flavour do not fully provide a 
description of reciprocal positioning. 
In his paper, ”Cognitive theory, object relations and the self” (Ryle, 1985), Ryle ap-
pears to attempt to make his original concept of reciprocal positioning more tenable 
by returning to object relations. 
In acquiring RRPs (reciprocal role procedures, my italics), a person must learn 
the essential rules governing both his own and the other’s roles, for roles are 
defined in terms of interactions. In this sense, two role procedures are learned 
in each interaction (corresponding to the self-and-other-derived suborganiza-
tions postulated by Fairbairn and emphasised by Ogden). For example, to learn 
the role behaviours of submission, dependency or nurturance requires the 
experience of the other role of controlling, providing or needing, and hence 
the acquisition of at least some version of these reciprocal procedures.
The roles sought with others have their counterpart in the structure of the 
self. We are all aware of the inner ’voice’ that comments on our acts and thoughts 
and even, by a potentially infinite regress, on our comments. This voice, which 
often has a parental tone to it, is the basis of our sense of self. As Mead (1964) 
observed ’there is always that distinction... between the ”I” and the ”me”. Taken 
together they constitute a personality as it appears in social experience. The self 
is essentially a social process going on with these two distinguishable phrases’. 
There is no reason to suppose that these consciously accessible aspects of the 
internal process, which account for the sense of self, constitute the whole of the 
internal process defining the structure of self. To Mead’s account we must add 
a consideration of the earlier events that have preoccupied the object relations 
theorists, namely of the ways in which the other-derived aspects of the self are 
founded on what was first learned at a stage of life when the ability to concep-
tualise self and other, and their separateness and relationship, was elementary. 
With this qualification we can see that Mead’s definition of the self as a so-
cial process and Ogden’s insistence on the mutual dependence of the self-and 
other-derived aspects of the internal world are addressing the same issue. The 
implications of this early origin will now be considered further by presenting a 
cognitive account of splitting and projection. (Ryle, 1985, p. 3)
In the cognitive restatement of concepts associated with object relations, the process 
of splitting and projection is deemed to occur when the predictable reciprocal role is 
not enacted, supraordinate self-organisation ceases to occur. When the organising 
process of the self is disrupted and ”higher order rules and values” (Ryle, 1985, p. 5) 
are unobserved, at low levels of intensity procedures may undergo alteration, at high 
levels of intensity defences may be triggered or depersonalization may occur. Overall, 
therapeutically, Ryle argues for the integration of ”a poorly coordinated supraordinate 
self-structure” (Ryle, 1985, p. 7).   Further integration of object relations theory serves 
to maintain the essence of reciprocal positioning, however, the in-between phenom-
enon tentatively articulated in Ryle’s first integration remains thwarted in hierarchi-
cal schematic mismatches. The diagram below is a useful illustration of how Ryle now 
visualises the idea of two role procedures.
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thwarted in hierarchical schematic mismatches. The diagram below is a useful illustration of 
how Ryle now visualises the idea of two role procedures.
Figure 1. Reciprocal role diagram. Adapted from " The Practice of CAT" by A. Ryle, 
1995, Cognitive Analytic Therapy: Developments in Theory and Practice p. 39.
Copyright 1995 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
To some degree, patterns of thought are essentially absorbed in their own activity,
each has scripts or rules rather than any degree of reciprococity. Moreover; learning or the 
acquisition of new knowledge is deemed to occur through what appears to be a process of 
assimilation. Perhaps the loss of authentic reciprocal positioning is further compounded by a 
need to achieve some sort of equilibrium; under these circumstances, reciprocal role 
procedures appear to have a somewhat more perfunctory quality rather than having a jointly 
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Figure 1. Recipro al role diagram. Adapte  from ”The Practice of CAT” by A. Ryle, 1995, 
Cognitive Analytic Therapy: Developments in Theory and Practice p. 39. Copyright 1995 by 
John Wiley & So s Ltd.  
To some degree, patterns of thought are essentially absorbed in their own activity, 
each has scripts or rules rather than any degree of reciprococity. Moreover; learning 
or the acquisition of new knowledge is deemed to occur through what appears to be a 
process of assimilation. Perhaps the loss of authentic reciprocal positioning is further 
compounded by a need to achieve some sort of equilibrium; under these circumstanc-
es, reciprocal role procedures appear to have a somewhat more perfunctory quality 
rather than having a jointly mediated, co-constructed quality. The psychoanalytic 
need to preserve satisfactory relationships with the caregiver is superseded; a more 
perfunctory need is fulfilled by the infant learning in some form the role procedure 
that is perceived to be missing.
In seeking to understand the agencies of the mind by elevating mental representa-
tions, within this new paradigm, Ryle strips away some of the psychoanalytic theoreti-
cal concepts underpinning the first integration, leaving the bare bones constructing 
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a sequence that “involves perception, comprehension, action, and evaluation” (Ryle, 
1982, p. 12). In addition, the emphasis on sequentiality dilutes the Kellyian concept 
of construing as meaning making, the process involved in meaning making does not 
make a comfortable bed-fellow with the idea of comprehension, action and evalua-
tion.   In an attempt to juxtapose a rudimentary dialogical understanding with a single 
person psychology, dialogicality has become all but lost, only echoes of reciprocal role 
procedures remain.  
In many ways, in this second integration, Ryle has attempted a herculean task. 
Rather than dismiss metapsychology, in the construction of a theory of mental pro-
cess he has addressed the question of mental content, subjective experience, qualia 
and consciousness. In addition, Ryle has attempted to construct a mental system that 
provides a description of self-judgment and a sense of identity. Through his interpre-
tation of cognitive concepts and his provision of a simplified model (Ryle, 1982), that 
attempted to acknowledge the role of social judgments and actions (Ryle, 1982), Ryle 
has not confined himself to the classic cognitive approach of focusing on the head 
whilst neglecting the social and interpersonal. 
However, Ryle’s personal critique of his focus on sequentiality is that there was no 
adequate emphasis concerning the role of relationships with others. He attempted to 
resolve this by reintroducing concepts from object relations, this however was only 
to increase the tension between reciprococity and sequentiality. The Fairbairnian 
object seeking principle (Fairbairn, 1955) is eclipsed by the focus on mental function 
facilitating self-reflection. There is no longer a stress on the human infant’s struggle 
to remain in existence, any sense of intersubjectivity has been displaced by a stress 
on the individual cognitive capacity to predict and evaluate.  Reciprocal roles are now 
defined in terms of interaction, a need to learn the rules of one role or another coupled 
with a capacity to predict and adapt to the opposing role.
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7 The Return to a Focus on 
Reciprocity
Understanding the self is to remain of great significance to Ryle, in his earlier work 
it will be recalled that in his critique of cognitive approaches Ryle states, ”no serious 
attention is paid to the structure of self or to who, or what, it is that rewards, punishes, 
measures the power of, or controls of the self” (Ryle, 1982, p. 37). These questions re-
main important, however, it is the organization of self and the impact of experience 
upon the developing self, in particular negative life experiences that Ryle turns his 
focus towards in the next integration. This is to bring to the fore once again concepts 
of human reciprococity, which in turn results in Ryle relinquishing his earlier stress 
on sequential patterns of action.   
The quest remains in many ways a continued drive to understand the epidemiol-
ogy of psychological distress. Drawing on his own experience and accumulated years 
of clinical, ”at the coal face” type work, Ryle forms a unique vision of the human 
condition, the genesis of which arises in an attempt to adopt a humane and compas-
sionate approach to his work with patients. In a pragmatic attempt to utilise his own 
clinical experience Ryle looks to current psychological theories, recognising concepts 
that bring some degree of understanding to the human condition. Drawing on these 
theories Ryle has connected, in many ways, his own vision of the human condition 
to two traditionally opposing visions. One of course can be described, in a rather 
elementary fashion, as a theoretical account that reifies the notion of innate psychic 
conflicts played out in the terrain of the internal world, whilst the other, described in 
an equally elementary manner, as an account of the human condition being attributed 
to a unitary mind engaged in information processing. Whilst recognising that each 
approach had something to offer Ryle was not to become an acolyte choosing one 
approach over another, rather his explorative journey resulted in him extending the 
theoretical boundaries of both these ways of understanding what it means to be hu-
man. However, as stated in chapter six, this resulted in Ryle juxtaposing his original 
rudimentary dialogical understanding with a single person psychology. 
In chapter seven, I will discuss why Ryle set about taking steps to relinquish and 
correct what had in essence resulted in a single person psychology understanding 
taking precedence.  This had occurred through the development of Ryle’s account of 
sequential patterns of action in the world; due to a focus on sequentiality, patterns of 
thought were essentially described as being absorbed in their own activity, each had 
scripts or rules that resulted in hierarchical schematic mismatches.         
In evaluating the development of his understanding of the organisation of action, 
and his movement towards a single person psychology, Ryle states,
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I now regard the Procedural Sequence Model as a useful analytic tool rather 
than as a general model of human learning; interpersonal and intrapersonal 
procedures are acquired in interaction, influenced by the caretaker’s pro-
cedural patterns, rather than being formed and modified through rational 
learning, and failure to revise problems procedures has additional sources to 
those suggested by the model. But the focus on self-perpetuating sequences of 
linked mental, behavioural and environmental processes remains therapeuti-
cally valuable. (Ryle, 1997, p. 13). 
In order to address some of the points raised in the above statement, Ryle began to 
retrace his steps and return to focus on the key role of relationships and their func-
tion concerning the intellectual and emotional development of the infant. So rather 
than a focus on cognitive development essentially being a form of procedural learning 
taking place without conscious reflection Ryle turns now to focus on how the infant 
has to develop organizing psychological structures in social interactions with others, 
and in the third integration, how this can be thwarted depending on the nature and 
quality of those social interactions.  In the second integration, Ryle returns to consider 
the intersubjective nature of human consciousness, the self is no longer conceived as 
”the highest and most general set of memories”, (Ryle, 1982, p. 54), the ontogenesis of 
the self arises in human reciprococity, namely self-other relationship patterns that in 
cognitive analytic therapy (CAT) are called reciprocal role procedures. The following 
is Ryle’s description of reciprocal roles procedures (RRPs):
Procedures are the sequences of perception, appraisal, action and evaluation 
of the consequences shaping aim-directed action. Relationships are main-
tained by procedures in which the aim is the desired or expected reciprocating 
response of the other. RRPs are developed early in life in relationships with 
caretakers and are centrally concerned with issues of care, dependency, con-
trol, and submission and are influenced by damaging or depriving caretaking. 
The patterns experienced are internalized and shape both self-management 
and relations with others, and continue to be maintained and reinforced by 
the perceived or actual reciprocations elicited from others. (Ryle, 2007, p. 330)
7.1 A C L I N I C A L PI C T U R E O F E M O T I O N A L ( A N D S O C I A L) 
D E PR I VAT I O N A N D T H E I M PAC T O N T H E D E V E LO PI N G S E L F
In chapter five I was able to provide some autobiographical detail given to me by Ryle, 
however in order to set the scene for a clearer account of Ryle’s next integration I will 
attempt to catch and elaborate the historical echoes of Ryle’s career further.  With 
hindsight, one is of course able to add colour and detail to an earlier experience and 
as I write I find that I am drawn once again to read Ryle’s paper ”The whirligig of time” 
(Ryle, 1998). If memory serves me well, I would have read this paper for the first time 
not long after it was written in 1999.  I hope that my own understanding of Ryle’s work 
has continued to develop and grow over time. I now find that I revisit this paper with 
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a potentially fresh comprehension of how the comments made by Ryle in the paper 
reflect what was to occur as CAT has continued to develop as a living model, aimed at 
refining its understanding of humanity.  
Alongside a group of likeminded colleagues early in his medical career as a general 
practitioner, Ryle set up a group practice, this was called the Caversham Centre, which 
Ryle states was later to become part of the Kentish Town Health Centre. In order to 
stress an aspect that I believe is essential to the further development of the CAT 
model I will introduce an historical voice and quote directly, as Ryle did in his own 
reflections when writing ”The whirligig of time” (Ryle, 1998). Ryle quotes a verbatim 
statement made by one of his patients whom he identifies as the local bookie’s run-
ner, who describes the Caversham Centre ”as the poor (my italics) man’s ’arly street” 
(Ryle, 1998, p, 263). In a ’tongue in cheek’ manner Ryle highlights that this was indeed 
intended by the individual as a compliment. For my purposes, what I wish to extract 
from the gentlemen’s statement, is the emphasis on poverty and at this point introduce 
Ryle’s account of the contribution made by Madge Hamilton, an experienced social 
worker who joined the practice. For, in re-reading ”The whirligig of time” (Ryle, 1998) 
it seems evident that Madge Hamilton’s contribution to understanding the origins of 
the nature of the clinical population’s psychological distress was to, in this next inte-
gration, become the kernel from which Ryle’s ongoing understanding of his clinical 
population developed further.  Commenting on Hamilton’s contribution Ryle states, 
Madge Hamilton, who proceeded to interview the parents of over 100 families. 
From these interviews, my practice records, various psychometric tests and 
from school reports on the children, we were able to study the relations be-
tween the parent’s life histories, mental health, marital relationships and child 
rearing practices, and the psychological status of the children. The findings 
demonstrated the transmission of psychological problems within the family, 
and we were able to argue with conviction for the family as being an appropri-
ate focus for intervention and for primary care as being a good place to locate 
services. (Ryle, 1998, p. 264).
The above statement provides a clear account of the epidemiology of psychological 
distress. Once again, to the foreground in the next integration, this kernel of under-
standing was to go on to influence the future development of CAT’s conceptualisation 
of the self and psychopathology. This not only is the beginning of the provision of a 
socio-historical account of the formation of self, moreover; it is the beginning of the 
redefinition of psychopathology as being a relational, social and cultural phenom-
enon. It is now in my archaeological account of the development of CAT that I need 
to consider the role of  human deprivation, (poverty, both material and emotional) 
and frank human abuse and trauma, for in Ryle’s ongoing clinical experience these 
elements were to become the fulcrum around which the next theoretical additions 
were made to the model. Archaeology, by its very nature is composed of historical 
resonance therefore; once again, I will continue my own account by first commenting 
on those theorists who, in my understanding, influenced Ryle. 
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7. 2 H O R OW I T Z ’S CO N C E P T UA L I SAT I O N O F S TAT E S O F M I N D TO 
RY L E ’S CO N C E P T UA L I SAT I O N O F S TAT E S O F B E I N G
Mardi Horowitz is a professor of psychiatry at the University of California, San 
Francisco; he is a prolific academic whose research career spans over four decades. 
In addition to his work on understanding the impact of stress and trauma and the 
psychological processing of trauma, Professor Horowitz’s work includes the devel-
opment of an integrative approach to cognitive and psychodynamic theories. In his 
theoretical understanding, Horowitz formulated ideas regarding the conscious and 
unconscious mental structures that organise both a sense of identity and a sense of 
interpersonal connection. Moreover; in his book ”States of Mind: Analysis of Change 
in Psychotherapy” (Horowitz, 1979) he formulates an approach aimed at understand-
ing impaired psychological functioning and the process of change.
In Horowitz conceptualisation of ”states and state cycles” (Horowitz, 1979, p. 30) he 
defines states as ”recurrent patterns of both content and form of behaviour and experi-
ence” (Horowitz, 1979, p. 30). Through the convergence of psychodynamic ideas, con-
cepts from cognitive science and interpersonal therapy, Horowitz restates intrapsychic 
conflicts in cognitive/relational language. Rather than innate psychic conflicts, such 
as biomental forces in opposition, Horowitz, in his adaptation of intrapsychic conflict 
describes the ability of the mind to group together experiential clusters to form multiple, 
distinct states of mind. Horowitz conceptualised four general categories of state descrip-
tion some of which can be problematic, whilst others can be quasi-adaptive. 
The management of emotion can vary from state to state and in the general catego-
ries defined by Horowitz he describes ”undermodulate” (Horowitz, 1997, p. 32) states 
as a particular state category where affect is essentially unregulated, therefore any 
affect associated with an undermodulated state can be expressed explosively, as in 
anger, or be excessively raw as in sadness. Behaviour associated with undermodulated 
states tends to be impulsive; most of the symptoms that create psychological dis-
tress are associated with ”undermodulated” states. In comparison in ”overmodulated” 
(Horowitz, 1997, p. 32) states affect is stifled, only dealt with in a dismissive or rigid 
manner. In ”shimmering” (Horowitz, 1997, p. 33) states there can be rapid fluctuations 
between the lack of control of affect (as in undermodulated states) and rigid control 
of affect (as in overmodulated states). Due to rapid shifts, discordant emotions may 
be experienced resulting in attempts to mask emotions. Horowitz states that when 
individuals are caught in shimmering states there may appear to be an incongruity 
between facial expression and tone of voice or overt verbal statements. In contrast to 
the first three states, where Horowitz describes dysfunctional elements, in working 
or ”well-modulated” (Horowitz, 1997, p. 32) states Horowitz describes ”relatively har-
monious accord” (Horowitz, 1997, p. 32). The very same emotions that can be experi-
enced as overwhelming in other states, when experienced in a well-modulated state 
the individual can maintain a sense of ”self-command” (Horowitz, 1997, p. 32) even in 
the face of intense emotion.  Horowitz states, 
People maintain varying levels of understanding of self-organisation, which 
leads to a sense of identity or self-regard. We have already considered how 
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individuals may have different self-concepts in different states of mind. Some 
individuals learned during development how to contain this multiplicity, 
whereas others lack this capacity and have less coherence of self (Horowitz, 
1995b).
Without coherence of self-organisation, a person is more likely to form symptoms, 
have explosive shifts in state, express unstable state cycles, and experience more 
distortion in interpreting acts of self and other. Such people may seem to have inap-
propriate divisions in personal meanings, such as all-good or all-bad clusters. For this 
reason, low-coherence in self-organisation has been called ”narcissistic vulnerability” 
(Kernberg, 1968). (Horowitz, 1997 p. 90).
Multiplicity concerning sense of personal identity/self-regard and divisions in 
personal meaning are for Horowitz, the stuff of which motivational drives are con-
structed. However maintaining the core ideas of psychodynamic formulation, it is the 
interplay of wishes, fear and defences that guide the psychical processes of motiva-
tion, therefore some states become desired, some dreaded, others may be problematic 
and some will be states where some form of compromise is achievable. 
It is through the convergence of psychodynamic ideas, concepts from cognitive 
science and interpersonal therapy, that Horowitz is able to progress an understand-
ing of transference phenomena. This is developed to become the role relationship 
configuration model (RRCM). Horowitz describes the RRCM as a conceptual tool that 
can be used to understand maladaptive interpersonal patterns.
The tool is a model of how self and other are connected by roles and transac-
tional sequences. This tool is called a role relationship model, and it embodies 
cause-and-effect beliefs. Any individual has many role relationship models 
as part of memory-stored personal meaning systems. Each role relationship 
model carries meanings about who is involved and what they mean to do 
(Horowitz, 1979/1987, 1989, 1991). (Horowitz, 1997 p. 68)
Horowitz is in essence interested in ”interpersonal transactional patterns” (Horowitz, 
1994, p. 184), he notes that the earliest interpersonal transactional patterns form the 
beginnings of a compendium of self and object images. Of particular relevance to 
Horowitz is the external observations made in relation to interpersonal relationships, 
in other words the self-other views or person schemas that become part of the indi-
vidual’s repertoire. 
To some extent, then, a role relationship constellation includes self traits, oth-
er traits, holistic labels, transactive sequences for gratification, and techniques 
for threat reduction. (Horowitz, 1979, p. 51). 
Schemas are formed as layer upon layer, nuances of self and object images become the 
representational foundations leading to the construction of individual cognitive tem-
plates or schemas and person schemas. The activation of pre-existing schemas will 
determine the organisation and management of thoughts and emotions and will be-
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come the ”ingrained patterns of social interaction” (Horowitz, 1994, p. 186).  Horowitz 
cities schemas and person schemas as the active components that directly influence 
the processing of new information as these are directly linked to the organisation and 
management of thoughts and emotions. Ergo the process of change in psychotherapy 
is directly linked to the organisation of schema. 
In acknowledgement of the diverse nature of states of mind and states where 
affect is undermodulated, overmodulated or shimmering, Horowitz claims that con-
scious thought is not the sole determinant of human motivation, choice and behaviour 
(Horowitz, 1979). Under certain circumstances, such as regressive behaviour, or in-
deed altered states of consciousness, Horowitz states that it is more likely that primi-
tive schemas will dominate experience and decision making (Horowitz, 1979).  Part of 
the therapeutic process of bringing polyvalent configurations together is to increase 
conscious awareness of the dreaded, warded off states where affect is experienced 
as overwhelming or expressed in an intense inappropriate and problematic manner. 
The aim of naming predominant problematic states of mind is to gain greater clarity, 
increase therapeutic empathy and increase the individual’s capacity for reflective 
self-observation. These elements are seen as central to the attenuation of problematic 
states of mind that influence and guide the psychic processes of self and interpersonal 
relationships. 
Shared common ground for Horowitz and Ryle is that they both believe there is 
clinical merit in adopting an integrative approach to cognitive and psychodynamic 
theories, however Horowitz places more stress on the notion of innate psychic con-
flicts, he conceptualises the origins of psychopathology as being primarily linked to 
the opposition of wishes and fears. Ryle, however, influenced by his clinical experi-
ence and the work of Madge Hamilton adds to this by also considering the intersub-
jective nature of human consciousness. Ryle brings to the fore the importance of the 
nature and quality of care provided, the lottery of life events, and in the face of these 
life events and experiences, how the caretakers address the child’s subjective experi-
ence. The internal domain, due to multiple or a divided-self experiences is however 
radically impacted upon by the frank experiences of abuse and trauma. Ryle now 
formulates a model that affords us a greater capacity to understand not only the com-
plexities of psychopathology, but also a means to comprehend the relational, cultural 
and social conditions in which there is greater potential for damage to the developing 
self.   There is now a stronger emphasis on human reciprocity as a significant force in 
shaping the development of self.
7. 3 T H E D E V E LO PM E N T O F T H E M U LT I PL E S E L F S TAT E M O D E L 
(M SS M)
Ryle’s primary concern lies in attending to the practical clinical difficulties en-
countered in psychotherapy. In CAT there is the provision of shared understanding 
through the construction of a collaborative reformulation. As a developing model of 
psychotherapy, CAT, through the process of reformulation, had advanced the idea 
that it was clinically/therapeutically important to link the observable manifest be-
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haviour of (activity of) human beings to underlying processes. Moreover, to link these 
to not only to their earlier experiences with caregivers but to also acknowledge the 
internalisation, through language and other signs (Leiman, 1995), to socially derived 
meanings and values. In order to explain further I will introduce Leiman’s under-
standing of sign-mediation. In his paper, ”The concept of sign in the work of Vygotsky, 
Winnicott and Bakhtin: Further integration of object relations and activity theory” 
(1992) Leiman discusses signs as the fundamental unit of analysis in psychologi-
cal processes. Through the theoretical integration of Vygotskian, Winnicottian and 
Bakhtinian ideas, Leiman concludes that mental phenomena come into being in in-
terpsychological territory through the use of symbolic mediating tools. Reciprocity 
therefore becomes central to the creation of signs, Leiman states,
It is the infant that brings the sign into being. There would not be anything 
that could be called a sign without the neonate’s activity that establishes his 
or her relation to the object and creates the sign as a mediator. The presence 
of the caretaker must, however, also be taken into account. Signs arise in the 
interpsychological territory and they are, to use Voloshinov’s (1928) definition 
of words, two-sided acts. (Leiman, 1995, p. 111)
The essence of understanding psychopathology also becomes a two-sided act, it takes 
into account relational, social and cultural phenomena thus the nature/ meaning con-
tained within jointly created signs.  
In the course of paying serious attention to the development and structure of 
self (the psychological processes of the self), gained through clinical experience of 
working with individuals with greater levels of disturbance, Ryle has to consider not 
only the intersubjective nature of the development of self, but also address the ques-
tion of the development and differing capacities of the organization of self processes. 
Rather than continuing to rely solely on core ideas from psychoanalytic theorizing 
such as notions of unconscious conflict and defence, Ryle’s focus on reciprocity in-
volves consideration concerning how the child’s subjective experiences are mediated 
through caretakers and the role of sign mediated interactions. This of course raises 
the question of what happens to the organization of self processes when the infant’s/
child’s subjective experiences are further compounded by frank experiences of ne-
glect and abuse. For Ryle, in taking neglect and abuse into account, it is no longer just 
a question of repression of conflicting wishes and desires, ”this involved in particular 
a consideration of the role of dissociation and a clarification of its relation to repres-
sion.” Ryle (1997, p. 26)
Returning to greater degrees of disturbance for any given individual, for Ryle it 
becomes a question of the difference between well integrated self systems, and those 
individuals whose self systems are impaired by dissociation. A particular group where 
Ryle identifies self systems to be impaired by dissociation are those individuals who 
often attraction a clinical diagnoses of personality disorder, and in particular, those 
who attract a diagnoses of borderline personality disorder (BPD). Having self systems 
that are impaired in some way by dissociation, or partial dissociation, Ryle proposes a 
model of damage to complex and inter-related hierarchical systems through the prop-
osition of damage affecting three levels of development (Ryle 1997). The proposed 
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model, the multiple self state model (MSSM) describes phenomena that are viewed as 
being an exaggerated means of the normal processes of reciprocal role relating and 
as such address the developmental and structural aspects of self.
It is perhaps helpful to outline CAT’s conceptualisation of normal multiplicity. This 
is described as perspective multiplicity (Ryle & Fawkes, 2007). If the developing indi-
vidual receives good enough care and their subjective experience of the life events they 
encounter is taken into consideration, it is highly probable that a reasonably well inte-
grated self system will develop. Therefore the reciprocal role procedures internalized in 
the course of childhood and adolescent development will be multiple and indeed often 
contradictory, however this is essentially functional. The functioning metaprocedures, 
although for the most part unconscious patterns of connections and links between 
reciprocal role procedures will remain intact, these metaprocedures will smoothly mo-
bilize interpersonal activity and as a result, will enable connections to be made with 
the individual’s changing aims and values. This smooth uninterrupted functioning and 
the ability of metaprocuderes to make successful links and connections will result in an 
inherent ability for contextual multiplicity (Ryle & Fawkes, 2007).  
It is this very ability for contextual multiplicity that is thwarted with experiences 
of early deprivation and abuse. Without contextual multiplicity, the scene is set, (in 
worst case scenarios), for an almost exponential growth in negative life experiences. 
The MSSM is a means of simplifying and understanding the complex and inter-re-
lated hierarchical systems that increase the likelihood of a fragmented self system. 
Having a fragmented self system will in essence perpetuate dissociation as a means 
of coping as there remains a predominance of ongoing deprivation. This is of course 
directly due to an exaggerated means of the normal processes of reciprocal role relat-
ing, both in essence, real and perceived.
Ryle provides an account of the aetiology and phenomenology of the develop-
mental and structural aspects of self in BPD, putting forward a hypothesis based on 
innate intersubjectivity. He defines these in terms of three related processes, which 
collectively form the MSSM. 
As the baseline process, Ryle discusses intersubjective privation, when the infant/
child is dependent on an external other/s. Being on the receiving end of caretak-
ing where emotional (and often basic physical needs) are unmet, this  impairs the 
primitive developmental and structural aspects of self. Based on innate intersubjec-
tivity, the experience of unmet need and/or frank abuse ”engenders patterns such 
as victimhood or revenge in relation to the experience or perceived threat of neglect, 
abandonment and abuse.  (Ryle, 2007, p. 330). These harsh and abusive patterns will 
become internalized forming part of the self structure and processes of interpersonal 
interactions and self management procedures. When predominately abusive forms of 
reciprocation have been experienced and basic developmental needs have essentially 
been unmet, Ryle states ”reciprocations sought from others are often over-specific and 
forcefully sought for” (Ryle, 2007, p. 330). Experience of unmet need does not dimin-
ish; unmet need continues to be reinforced not only through interpersonal interac-
tions but also through there being no structural framework to enable needs to be met 
through functional self management procedures. Under these circumstances, and 
the operation of narrowly defined processes of self, the individual is limited to very 
restricted ways of being in the world. 
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It is at the second point, in Ryle’s three related processes, that dissociation be-
comes a central feature. If relational patterns are experienced as overwhelming or 
unstable, then dissociation or partial dissociation occurs as a means of coping. This 
inherent strategy of management however serves to undermine further the normal 
functioning processes of self.    When abuse is of a severe nature, or if it is prolonged, 
human beings dissociate. Not only does this mean that the individual develops a small 
number of reciprocal role procedures (RRPs), but if there is any degree of dissociation 
then conscious reflection becomes confined to these roles or self states (Ryle, 2007). A 
state may be described as ”the subjective experience of occupying a particular role” 
(Ryle, 2007, p. 330). 
Due to dissociated processes of the self, rapid and sudden switches can take place. 
Due to restrictive ways of being in the world when combined with a need to dissociate, 
these state switches can be experienced by the individual as highly confusing, but 
certain repeat patterns might become, for some, recognisable. Ryle describes three 
types of state switches, 
(1)  Role reversal, as in from self as victim to abuser to self as abuser to victim;
(2)  response shifts, as in from compliant to defiant in relation to abuser; 
(3)  self state shifts, as in from a state defined by the RRP as ideal carer to ide-
ally carer for to one defined by victim to abuser. (Ryle, 2007, p. 330)
When we reach the third level of the inter-related hierarchy proposed by Ryle, the 
ability for conscious self reflection with an often severely limited repertoire of re-
ciprocal role procedures is circumscribed. When conscious self reflection is circum-
scribed, or the process is periodically interrupted by some degree of dissociation, this 
renders the individual incapable of making any revisions to these early dysfunctional 
reciprocal role procedures. Ensnared in a situation where tomorrow becomes yester-
day, or to put it into other words, there is the constant elicitation of early damaging 
reciprocal role procedures, for the individual there is not only the phenomenon of 
re-experiencing the original trauma/s, but also these original traumas are recreated 
in everyday experience.   
Ergo, in contrast, those individuals with a greater degree of disturbance have es-
sentially an impaired capacity for multiplicity. This is described by Ryle and Fawkes 
as diminished multiplicity (Ryle & Fawkes, 2007) developed in the face of negative 
reciprocal role procedures, or where the individual has had to cope with adverse ex-
periences by frequent dissociation, pathological multiplicity (Ryle & Fawkes, 2007). 
Put in very simple terms, Ryle summarises the MSSM as:
Level 1. The restriction or distortion of the reciprocal role repertoire
Level 2. The incomplete development or disruption of higher order procedures 
responsible for mobilizing, connecting and sequencing Level 1 procedures 
Level 3. The incomplete development or disruption of self-reflection 
(Ryle, 1997, pg 34)
Following the provision of a description of the three process that collectively form the 
MSSM, it will now be helpful to expand on the implications of dissociated or partially 
dissociated self states that result in exaggerated reciprocal role relating. Ryle state, 
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In terms of CAT theory, therefore, a patient’s state will be identified with a 
role. Roles are defined as combining memory, affect and action organised in 
relation to the search for, or the experience of, reciprocation. A self state will 
therefore be described in terms of its reciprocal role pattern, either pole of 
which may be subjectively identified with and experienced as a state. In the 
dissociated self states of BPD the role repertoire of each state can often be 
described in terms of a single reciprocal role pattern. (Ryle, 1997, p. 27).
Relational interactions that are of a hostile nature, as stated above, markedly influence 
the development of self processes. Relational experiences become internalised and 
relational memory informs and guides self management procedures. In reciprocal 
role procedures where there has been no acknowledgement of the child’s subjective 
experiences (and under these circumstances affect is usually intensely negative), re-
lational memory becomes a distressing phenomenon that is experienced as an ongo-
ing reality for the traumatised individual, a reality from which they must find some 
means of escape.  Dissociation or partial dissociation provides respite, however under 
these circumstances the self becomes fragmented with the formation of isolated states 
of being that contain intense unmediated affect, or paradoxically unrealistic hope of 
perfect care. With a fragmented sense of self, there becomes a heightened need for 
acknowledgement by another, this results in strong patterns of exaggerated reciprocal 
role relating.  Under these circumstances, when locked into specific self states actions/ 
behaviours may be extreme. There is always a need to seek reciprocation, if this is 
deemed too psychically dangerous, then the only alternative for the individual is to 
try to shift to a new state. The extreme and exaggerated nature of the role played by 
the individual under these circumstances very often provokes the other to adopt an 
equally extreme role in relation. Under these circumstances, revision of this recipro-
cal role pattern is impossible without first bringing into awareness the dissociated/
partially dissociated reciprocal role. In CAT, this involves a collaborative exploration 
in therapy. Ryle notes that individuals are for the most part usually adapt at provid-
ing description of their self-states, (Ryle & Beard, 1993 & Ryle, 1997). Nevertheless, 
depending of the degree of dissociation Ryle adds the following caveat.
However, patients may not subjectively identify with every role; thus Pollock 
(1996) has shown that abused women who had attacked their abusers were 
not able to see themselves as victims. Other individuals may not be able to 
describe themselves as providing care. Even where only one pole of the re-
ciprocal role procedure is identified as a state by the patient, the nature of the 
other pole (which is attributed to others) should be identified. (Ryle, 1997, p. 85)
Hence, discontinuities in experience and the predominance of negative patterns of 
reciprococity (negative reciprocal role procedures) result in a diminished capacity 
for functional multiplicity. The concept of reciprocity (and the rudimentary dialogi-
cal understanding) formed in Ryle’s first integration rises like a phoenix from the 
ashes. It facilitates the use of the metaphor of  a two-way street of human interaction, 
which as further theoretical integrations take place eventually becomes described in 
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CAT as a between phenomenon (Ryle & Kerr, 2002). An inherent problem however 
remains, namely how to unify a reciprocal/dialogical understanding with a single 
person psychology (monadic cognitivism). The underlying philosophical divergences 
remain intact. To continue with the mythology metaphor, (and indeed a clumsy effort 
to integrate myths!), the rise of the phoenix sets in motion a reawakening of the clash 
of the Titans, there remains a tension between how to describe sequential patterns of 
action and reciprocal procedures. Ryle has wrought a paradigm shift in the construc-
tion of CAT, however a further paradigm shift is required to try to solve the tension 
between reciprocal role procedures and sequential patterns of action.
7.4 T H E R A PE U T I C M E T H O D O LO G Y, T H E D E V E LO PM E N T O F T H E 
S E L F - S TAT E D I AG R A M M AT I C R E FO R M U L AT I O N (SS D R )
The provision of shared understanding between therapist and patient has always 
been a central feature of CAT, and the process of reformulation, in a narrative and 
diagrammatic form are a core feature of the model. The diagrammatic reformula-
tion has with each theoretical integration undergone a number of transitions, from a 
simple flow diagram depicting traps, dilemmas and snags to a more complex format 
following the development of the Procedural Sequence Object Relations Model. As 
Ryle returns to focus on the intersubjective nature of human consciousness, and how 
this influences the development of the processes and structures of the self, these 
simple flow diagrams developed into a format named the sequential diagrammatic 
reformulation (SDR).   The ontogenesis of the self is now clearly stated as arising in 
human reciprococity, the reciprocal role repertoire becomes the predominant focus 
of the SDR.  The SDR is not intended to be an account of experience, but is used as 
an explanatory and theoretical device to describe the core reciprocal role repertoire 
(Ryle & Kerr, 2002). As a therapeutic tool, it directs its focus to emotionally important 
aspects and learned patterns of self-care. The SDR not only addresses the multiplicity 
of self but also addresses the intersubjective developmental origins of the structures 
and processes of the self. Ryle states,
For the therapist, the diagram is first and foremost a guide which can trace and 
make sense of the shifting parts played by the patient and of the accompany-
ing transference-countertransference variations. The developmental under-
standing points to the need to identify each role in relation to its reciprocal. 
As explained above a role, in this theoretical context, is understood to imply a 
pattern of action, expectation, affect and memory. Either pole of a core recip-
rocal role procedure may: 
1. Be enacted towards others who will be induced to play the reciprocal
2. Be enacted towards the reciprocal aspect of the self
3. Be transformed into an alternative avoidant, symptomatic or defensive 
procedure. (Ryle, 1997, p. 24)
With a return to a reciprocal/dialogical understanding, and with the development of 
the MSSM, the main therapeutic aim is to increase conscious awareness, facilitate 
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integration of dissociated states, and increase the capacity for contextual multiplicity 
for those individual who present with higher degrees of impairment to the processes 
and structures of the self.   Taking into account the impact of trauma and dissociation, 
the SDR is developed further to become the self-state diagrammatic reformulation 
(SSDR). This is to become the central heuristic tool in relation to the management and 
treatment of individuals with greater levels of disturbances. 
As can be seen from the description above, the SSDR developed over the course 
of a number of theoretical transitions; however, its origin can perhaps be traced back 
to Ryle’s modification of Kelly’s repertory grid. This modification of course became 
the dyad grid, which was a research instrument used to gain a phenomenologically 
informed analysis of the intersubjective nature of human consciousness. During this 
integration, Ryle’s early account of sign-mediated activity and his understanding of 
human reciprococity have developed further.
Ryle was introduced to the work of Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky (1896 -1934), a Russian 
scholar by his friend and colleague, Mikael Leiman, a Professor at the University of East 
Finland in the early 1990s. Following this introduction to the work of Vygotsky Ryle 
uses activity theory to attempt to bridge the gap between his early reciprocal/dialogical 
understanding and a single person psychology (Ryle, 1991). Centre stage for Vygotsky 
is the significance given to the role of the adult in relation to the child’s intellectual de-
velopment. Moreover, with the introduction of Vygotskian thought, emphasis is given to 
the use of cultural tools, artefacts and language with an understanding of how these are 
used in interpersonal relationships, eventually, particularly in relation to Egocentric 
speech, how this evolves to become an inner dialogue and becomes the main medium 
through which thought becomes de-contextualized. 
The use of tools becomes increasingly embedded in Ryle’s methodological frame-
work, and in the case of BPD, where the functioning of self processes is impaired and 
states switches and dissociation predominate, then the joint construction of an SSDR 
becomes central to the therapeutic process. The therapeutic process is informed by 
Ryle’s emphasis on human reciprocity and the intersubjective nature of the develop-
ment of the self.  When considering the impact of abuse and trauma Ryle clarifies his 
distinction between repression and dissociation.  
The multiple self state model rests on making a major distinction between re-
pression and dissociation. Repression is seen to operate at the level of the spe-
cific role procedures of Level 1; it results from intrapsychic conflict between 
individual wishes and prohibiting or threatening internal parentally-derived 
’voices’ and serves to avoid the anxiety provoked by challenging these, com-
monly through the elaboration of more submissive or avoidant interpersonal 
procedures, a process often accompanied by somatic symptoms. In contrast, 
dissociation represents the disruption of, or failure to develop, Level 2 con-
necting and sequencing metaprocedures. It is provoked by overwhelming 
emotional arousal, such as accompanies abuse, or by cues serving to bring 
such experiences to mind. A child exposed to repeated abuse may learn to dis-
sociate deliberately. While serving to avoid emotional distress, such defensive 
dissociation is not in any way the result of intrapsychic conflict. In repression 
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a less forbidden or less provocative reciprocation is offered to an unchanging 
internal parental figure. An example would be the replacement of expressed 
anger by passive aggression or avoidance. In moving between dissociated self 
states, on the other hand, the roles of both self and other are altered, for exam-
ple between patterns of bullying in relation to rebellion and patterns of ideal 
care giving in relation to need. The two processes of repression and dissocia-
tion may both operate in the same person, for in the course of development a 
harsh parent may both constitute an unmanageable external threat, provok-
ing dissociation, and be internalized (in some states) as a threatening, judge 
provoking repression. (Ryle, 1997, pp. 36 - 37)
Taking into account the two processes of repression and dissociation it is the move-
ment between dissociated self-states that becomes of significance. It is no longer se-
quential patterns of action, but a sequential movement from a state or a position of 
high risk towards an attempt to inhabit a protective self-state. 
Ryle’s therapeutic methodology changes from focusing on clinically significant re-
ciprocal role procedures. This is deemed sufficient in cases where individuals have 
the capacity for contextual multiplicity. The aim with the SSDR is to collaboratively 
capture a description of the all self-states in the patient’s repertoire, moreover; to aim 
to understand the sequential order of movement between self-states.  The case example 
below is used in Ryle’s book, ”Cognitive Analytic Therapy and Borderline Personality 
Disorder”, (Ryle, 1997), this is provided by one of Ryle’s colleagues, Hilary Beard who 
gives an account of the collaborative nature of naming self-states in the case of Elaine.
I suggested that it would be helpful to know about this loss of control and the 
changes of state she experienced, and she settled down to the task of describ-
ing these with great directness in a way which I came later to recognise as 
one of her strengths. The first ”mood” she described was called ”horrified”; it 
was accompanied by images of animals being slaughtered: ” I can’t watch but 
I know its there....I’ve seen awful things....I want to stab myself and die they 
way they die.” Later, we called this ”the slaughterhouse ”. A second ”mood” 
was called ”humiliated” and followed arguments: ”it seems the only thing I 
can do to prove I’m not going back down is to try and commit suicide or cut 
myself...”Associated with this was the depressed mood of hopelessness, gloom 
and despair. It lead to self-cutting; ”nothing on earth can stop me apart from 
someone hitting me; if only someone could flog all the badness and hatred out 
of me”. Sometimes her partner was seen as an intimidating bully, making her 
feel intimidated and paranoid (a state with clear origins in her early life), but it 
was evident that she too could be this bully to herself and too others. She went 
on to summarize herself in terms of opposites: either as ”a thing that curls up 
in the corner” or as ”arrogant and awful”. And finally, she was able to find one 
description of feeling good: one way of finding this was through her long-term 
interest in visiting the uncared-for and abandoned Lidos of London’s parks. 
This state was symbolised by, and called after, a small glass globe which she 
would hold and look at: ”it makes my mind feel good”. (Ryle, 1997, p. 100)
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The SSDR is in essence a psychological tool that takes into account the inherent prob-
lems brought about by dissociation, partial dissociation and repression. As a thera-
peutic methodology the reformulatory process involved in the collaborative construc-
tion of the SSDR, ”offers an effective means of controlling and of using therapeutically 
the chaos such patients bring” (Ryle, 1997, p. 105). It starts from a position where there 
is an expectation that due to the processes of dissociation and repression that there 
will be a degree of what Holmes referred to as ”narrative incompetence” (Holmes, 
1998b). Generally, individuals will usually be able to provide clear descriptions of pat-
terns of action and levels of expectations, and a vivid description of the affect associ-
ated with each state; however, relational memory might well be impaired.  Clinically/
therapeutically it is the therapist’s task to primarily identify the role taken by the 
patient in the self-state, but it is also their task to initiate a dialogue about the warded 
off or dissociated reciprocal role. Ryle and Kerr comment, 
It is often the case that both poles of the reciprocal pattern will be described 
as subjectively experienced states, as when both an abuser and a victim state 
are recognised, but in other cases only one pole will have been recognised as 
experienced subjectively, perhaps because the reciprocal is always perceived 
in, or elicited from (or in psychoanalytic terms ’projected into’), others. (Ryle 
& Kerr, 2002, p. 93).
With the inclusion of Vygotsky’s activity theory into the CAT model, the SSDR be-
comes a psychological tool, or sign, that acts as a mediator that assists abstraction. The 
therapist may use the SSDR as a conceptual tool to facilitate the non-reciprocation of 
damaging reciprocal role procedures. Thus, this enables the relational experience of 
therapy to be a perceptually different experience for the patient. In the collaborative 
construction of the SSDR jointly created signs are brought to life. Leiman reminds 
us ”sign meanings are created by the activities into which the sign is brought as me-
diator” (Leiman, 1995, p. 104), therefore in this context the SSDR becomes the tool 
through which the thoughts, or dialogue of isolated self-states becomes de-contextu-
alized. In summary, as a psychological tool the SSDR acknowledges and actively uses 
the interpsychological territory of the therapeutic encounter to increase conscious 
awareness and facilitate the integration of dissociated states. 
It may be concluded that Ryle’s therapeutic methodology addresses the develop-
mental aspects of the structure and processes of the self and clearly takes into ac-
count the impact of trauma and dissociation on these aspects. Moreover; it not only 
addresses the spatial nature of a multiple or dialogical self, but also addresses the 
reciprocal nature of a multiple or dialogical self and the sequencing of self-states. The 
SSDR is a therapeutic methodology designed to address psychopathology, however in 
the process it becomes a therapeutic methodology where psychopathology is clearly 
seen as a relational, social and cultural phenomena. 
In therapeutic encounters with individuals where, due to traumatic early experi-
ences, there are greater degrees of disturbance, the SSDR is a clinical tool unique 
to the CAT model. The SSDR can be described as a therapeutic methodology that 
increases the individual’s capacity for conscious self-reflection and facilitates a more 
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integrated sense of self.  Ryle considers self-reflection to be procedure in its own right, 
”which is derived from interactions from other” (Ryle 1997, p. 37). This will be a pro-
cedure that for some individuals may well only be available in a specific state/s, some 
of which might be avoided or dreaded states. The process of the internalisation of the 
reformulatory process in Elaine’s case is described below, Ryle comments, 
The process of her growing internalization of the reformulation, was summarized 
by her therapist as follows (the therapist’s account is recorded in normal type, the 
patient’s state and achievements in italics),
*Naming each state. Differentiating between different states. *Describing feel-
ing, images, words associated with all states, including those largely dissoci-
ated. Beginning to recognise states. *Linking states and relating them to key 
figures and to symptoms. Some sense of continuity. *Paths between states iden-
tified. More flexible, less disconnected. *Differentiation of self from different 
states. Sense of an ‘I’ beyond the states. *Clarity about what belongs to self, 
what to other. Sense of self as having control, possibility of getting what only oth-
ers seem to have. *Often can predict, control, avoid, alter, contain and soothe. 
Growing sense of power. State switches less frequent and intense. *Hope and 
intense fear of loss. Separation anxiety. (Ryle, 1997, p. 101)
In the account given by Elaine and her therapist, dissociated (and possibly repressed) 
aspects are now more to the fore. In the interpsychological territory of the therapeutic 
encounter, conscious awareness has been increased, isolated self-states show evi-
dence of becoming de-contextualized and more integrated. Ryle’s therapeutic meth-
odology, namely the joint construction of the SSDR has enabled Elaine to develop 
the procedure of self-reflection. Elaine is able to describe the subjective experience 
of occupying more of the roles in her repertoire; this is beginning to strengthen her 
perception of herself as a unique and individual subjectivity. She appears to be on 
the threshold of becoming capable of revising early dysfunctional reciprocal role pro-
cedures and thus increasing the possibility that this in turn will enable her to adapt 
limiting self-management procedures.   
7. 5 C LO S I N G R E FL E C T I O N S O N O F S TAT E S O F M I N D TO S TAT E S 
O F B E I N G
Theoretically, concerning the question of conscious awareness, Ryle concurs with 
Horowitz. In order to repair the damage to the fragmented self system, the therapeutic 
aim is to increase conscious awareness and facilitate integration. There is no ques-
tion that there are a number of commonality between Horowitz states of mind and 
Ryle’s states of being. At the core, for both Horowitz and Ryle there lies as a bedrock 
layer, a psychodynamic configuration, however Ryle adds other theoretical strata in 
addition to the cognitive and interpersonal strata added by Horowitz. These strata are 
strongly associated with Ryle’s return to focus on the intersubjective nature of human 
consciousness and the role of reciprocity. Ryle states,
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The CAT emphasis on the key developmental role of relationships as opposed 
to schema based upon representations of self and other is supported by ob-
servational studies of early development, for example the work of Trevarthen 
(Aitken and Trevarthen, 1997), which points to the innate, active search for so-
cial activity and communication that is evident from birth. (Ryle, 2005, p. 361)
In contrast, Horowitz has no conceptualisation concerning innate intersubjectivity, 
instead it is from interpersonal therapy that Horowitz directs his focus towards ”in-
terpersonal transactional patterns” (Horowitz, 1994, p. 184). Horowitz describes these 
transactional patterns in this manner, 
The patient and the therapist each come to therapy with their individual rep-
ertoires of relationship models. As they interact they may develop new ways of 
relating. The patient learns from these new interactions by identification with 
the adaptive behaviour styles of the therapist, and by unlearning maladap-
tive models. The patient learns by review of old patterns of interaction and by 
planning future self-images and roles. Naturally, the patient is also engaged 
in, and learning from new interactions outside of therapy. This phase of dis-
cussion covers relevant patterns of change in self-images and role relation-
ships. (Horowitz, 1979, pp. 103 - 104)  
Ryle’s understanding and inclusion of developmental theories conceptualisation of 
infants as having an innate intersubjectivity expands the conceptualisation of mul-
tiplicity.  It is now no longer merely a question of how as individuals we learn to 
contain our multiplicity through the restructuring of cause-and-effect beliefs, or the 
syntheses of previous incompatible models, or indeed the assimilation of new schema 
into pre-existing schema. With states of being, rather than states of mind as concep-
tualised by Horowitz, for Ryle it becomes a matter of contextualised multiplicity. Ryle 
provides an explanation, ”a state, in this approach, will be understood in relation to 
its reciprocal, whether this is internal or external, implicit or explicit” (Ryle, 1997, p. 
27). With reciprococity it is now no longer a question of multiplicity being a number of 
patterns of thought, essentially absorbed in their own activity, but a focus on recipro-
cal role procedures. 
With a return to reciprococity Ryle’s model spirals back towards its earlier dia-
logical understanding, the notions of representations of the other fades more to the 
background.  Ryle has now created a model that is more dialogic in nature rather than 
a model based on the concept of a self-contained individual mind. The very founda-
tions of self and conscious thought are directly linked to joint activity with others 
that involves the use of conceptual tools, signs and language. This is not articulated 
in Horowitz model.
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8 From the Forgotten Past 
of DST to a Contemporary 
Account 
In the previous chapter, Ryle returned to his early dialogical understandings focusing 
once again on the question of intersubjectivity. This was to expand his conceptuali-
sation of multiplicity. In contemporary DST, Hermans and Hermans-Konopka also 
expand their conceptualisation of multiplicity, returning to focus once again on ideas 
related to movements in metaphorical space. These movements are seen to take place 
in a rapidly changing world, where the collapse of traditional homogenous societies 
take place in tandem with greater interconnections between cultures and shifting 
social boundaries. Technical aspects of the modern world influence these intercon-
nections. What is of note in contemporary DST is the question of internal positions 
and external positions, and how tension and uncertainly create the phenomenon of 
an internal-external nexus. 
8.1 CO N T E M P O R A RY D I A LO G I C A L S E L F T H E O RY
Hermans and Hermans-Konopka have recently published a new work, namely, 
”Dialogical Self Theory. Positioning and Counter-Positioning in a Globalizing Society” 
(Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010). In this work, they address the social processes 
in the formation of the self in an increasingly globalizing society. The work predomi-
nately offers a cultural-anthropological view discussing the tensions, or certainty 
versus uncertainty created within the self in a world of global-local dialectics. To set 
the scene for the new theoretical juxtapositions the authors describe the process of 
tension and uncertainty in the following manner, 
On the basis of the philosophical literature, we argue that the mind does not 
simply coincide with itself and the world. In order to find meaningful answers 
in uncertain situations the person has to interrogate himself in order to find 
the proper direction. The mind is involved in a series of proposals and dis-
posals to itself that reflects the basic ”imperfection of the mind”, that is, the 
mind is a question to itself that cannot immediately be answered or a prob-
lem to itself that cannot immediately be resolved. This imperfection, which 
leaves room for the darker realms of the self (populated by ”shadow” or ”dis-
owned” positions), strongly contrasts with the clarity and transparent unity 
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of the modern Cartesian concept of the self. The metaphorical movements 
from one position to another in the landscape of the self are ways of gaining 
understanding about the self in relation to the world. (Hermans & Hermans-
Konopka, 2010, p. 8)
It is no easy task to understand Hermans and Hermans-Konopka’s’ contemporary ac-
count as new formulations are liberally introduced with little to no reference to earlier 
use of the dialogical self concept. To provide a base line from which an understand-
ing of their new work might be reached, we have to begin by stating the way they 
formulate as their point of departure the self’s primordial involvement with a world 
in which there is an ever-increasing globalizing society. In a globalizing society, a 
dialectical process between the forces of globalisation and localisation is emphasised. 
This involves a compression of space and time alongside a greater extension of the 
self into space and time. Hermans & Hermans-Konopka resolutely state, ”the self and 
identity can only be properly understood when their spatial and temporal nature is 
fully acknowledged” (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 120).
In a globalizing society, the spatial quality of the contemporary world is noted to 
be undergoing a radical change. Hermans’ earlier reformulation of Jaynes’ analog 
’I’ continues to be a central feature in contemporary DST; however, movements in a 
metaphorical space are enhanced by the collapse of traditional homogenous societies. 
Due to ever diminishing homogeneous cultures, Hermans and Hermans-Konopka 
describe the contemporary individual as being on the interface of differing cultures 
and as a result they state, ”the global-local nexus is not just a reality outside of the 
individual but is rather incorporated as a constituent of a dialogical self in action.” 
(Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 30). 
The authors expand their understanding of the spatial nature of self by juxtapos-
ing dialogical self theory with concepts from global systems theorists. In particular 
the work of Arjun Appadurai. 
8. 2 T H E I N C LU S I O N O F A N A N T H R O P O LO G I C A L V I E W
Appadurai is a social-cultural anthropologist. In his account, due to disjuncture and 
differences in a global cultural economy, human imagination is expanded to comprise 
five dimensions. Hermans and Hermans-Konopka utilise a variation on Appadurai’s 
five dimensions. I will set the scene to explain Hermans’ inclusion of these variations 
into his contemporary account by providing a direct quote from Appadurai on the 
faculty of imagination.
If globalization is characterized by disjunctive flows that generate acute prob-
lems of social well-being, one positive force that encourages an emancipator 
politics of globalization is the role of the imagination in social life (Appadurai, 
1996). The imagination is no longer a matter of individual genius, escapism 
from ordinary life, or just a dimension of aesthetics. It is a faculty that in-
forms the daily lives of ordinary people in myriad ways: It allows people to 
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consider migration, resist state violence, seek social redress, and design new 
forms of civic associations and collaborations, often across national bounda-
ries. This view of the role of imagination as a popular, social, collective fact in 
the era of globalisation recognises its split character. On one hand, it is in and 
through imagination that modern citizens are disciplined and controlled - by 
states, markets, and other powerful interests. But it is also the faculty through 
which collective patterns of dissent and new designs for collective life emerge. 
(Appadurai, 2001, p. 6)
With the concept of the self as a functional space without boundaries, the globalizing 
forces described by Appadurai enter and affect the contemporary self. Rather than 
adhere to concepts associated with ”the specific trait-based idea of ”culture” areas” 
(Appadurai, 2001 p. 8) primarily generated during the cold war era (Appadurai, 2001), 
he considers the creative abilities of social actors through imagination, defining this 
as social imaginary. Instead of a fixed, cultural architecture, with the faculty of social 
imaginary, cultural traits are replaced by the concept of social processes, or what 
Appadurai calls ”process” geographies (Appadurai, 2001).  Therefore having discarded 
the idea of cultural traits he focuses on ”areas of human organization as precipitates 
of various kinds of action, interaction, and motion - trade, travel, pilgrimage, warfare, 
proselytization, colonization, exile, and the like” (Appadurai, 2001 p. 8) to develop 
the concept of dimensions of global cultural flow named scapes. Appadurai describes 
five particular areas of global cultural flow, called 1) ethnoscapes; 2) mediascapes; 3) 
technoscapes; 4) financescapes; 5) ideoscapes. 
The influential phenomenon for Appadurai is the relations between, or the dis-
junctive flows between, the five named dimensions defined as scapes.   The relations 
between these scapes create a cultural field that facilitates globally imagined worlds. 
Access to globally imagined worlds ultimately leads to tensions and conflicts between 
nations and states, these power struggles have the capacity to initiate both beneficial 
and detrimental outcomes and are describes as the source that facilitates global flow. 
Appadurai has expanded Anderson’s concept of ”Imagined Communities” (Anderson, 
1983), where community is described as a phenomenon that requires imagination 
because in order to be a community it must extend beyond immediate experience.  
Hermans and Hermans-Konopka suggest that contemporary human beings have 
to react to globalizing phenomena, however, ”rather than unidirectional impact of 
globalization on the self, a dialectic relationship between globalization and localisa-
tion can be observed” (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010 p. 76). For Hermans and 
Hermans-Konopka the process of living in a contemporary social context involves 
and encapsulates three levels, the global, local and individual. Appadurai’s concept of 
social imaginary therefore is used as a rhetorical devise to emphasise that the dialogi-
cal self is extended over these levels. 
Hermans and Hermans-Konopka state,
Appadurai (1990) distinguished between a variety of categories of global land-
scapes: ethnoscapes (immigrants, tourists, refugees, guest workers, exiles); 
mediascapes (newspapers, television stations, film production studios); tech-
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noscapes (global configuration of technology, both mechanical and informal); 
financescapes (currency markets, stock exchanges, commodity speculations) ; 
and ideoscapes (ideology of states and counter-ideologies of movements; ideas 
about freedom, rights, welfare). Whereas in traditional homogeneous socie-
ties, technology, ideology, and media communication are to some degree inte-
grated, they are widely separated and disjunctive in contemporary societies. 
(Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 60)
Taking into account the impact of globalization, Hermans’ core theoretical metaphor 
once again changes.  The term imaginal landscapes of the mind is no longer viewed 
as an adequate means to define the complexity of the self. The functional space of a 
mind without boundaries in a contemporary society now includes global landscapes, 
therefore Hermans now redefines imaginal landscapes of the mind as a ”society of the 
mind” (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010 p. 62). This may be regarded as direct 
transfer of Appadurai’s model of social processes to the conceptualization of the self. 
Hermans and Hermans-Konopka suggest that the macrocosm of a globalising society 
is mirrored in the microcosm of the self.
This strategy of conceptual juxtaposition can also be seen in the account of the 
self’s evolving. Appadurai states:
A new architecture for producing and sharing knowledge about globalization 
could provide the foundations of a pedagogy that closes this gap and helps 
democratize the flow of knowledge about globalization itself. Such pedagogy 
would create new forms of dialogue  between academics, public intellectuals, 
activists and policymakers in different societies. (Appadurai, 2001, p. 20)
Likewise, the society of the mind is conceptualised as having a capacity (perhaps 
when honed and guided in therapy) to facilitate the democratization of dialogue be-
tween I positions/coalitions. 
Whilst social imaginary ”can create not only worship and charisma but also ani-
mosity and hate”(Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010 p. 73), there is the potential for 
knowledge to be shared and exchange between I-positions, closing the gap as it were, 
or shifting the balance of power between positions. 
8. 3 S PATA L I Z AT I O N A N D T E M P O R A L I T Y I N T H E S E L F
Hermans and Hermans-Konopka do not confine themselves to a spatial account but 
instead aim to construct a ”spatalization of the temporally ordered models of the self” 
(Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 113). They describe the dialogical self as 
simultaneously containing the traditional, modern and post-modern selves. 
In this process of ”temporal spatalization” there seems to be some sort of parallel 
with Hermans’ earlier work. During the narrative turn, temporality was introduced, 
it was central to the process of constructing an understanding of human experience. 
In the contemporary model, with the juxtaposition of Appadurai’s cultural-anthropo-
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logical view, the narrative plot in essence has been usurped, so to speak, by the global 
(plot) tensions. The concept of global flow replaces the narrative concept of there be-
ing a tension between stability and change.  
The configuration of a dialogical self that simultaneously contains the traditional, 
modern and post-modern selves carries more of an interventionist feel. It will be 
recalled that during the integration of the narrative model that a set of reflective 
processes were added to the structural framework of the self confrontation method 
(SCM). This was done in order to accommodate the conceptual shift of the newly for-
mulated temporal quality of valuations as self-narratives.  Indeed, with the expansion 
of spatalization through the process of globalization as a contemporary conceptual 
shift, the dialogical model is described as being ”a sufficiently strong model for the 
realization of dialogical relationships between different individuals, groups and cul-
tures” (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 114). 
8.4 O T H E R N E SS I N T H E S E L F,  T H E P O S I T I O N R E PE R TO I R E A N D 
I T S D E V E LO PM E N T
Considering the phenomenon of a compression of space that Hermans and Hermans-
Konopka describe following their juxtaposition of their variation of Appadurai’s five 
scapes of social imaginary, the spatial quality of the global world becomes more ac-
cessible. This results in a more complex repertoire of I-position,
The verb ”positioning” is a spatial term. It refers to the process in which the 
self is necessarily involved when part of the world in which people place each 
other and themselves in terms of ”here and now” and ”there”. When a person 
positions herself ”somewhere”, there are always, explicitly or implicitly, other 
positions involved that are located in the outer space around us or the inner 
metaphorical space. In this sense, I position myself as agreeing or disagree-
ing, as loving or hating, or as being close or opposed to another or to myself. 
An important theoretical advantage of the term positioning is that it can be 
used not only as an active but also a passive verb. From birth onwards we are 
positioned by our social environment (e.g., as a boy or girl, as black or white, as 
belonging to a majority of minority) and much of our active positioning can be 
seen as a monological or dialogical answer to these influences. We get engaged 
in dialogues or monologues when such positions become voiced positions that 
are heard or not heard, answered or not answered, and receive space for ex-
pression or not. (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, pp. 8-9)
With greater diversity, there is also the potential for greater conflict.
8.4.1 Promoter position
The increased complexity of the I-positions, now including the extra-psychic domains 
of the scapes in addition to the internal self-positions, requires some idea of how 
they are organized. The issue of hierarchy of I-positions was already addressed by 
101
Hermans in the polyphonic version of the self (Hermans & Kempen, 1993). In the 
revised model, it appears in the idea of the promoter position. 
The promoter position offers solution to the predominance of self-limiting I posi-
tions and assists in the process of the organisation of self. To introduce the concept 
of a promoter position, and the process of self organisation, Hermans and Hermans-
Konopka discuss the case of Leo2 (Hermans & Hermans Konopka, 2010). Leo has 
encountered a number of challenging life events; others attribute these to his ’per-
sonality’. Looking at the case from a dialogical self perspective, it would seem that 
the current predominant coalition of I-positions is acting as an obstacle to functional 
change. It will be recalled from chapter three that during the narrative turn the SCM 
was modified from a research tool that understood human consciousness from a first-
person perspective, to a therapeutic tool that utilised a more interventionist approach. 
Temporality and reflection-in-action became central to the process of change. During 
the dialogical turn, as noted in chapter four, there were further additions to the SCM, 
which then developed into the personal position repertoire (PPR). The PPR acknowl-
edged the spatial nature of the dialogical self.  In the case of Leo the therapists adopt 
a more interventionist approach in order to facilitate a re-working of Leo’s current 
predominate coalition, using future orientated questions to reveal and bring to the 
foreground an I-position that can facilitate an adaptive reorganization of the pro-
cesses of self.
Hermans and Hermans-Konopka describe the case. Leo’s colleagues have voiced 
their opinions concerning his ”arrogant behaviour”(Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 
2010, p. 229) and his lack of empathy towards others, in addition, his girlfriend has 
cited these as being the very reasons for ending their relationship. Unable to let go of 
the relationship Leo stalks his ex-girlfriend and her new partner. Having been given 
several accounts of himself as an arrogant and obsessive individual, the 29-year-old 
Leo seeks out therapy. On entering therapy the ”I as stalker”(Hermans & Hermans-
Konopka, 2010, p. 229) is identified as being a position in Leo’s internal domain, and 
it is reported as showing the highest correlation with the ”I as avenger” (Hermans & 
Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 229) position. An investigation is conducted concerning 
past and present associations with the I as avenger position. In Leo’s external space 
or position, his ex-girlfriend Laura is of particular significance. This significance is 
explored further using the self confrontation method (Hermans and Hermans-Jansen, 
1995) and ”I as dreamer” (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 230) position is 
discovered to be a background position that is also related to the external position 
that Laura held for Leo. A different voice emerges when the ”I as dreamer position is 
explored further.  The author’s state,
After comparing the formulations from the two positions the therapist and Leo 
concluded that, from the perspective of the avenger, Leo’s stalking behaviour 
was an act of restoring his self-esteem which had been threatened by Laura’s 
decision to end their relationship. From the perspective of the dreamer, this 
2 The original case study was written by Hermans in 2003.
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behaviour could be understood as a way of attracting Laura’s attention and 
to play the role of hero in her eyes. Although the dreamer was experienced 
by Leo as opposite to the avenger, the dreamer played a highly significant 
role in his behaviour towards his ex-girlfriend. The discussion between the 
therapist and Leo led to the insight that the stalker, avenger, and the dreamer 
formed a coalition in which the avenger was aroused in an effort to restore the 
threatened ideals of the dreamer. In the service of the unrealistic dreamer and 
the self-affirmative avenger, Leo became the stalker. (Hermans & Hermans-
Konopka, 2010, p. 230)
It seems, then, that the dreamer represents a kind of meta-position in the coalition 
of the three problem positions that provoked Leo’s stalking. Having established this 
understanding of the coalition Leo and his therapist then focus on positions that might 
be of relevance to his future development. On scanning the checklist (this is a list of 
common internal and external positions) Leo identifies ”I as accepting” (Hermans & 
Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 231) as resonating for him. This new position now adopts 
a role in transforming the power-relations of the problematic coalition and is named as 
the promoter position that assists change when the I as dreamer position is able to form 
a coalition with the newly identified promoter position, (I as accepting). Hermans and 
Hermans-Konopka highlight as being significant that the I as dreamer position has 
become integrated with the I as accepting. They summarise in the following manner,
As a result of this (beginning) integration, his dreamer position lost much of 
its unrealistic and narcissistic quality, and became more focused on attainable 
goals. His formulations suggested that the accepting position helped him to 
cope with his aggressive feelings and childish fantasies and stimulated him 
to reach some higher level of development. (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 
2010, p. 232).
The promoter position (I as accepting) has an effect of changing Leo’s way of acting in 
other spheres of his life as well. The case example includes statements made by Leo 
from his I as accepting position, which are as follows, 
Whereas Johnson [previous employer] reacted somewhat amused to my self-
image (dreamer), I see now that I get respect from Jackson [present employer]; 
for example, my suggestions are followed and I get respect from the adminis-
tration. (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 231). 
In the case example, Leo recognised the ”I as accepting” in the checklist of the self in-
vestigation. How did it become salient for him? Rather than offering  a developmental 
account of the origins of the promoter position in therapy, Hermans and Hermans-
Konopka provide a cultural-anthropological explanation citing the phenomenon 
known as ”shape shifting” (Gieser, 2006).
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8.4.2 Shape shifting
Gieser studies the phenomenon in relation to dialogical self theory claiming that acts 
of shape shifting affect the configuration of the person’s internal I-positions. He states, 
I will present an interpretation of a religious phenomenon, shape-shifting, 
conceived of as movement of positions whereby an external position tempo-
rarily becomes a dominant internal position. I will argue that religious phe-
nomena can modify not only the self-confrontation method or the content of 
the PPR, but also the mechanisms of the dialogical self. (Gieser, 2006, p. 444) 
Gieser has drawn examples from Greenwood’s ”Magic, Witchcraft, and the Otherworld” 
(Greenwood, 2000), this paper discusses the practice of Wicca in the United Kingdom. 
Wiccans view the boundaries between the natural world and the spiritual world as 
permeable, Gieser describes the following process,
The Other-world is a ’macrocosm’, which is mirrored in the ’microcosm’ of 
this world. Accordingly, the world is mirrored in every single person: that is, 
every person acts as a microcosm in respect to the world, thereby embodying 
the whole world. If this is believed to be the case, then a change of identity is a 
change from one aspect of the self to another aspect of the self. Shape-shifting 
here is not necessarily a change between separate entities, it is a means of 
imaginative communication with the forces of that Otherworld (and thereby 
with oneself) to actually become part of a respective personalized force via 
meditation techniques and imagination, especially visualization techniques. 
(Gieser, 2006, p. 446) 
Gieser suggests that Wiccans in general equate the Otherworld with the unconscious 
and that the process of shape-shifting is a vehicle to access the unconscious. In his 
summary, Gieser refers to the idea postulated by Greenwood that the ritual is used in 
order to counteract previous experiences of powerlessness. 
The theme of empowerment is echoed in Gieser’s second example of the practices 
of the Kuranko culture (Gieser, 2006). It describes shape-shifting as an ”innate abil-
ity of a man” (Gieser, 2006, p. 449) in the case of Mohammad, an ex-soldier who has 
been demobbed and has become disaffected, cut off from his original community. 
Mohammad’s account of his purpose in utilising his shape-shifting ability was an 
account of a means to extract revenge. 
But you must have a purpose, such as destroying someone’s crops. If someone 
offends you and you cannot take revenge by ordinary means you’ll walk ahead 
of that person in the bush, change, then fall on him as he passes on his way 
back to the village. (Jackson, 1989, p. 110)
By adopting, temporarily, the shape of an elephant Mohammad was able to restore some 
of his sense of dignity. As well as a shift in the power dynamics, what Gieser highlights 
in the Kuranko culture is ”persons exist only in relation to one another” (Gieser, 2006, p. 
450), this ”another” of course includes natural and spiritual phenomena.
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Under the aegis of the accounts of shape-shifting extracted from Wicca and the 
case of Mohammad, shape-shifting is describes as a relocation of consciousness. As 
his point of departure from a psychoanalytic account of this phenomenon, aiming at 
a dialogical account Gieser states, 
Within this frame-work, shape-shifting is a process whereby an external po-
sition (into which the shape-shifter had transformed) is given a voice (i.e. 
transformed into an I-position) and finally becomes a dominant internal posi-
tion (during the process of shape-shifting) which suppresses all other voices. 
(Gieser, 2006, p. 453)
Illustrating the dynamic of the promoter position through shape-shifting, Hermans 
and Hermans-Konopka accomplish two things. First, shape-shifting seems to transfer 
the two domains of external and internal in the structure of the self. Secondly, it also 
has the power of generating a new hierarchy of I-positions. To illuminate this point a 
long quote from Hermans and Hermans- Konopka is required. 
From a theoretical point of view Gieser analyses the process of shape-shifting 
as a dynamic relationship between two domains of the self: the internal and 
the external (or extended) domain. An external position (the animal as the 
object of identification) is transformed into an internal position (”I as ani-
mal”). As soon as the external position has been appropriated by the internal 
domain, it becomes so dominant that it suppresses all the other positions in 
the internal domain. In this phase of the transformation process, the power-
ful asymmetries between the positions are pushed to the extreme, resulting 
in a monological self. There is only one voice that reigns in the self, the voice 
of the person-as-animal. The shape-shifter believes that he has transformed 
himself into the reality of another being, which increases his strength and 
power to the upmost. After a period of shape-shifting, however, the new po-
sition loses its dominance and, receiving its place among a variety of other 
positions, it becomes a normal dialoguing partner in a multi-voiced self. The 
new position become stabilized as part of the repertoire, together with all the 
rewarding characteristics the shape-shifter attributes to it (power, control, 
and healing.) Although the new position has lost its absolute dominance in the 
self, it has the capacity to subordinate and influence earlier positions that were 
characterized by marginality and powerlessness (Gieser, 2006). (Hermans & 
Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 233)
It seems that, in this new phase, anthropological concepts are incorporated to account 
for two aspects of the dialogical self theory that have been important in the earlier 
versions of the model, i.e., the question of the internal hierarchy of the self, and sec-
ondly the nature of imagination. It may be recalled that valuations were constructed 
as the personally significant objects of consciousness in a Jamesian fashion, and when 
accompanied by the Jamesian conceptualisation of self-feeling a capacity for self-love 
and self-seeking was engendered. Originally, valuations were seen as the cognised 
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expression of personal experience with the nomothetically constructed affective com-
ponents associated with the valuation seen as reflecting its personal meaning.  In the 
course of identifying the affective components of valuations, Hermans identified a 
range of affective contrasts. This led him to postulate the notion that there were two 
basic human motives, these were defined as the self-enhancement motive (S motive) 
and the (O motive), a desire for contact and union. The person’s repertoire of valu-
ations was structured by way of these two motives. The valuations, however, were 
understood as intentional objects and the process of self-confrontation relating valu-
ations with affects, was a structured means to reflect on them. 
Furthermore, it may also be recalled that during the narrative turn, the two ba-
sic motives were linked to two basic themes in collective stories (Hermans, 1988 & 
Hermans & Van Gilst, 1991). Imagination was deemed an important component in the 
development of a narrative identity (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995). Juxtaposed 
alongside the Vichean concept of ingenium, the poetic and rhetorical aspects of inge-
nium led to imagination being defined as a powerful tool and a creative force in the 
process of stability and change. In addition, with the inclusion of Jaynes’ concept of 
mind space (Jaynes, 1976), the external world became part of the inner, conscious ex-
perience of self reflection. This of course set the scene for decentralisation of the self 
and the introduction of the I-positions. However, in the polyphonic model they were 
still intra-psychic positions. The interplay between external and internal positioning 
is now elaborated by the ”scapes” and shape-shifting, which adds a new element into 
the picture..   
8.4.3 The introduction of shimcheong
In keeping with a cultural-anthropological view, Hermans and Hermans-Konopka 
extend the understanding of affects to the social domain by introducing a Korean 
cultural/vernacular concept called shimcheong (Choi & Kim, 2004). This particular 
term is described by Choi and Han in their paper ”Shimcheong Psychology: A Case of 
an Emotional State for Cultural Psychology” as ”an indigenous emotional state, which 
plays critical roles in interpersonal relationship making in Korea” (Choi & Han, 2008, 
p. 206).”The term Shimecheong consists of two parts: shim meaning mind and cheong 
meaning affection” (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 284).  
Choi and Han (2008) view this as primarily being related to dyadic relationships, it 
is a process that maintains relational harmony through the subjugation of individual-
ity. A further account from Choi and Han will clarify this further.
Interactions based on ”from one mind to another” occur most frequently 
between family members. Parents have developed the ability to read their 
children’s mind and to act accordingly even when the children do not unfold 
explicitly their inner feelings. Children also behave in the considerate ways 
of their parents’ wishes and desires although these are not explicitly stated. 
Ability to read each other’s shimcheong unspoken outwardly and to react ac-
cordingly is well-developed in the parent-child relationships in Korea (Choi 
& Kim, 1999, 1999b). Let’s take an example of shimcheong discourse between 
son and mother (Choi, Han & Kim, 2007):
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On a rainy day, a mother was waiting for her son coming back from school 
with an umbrella for him at a bus stop. Finally, the bus arrived and the son 
got angry on seeing his mother. ”You shouldn’t have come out here with the 
umbrella for me”. The mother replied, ”My baby, sorry about that”.
Superficial contents of this discourse are constituted by a complaint made 
by the son about his mother and an apology made by his mother. However, 
this dialogue illustrates a typical case of shimcheong exchange. The son must 
be grateful for the considerate behaviour of his mother. Nonetheless, the son 
hides his real shimcheong of gratitude by getting angry with his mother. The 
mother also conceals her true shimcheong of being disappointed at her son’s 
blame just apologizing to him. In this episode, both parties have exchanged 
the mind of caring implicitly. (Choi & Han, 2008 p. 215) 
In shimcheong, Hermans and Hermans-Konopka attempt to overcome some tra-
ditional dichotomies and restrictions in Western psychology, such as cognition and 
emotion, self and other, internal and external, and finally, space and time. 
Because Shimcheong implies (shared) emotions, it takes place in a common 
space where the other and the self meet and, moreover, where the internal 
and external positions create a platform for the emergence of we-positions. 
Conceived in the way Shimcheong takes into account the position history and 
context of the parties involved. These possibilities of self and identity pose 
a challenge to the Western concept of self-esteem. The question is this: is 
it possible to develop forms of self-esteem that go beyond individualism, as 
typical of the modern model of the self and generate we-positions that func-
tion in such a way that the costs of the pursuit of individualistic self-esteem 
are reduced? In our view, this question can be answered only by theories that 
go beyond the container view of the self and acknowledge the fundamental 
otherness of self and identity. (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 287)
With the inclusion of shimcheong focus seems to be shared, implicit emotion. This 
understanding is quite remote from Hermans’ original conception of affects as signs 
of persons’ internal positioning with regards to their valuations. However, shimcheong 
echoes the tension between the two basic motives of self-enhancement and longing 
for union, played out in human relationships. The illustration suggests a communica-
tive resolution that seems to preserve the differing points of view (to the umbrella) 
while, implicitly, preserving the union between son and mother.
This description of ”a complex cultural emotional state operating in Korean soci-
ety” (Choi and Han, 2008, p. 219) seems somewhat contrived in the reformed model. 
The shared implicit, rather than reciprocal emotion of shimcheong is a theme that is 
continued in their account of dialogical love.
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8. 5 D I A LO G I C A L LOV E
Dialogical love (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 295) has less of a temporal 
quality as it is described as a phenomenon linked strongly to the immediate and pre-
sent moment. Where dialogical love is present, the process of giving and receiving is 
no longer seen as separate actions, but instead seen as actions that coincide. Hermans 
and Hermans-Konopka describe love as an emotion that has the capacity to be ”spatially 
bi-directional” (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 299), however, dialogical love 
transcends the bi-directionality and increases its spatial qualities as both internal and 
external I-positions associated with the loved one are described as being taken  into ”the 
deeper regions” (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 296) of the self.
The loved one opens new doors through which new spaces become acces-
sible, which in turn lead to new experiences that give strong innovative and 
transformative impulses to the self and its further development. Through this 
two-step extension, the loved one becomes a central position in the self and is 
experienced as an important promoter of the lover’s development.(Hermans 
& Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 297) 
Hermans and Hermans-Konopka seem to reinforce the idea that dialogical love is solely 
conceptualized as an adult-to-adult phenomenon by using an extract from an unnamed 
man’s journal, written during a cycling trip when he is temporarily apart from his 
girlfriend. The salient point they wish to raise is that due to the love he feels for his 
girlfriend he experiences his trip not only through his own eyes, but also through hers.
During my bike trip some days ago, I looked with intense interest at the horses, 
elegantly moving in the meadows near the river. It occurred to me that they 
aroused more interest in me than ever before. I enjoyed their strength and 
beauty and I looked at them with love. After a while I became aware that Laura 
[his girlfriend] was looking at the horses through my eyes...When I continued 
my trip, I was conversing with her in my imagination and I expressed my love 
to her, almost silently speaking sweet words. While I was doing this, I looked 
at the gentle rolling meadows with the majestic mountains at the background. 
It was as if she was merging with this natural environment and was answering 
me through its expressive beauty.
Later, when I was home, I felt a strong urge to know more about her family, 
her father, her mother, brother, and sister. What did they do in the past? How 
were they connected with her? (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 296)
The above account of the bike trip is a description of approbation of Laura’s I-positions. 
The diary writer adopts her position to the horses rather than his own (or his ”pre-
dialogical love” position). Hermans and Hermans-Konopka describe dialogical love 
as being central to the process of change, as it is ”a space-providing emotion par 
excellence” (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 308). The promoter position re-
ceives here a new aspect. It now appears as an external one, which mediated by love, 
becomes internal. 
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8.6 S U M M A RY
In the most recent reformulation of dialogical self theory, real positions in the land-
scape of the mind are superseded by phenomena such as scapes, shape-shifting, the 
arousal of shimcheong or we-ness, and the creation of shared emotion.  This refram-
ing facilitates a self, capable of achieving relational and emotional harmony through 
movements from self-limiting emotional positions, (such as Leo’s aggressive feelings) 
to more benign emotional positions. 
The anthropological view enforces a reformulation that results in a movement 
away from Hermans’ original phenomenologically informed analysis of conscious-
ness. In the contemporary account, what appears to come to the fore are the meta-
phorical movements resulting in an internal-external nexus where self-other distinc-
tion is temporarily lost. 
From my reading, this internal-external nexus appears to facilitate some form 
of projective identification.  In order to stress the nature of this phenomenon I will 
appropriate Bion’s account of ’parasitism’ (Bion, 1965). A direct citation from Bion 
provides an account of this phenomenon  ”The patient draws on the love, or benevo-
lence of the host to extract knowledge and power which enables him to poison the 
association and destroy the indulgence on which he depends for his existence” (Bion, 
1965, p. 28). This citation aptly describes the destructive nature of Bion’s description of 
parasitism. In Hermans and Hermans-Konopka’s anthropological account, projective 
identification and /or parasitism is more benign in nature. The invasion of the ’other’ 
seems primarily aimed at the extraction of the power and knowledge of the ’other’ 
in order to overcome uncertainty created by global and local dialectics. The tensions 
inherent in the global-local nexus seem to alter the ability of I-positions to construct 
meaning. The authors claim that with an ever-increasing complexity to self, that there 
are some positions that hold no meaning; the authors define this as a place of absurd-
ity. Uncertainty therefore acts as a force that causes the multiple dispersed self to seek 
yet another part, there is continued movement between certainty and uncertainty. 
Hermans & Hermans-Konopka’s contemporary account of self is seen to present a 
direct challenge to the concept of the Cartesian unitary self. The authors state,
The dispersed self is basically uncertain because it is never complete at any 
moment in time and needs ”another part of itself” in order to arrive at some 
clarity in its relation to itself and the world. This uncertainty strongly con-
trasts with the Cartesian self that results from the search for complete cer-
tainty, expressed in the famous dictum Cogito ergo sum (”I think therefore I 
am”).(Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 135).
In this description there remains a quality of a fugit amour, however the unreachable 
other become accessible through a form of projective identification which is used to 
temporarily alter the ”imperfection of the mind” to gain a new understanding or form 
a new meaning. 
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9 From the Forgotten Past 
of CAT to a Contemporary 
Account 
Chapter seven provides an overview of Hermans and Hermans-Konopka’s anthro-
pological view in which the authors are able to conceptualise the basic imperfections 
of the mind in which a series of proposals and disposals occur. The imperfect mind 
contains space to incorporate other positions, or indeed shadow or disowned positions 
found within a world of global-local dialectics, and due to transitions to moments of 
uncertainty is compelled to find meaning. Rather than dialectics, tensions and move-
ments between certainty and uncertainty being seen as the source for ontogenesis of 
the self, CAT in contrast relies on the social origin of the self in reciprocal actions. The 
concept of the Cartesian unitary self is also challenged by CAT’s conceptualisation 
of a dialogical self. In CAT, the focus and challenge is directed to the Cartesian no-
tion of centrality and independence of the thinking self (Ryle & Kerr, 2002). Ryle and 
Kerr state, ”in essence, the dialogical approach replaces the ’I think, therefore I am’ 
of Descartes with ’We interact and communicate, therefore I become’” (Ryle & Kerr, 
2002, p. 59). Ryle and Kerr consider the development of the self in a socially situated 
interpersonal context, considering how this influences and shapes the development 
of higher mental functioning.
9.1 CO N T E M P O R A RY CO G N I T I V E A N A LY T I C T H E R A PY 
In an attempt to describe and discuss the nuances of contemporary CAT, which has 
attempted to integrate cultural, developmental, dialogical, and semiotic understand-
ings, I will mention, perhaps for some, a familiar game, called the ”Minister’s cat”.  To 
briefly explain, this is a game to help children increase their language skills. Players 
will take turns to use an adjective to describe the cat’s qualities, running through 
all the letters of the alphabet. For example, the Minister’s cat is an adorable or an 
abominable cat. In keeping with the game, to describe CAT (in its contemporary form); 
an adequate description would be to say it is now a transformed CAT.  The (undevel-
oped) dialogical understanding outlined in objects relations theory has been made 
more robust  with the inclusion of Vygotskian activity theory (Ryle, 1991), and further 
enhanced by the inclusion of the Bakhtinian understanding of sign mediation with 
Winnicott forming the bridge between the two, (Leiman, 1992). 
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In a number of ways, it feels genuinely legitimate to describe contemporary CAT as 
a transformed model. In placing  emphasis on the ontogenesis of self,  viewing the de-
velopment of self as a social phenomenon, CAT has developed a number of conceptual 
ideas that add to and enhance the voice of ”critical psychology” (Billig, 2008, p. 2) and ac-
knowledge, that as human beings we are not separate from the ”social processes of his-
tory” (Billig, 2008, p. 2). The historical process of its own development however means 
that the model contains vestiges of its earlier monadic views of self, from conceptual 
juxtapositions with cognitivist, attachment seeking and humanistic understandings of 
the self (Pollard, 2000, p. 4). Ryle’s focus has been directed, at different points in the 
development of CAT, to the sequential and reciprocal nature of the self, and indeed, it 
is the notion of a reciprocal nature of self that in many ways lies at the heart of contem-
porary CAT. A sign of this is the popularity of the word ”relational” in the professional 
discussions among CAT therapists. In what follows, I will try to elucidate some of the 
complexities underlying this qualifying attribute that is used to characterize the model.
Notwithstanding many transformed aspects of the model, conceptual tensions 
related to monadic views of self remain; for example, the cognitive view of sequenc-
ing continues to impede the description of human activity in truly reciprocal terms. 
My account of contemporary CAT highlights two attempts, namely the approbation of 
the Vygotskian idea of sign-mediated action and the zone of proximal development 
and secondly, the attempt at describing the multiplicity of the self by the multiple self 
state model (or the MSSM), which partly addresses the Bakhtinian notions of dialogue 
and voice. 
9.1 M OV E M E N T TOWA R D S A N U N D E R S TA N D I N G O F S I G N -
M E D I AT E D AC T I O N  
With the ongoing integration of cognitive and analytic ideas, having turned, in the 
third integration away from a focus on the sequential organisation of action back to-
wards the key role of relationships, Ryle turned to pursue an increased understand-
ing of the development of higher mental functioning. This was now however to be 
considered in a social context.  
Throughout the historical development of the CAT model, a clear thread running 
through Ryle’s work is his quest to understand the structure of self. In studying the 
epidemiology of psychological distress this quest has held a bias towards ”abnormal 
emotional and personality development, and of how these may be traced back to the 
earliest stages of life” (Ryle, 1991, p. 312). Ryle’s understanding, even in his very early 
work, appears to be based on viewing this as a relational, social and cultural phenom-
enon. With the inclusion of activity theory, the development of the infant is no longer 
defined in individualistic terms, but in a socially situated interpersonal context. It is 
the quality of the relationships and joint activity with caregivers, or indeed that which 
is absent in the relationship and joint activity with care givers, that provide the scaf-
folding for individual development; moreover;  it is within this context of joint activity 
that distinctions of the self are formed through the acquisition of reciprocal roles.
In order to expand on Ryle’s integration of object relations theory with Vygotskian 
activity theory it is perhaps helpful to refer to Ryle’s description in his paper ”Object 
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relations theory and activity theory” (Ryle, 1991) of Vygotsky’s interest in under-
standing higher mental functions. In this paper, Ryle reminds us of Vygotsky’s ”non-
dogmatic Marxism” (Ryle, 1991, p. 311) and his aim to develop a Marxist psychology. 
Based on the concept of historical activity, Marx discusses the transformative nature 
of tool use for societal development and the emergence of language. This was to be 
the foundation of Vygotsky’s understanding of sign mediation in his formulation of 
signs as psychic tools (Silvonen, 2010). A salient quote from Silvonen is required in 
order to understand Vygotsky’s primary account of sign mediation; this was given in 
the time when he moved away from his early socio-behaviourist understanding of 
consciousness (Silvonen, 2010).
Vygotsky conceptualised in the first phase of his cultural-historical theory sign 
mediation in terms of psychological tools as instruments. This was also the 
conceptual background to Vygotsky’s experimental methodology. The meth-
od of double stimulation (Luria & Vygotsky, 1992; Sakharov, 1994, Vygotsky, 
1987) is influenced by the assumption that secondary signs included in the 
psychological operations are instruments or tools for the acting individual. 
Internalization, according to this interpretation, is a direct process of moving 
the external sign-tools into internal ones. Leontyev, in his 1931 major study of 
memory, makes the point clear; ’Only through a kind of process of ”ingrowth” 
are they converted into internal symbols’ and, in the way into higher psycho-
logical functions (Leontyev, 1981, 363). (Silvonen, 2010, p. 9).
This Vygotskian account of sign-mediation is required in order to review Ryle’s use of 
activity theory.  It may be helpful to reiterate that Ryle does not view himself as a judi-
cious builder of psychological theory; instead, he has adopted a pragmatic approach 
assimilating concepts and ideas that made sense of his clinical approach/experience. 
In my reading of Ryle’s juxtaposition of activity theory with object relations theory 
there appears to be two aspects of relevance. One is to address the ontological ques-
tion of human activity and the second is to move away from a ”schematic representa-
tion of internal structures” (Ryle, 1991, p. 309). 
Sociogenesis is a fundamental principal for Vygotsky. His socio-genetic law states, 
”Every function in the cultural development of the child appears on the stage twice, in 
two planes, first, the social, then the psychological, first between people as an inter-
mental category, then within the child as an intramental category” (Vygotsky, 1997c, p. 
106). It may be recalled, that originally, Ryle’s concept of reciprocal roles represented 
a Fairbairnian form of intersubjectivity; this was followed during the cognitive turn, 
by a representational understanding, where reciprocal roles were seen as templates 
(and accordingly named reciprocal role procedures). 
Vygotsky’s socio-genetic law provides a distinctly social origin of the formation of 
primitive reciprocal role procedures (Ryle, 1991). On this basis, Ryle considers activity 
theory as an addendum to the procedural sequence object relations model (PSORM). It 
is hard not to view this as the germ of a new theoretical understanding. The Vygotskian 
account of activity theory with sign mediation as a general concept seems to provide 
a sort of theoretical glue between Ryle’s early phenomenologically informed analyses 
of the intersubjective nature of human consciousness with the sequential patterns 
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of activity, (the focus during Ryle’s cognitive turn).  With the inclusion of Vygotsky’s 
activity model Ryle is able to stress the primacy of social experiences, and in addition 
the idea of psychological tools in relation to cognitive development. 
Ryle describes his early formulation of the procedural sequence model (PSM) as an 
attempt to take concepts from psychoanalytic therapy and cognitive and behavioural 
therapy (Ryle, 1991), to achieve a cross fertilisation between these two approaches, 
to make a restatement in cognitive terms. With the inclusion of activity theory, Ryle’s 
seems to continue to aim to reinforce this union.  It will be recalled, (chapter five) that, 
in the first integrative phase, Ryle focused on mother-baby and/or husband-wife pairs. 
The notion of reciprocity and the influence of social phenomena have historically been 
axiomatic to Ryle’s development of theory and clinical practice. The primacy of social 
and historical experience of the formation of higher mental functions contained within 
Vygotsky’s account act as a stepping-stone towards Ryle’s earlier restatement of object 
relations ideas of personality development.   Activity theory seemed for Ryle to enhance 
the developmental account offered by object relations theorists. Ryle states,
In developing the procedural sequence object relations model, the first aim 
was to find a way of integrating the ideas and practices of different approaches 
to psychotherapy and the second was to place psychotherapy in a broader 
theoretical setting. Neither cognitive-behavioural nor psychoanalytic theories 
are free from serious reductionism in their accounts of human experience, 
whereas activity theory, however patchily developed at present, proposes a 
view of individual development which places man in his full human and his-
torical context. (Ryle, 1991, p. 315).    
However, Ryle not only attempted to place humanity in its historical context, he ex-
tended ”activity theory to earlier ages (with a bias towards abnormality)” (Ryle, 1991, 
p. 314). Therefore, with the inclusion of activity theory, Ryle can ground the ontologi-
cal development of personality in a cultural and social milieu. In his summary of the 
inclusion of activity theory in the CAT model, Ryle states, 
Vygotsky was concerned (in a way that Piaget was not) with the ’highly charged 
experiences of intimate relationships’ of the child because of the emphasis he 
placed on the adult’s role in the process of intellectual growth through inter-
nalization, and he was interested (in a way that psychoanalysts are not) in the 
absolute importance of object relations (i.e. sign-mediated joint activity) for 
culturally shaped cognitive development. (Ryle, 1991, p. 315).    
9. 2 ZO N E O F PR OX I M A L D E V E LO PM E N T ( Z PD)
Activity theory, with its emphasis on intellectual development resulted in a peda-
gogical turn in CAT. As Vygotsky refined his own understanding, higher psychologi-
cal structures very clearly became defined as relational and cultural creations and 
indeed, in order to emphasis this phenomenon Vygotsky introduced the construct of 
the zone of proximal development (1978). With the inclusion of activity theory into 
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the CAT model, the maxim for an understanding of the development of personality, 
and indeed the maxim for the work of therapy became the Vygotskian concept zone 
of proximal development (Ryle & Kerr, 2002), henceforth referred to as ZPD.
Ryle’s interests in the sociogenetic roots of development led him to consider the 
work of Jerome Bruner, an American psychologist. There is once again an interweav-
ing of psychoanalytic and cognitive concepts. Ryle links Bruner’s ideas on internaliza-
tion with those of Vygotsky, both hold the idea that sociogenesis is the fundamental 
principal in the process of internalization. Bruner cites ”curiosity” (Bruner, 1966, p. 
114) as a fundamental human attribute, ”man is born into a culture that has as one of 
its principal functions the conservation and transmission of past learning” (Bruner, 
1966, p. 113). For Bruner a unique capacity associated with human beings is not only 
their curiosity and capacity to learn, but also the capacity to pass on higher skills 
and knowledge (Wood, Bruner & Ross, 1976). In their paper ”The Role of Tutoring in 
Problem Solving”, (Wood, Bruner & Ross, 1976) the authors formulate a ”theory of in-
struction” (Wood, Bruner & Ross, 1976, p. 98) called ”the ’scaffolding’ process” (Wood, 
Bruner & Ross, 1976, p. 98). Scaffolding is seen as essentially the processes through 
which children learn and increase their cognitive capacities, enabling them to prob-
lem solve, or complete tasks that are more complex. In order to pass on knowledge and 
higher skills, it is the adult’s role to stimulate and encourage the child. 
Bruner’s concept of scaffolding is, in CAT terms, understood as a framework, for 
”the ’learning’ involved in personality development” (Ryle & Kerr, 2002, p. 42). In 
the process of understanding the formation and adaptation of self processes, Ryle 
and Kerr highlight three points, the latter two are seen as central to the adaptation 
of limiting early self processes. The three points described by Ryle and Kerr are ”(1) 
’scaffold’ learning in the patient’s ZPD (perhaps better labelled here as the zone of 
proximal personality development ZPPD), (2) provide a significant empathic relation-
ship in which (3) appropriate mediating ’tools’  are created” (Ryle & Kerr, 2002, p. 42). 
In order to understand this rather compressed citation, more information is required. 
In what follows, I will try to elucidate further.  
A modified version of Bruner’s concept of scaffolding and a modified version of 
Vygotsky’s concept of ZPD suggest, the facilitating environment in which personal-
ity develops in a milieu of relational experiences, and the perceived meanings of the 
artifacts and language contained within the individual’s exposure to the available 
culture/s. Of primary importance is the style in which this scaffolding is supplied by 
the caregivers. In this context, the crucible for personality development resides in 
protoconversations orchestrated between the caretaker in relation to the infant. In 
this arena, there are transitions of values, assumptions and meanings, which become 
the structures underlying conscious thought. However, because protoconversations 
”and the reciprocal role relationships they embody” (Ryle & Kerr, 2002, p. 41) are 
mediated by ”prelinguistic mediating tools” (Ryle & Kerr, 2002, p. 41) they are not in 
themselves open to conscious reflection, although, collectively, they act as the founda-
tion for conscious thought. This is of marked significance for the developing sense of 
self as it may come to contain ”restrictions and distortions” (Ryle & Kerr, 2002, p.42), 
and indeed ”inherited” perceived meaning/s of which there is little, if any, conscious 
knowledge or understanding. This theme is present in some of Ryle’s earlier writing 
and is particularly evident in the statement that ”nothing is more effective as a social 
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control device than giving an individual a description of  himself that confines his 
self-understanding to the terms his society allots him.” (Ryle, 1982, p. 7).
In therapy, there is not only an aim to restore and transform meaning, but also to 
bring to awareness procedural description of any identified restricting or damaging 
procedures. With new self-knowledge, comes an increased capacity for self-reflection, 
no longer is the individual’s self-understanding imprisoned in the terms allotted by 
his ’society’. Therefore, scaffolding in this sense becomes an important concept con-
cerning the processes involved in psychotherapy. The ’scaffolding’ provided by the 
therapist must address these restrictions and distortions and use timely and appro-
priate interventions to ’scaffold’ clients’ development and increase their capacity for 
new self-knowledge/ self-reflection.  In CAT terms, the ZPD is seen as a reciprocal 
window of opportunity for revision of earlier higher psychological functions, or in-
deed acquisition of new higher psychological functions.
The following quote nicely summarises the Vygotskian inclusions described above. 
While the shaping of personality in terms compatible with society is a neces-
sary and inevitable process, there are some societies, or some sections within 
societies, and some families, and maybe some therapies, in which compliance 
to social norms leaves little room for individual exploration. Their scaffolding 
imposes narrow solutions and fails to provide the materials for personal learn-
ing. Seen in this way the concept of the ’false self’ implies a restricted sense 
of self and, given our quintessentially social character, a consequent sense 
of inauthenticity or not being ’in dialogue’. It suggests that the concept of the 
’false self’ may be seen as a shorthand for a certain group of RRPs (recipro-
cal role procedures, my addition) which result in the features described above, 
including the critical feature of being ’out of dialogue’ with self and others. 
(Ryle & Kerr, 2002 p. 57)
Whilst this provides a socially informed account of the formation of self, it does not 
provide a truly reciprocal, two-way account. Emphasis on the ”quintessentially social 
character”, in my reading, maintains a representational flavour of something being 
given to, rather than providing an account of a mediated, truly, reciprocal phenomenon. 
9. 3 R E V I S I O N O F T H E M U LT I PL E S E L F - S TAT E M O D E L: T H E 
I N C LU S I O N O F D I A LO G U E
The second significant feature of contemporary CAT, namely plurality of self, as con-
ceived of in the revised multiple self-state model, or the MSSM, and the inclusion in 
CAT theory of the concept of voice/s comes terminologically close to DST.
Within the multiple self-state model (Ryle, 1997), Ryle addressed the impact of 
adverse early experiences in relation to the developing self. The difference between 
normal development of the self and abnormal development of the self was originally 
attributed to the difference between those individuals that had well integrated self 
systems, and those whose self systems  had developed in the context of periods of 
partial or full dissociation.  With the inclusion of the sociocentric view, reciprocity 
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now also becomes a pivotal point of the infant’s psychic development, but in addition, 
it paves the way for mental processes to be articulated in terms of internal dialogue. 
To explicate an understanding, further interpretation of Vygotsky’s non-dogmatic 
Marxism is required, as elaborated by Cheyne and Tarulli (2005) in their way of relat-
ing Vygotsky’s theory of internalisation with the Bakhtinian concept of voice. Cheyne 
and Tarulli (2005) remind us that a by-product of Vygotsky’s Marxist psychological 
concept of cultural-historical development is the ”progressive evolution and inter-
nalization of control and mastery of action and production” (Cheyne & Tarulli, 2005, 
p. 136). For Vygotsky there is a reciprocal transformation, due to inner speech, of the 
master-slave or supervisor-subordinate relationships (Vygotsky, 1981). Cheyne and 
Tarulli draw our attention to the power differential in this reciprocal relationship 
and its role in dialogue. This other is described as ”not an interlocutor, but as an im-
portant presence: an authoritative voice” (Cheyne & Tarulli, 2005, p. 137). In viewing 
Vygotsky’s concept of the ZPD, not only through the lens of the scaffolding (Wood, et 
al, 1976), but in addition, through the Bakhtinian concept of voice, Cheyne and Tarulli 
emphasise a divergence between Vygotsky’s concept of other and Bakhtin’s concept of 
other (Cheyne & Tarulli, 2005).  The point of departure for Bakhtin is that the other 
does not ”occupy the same epistemological space” (Cheyne & Tarulli, 2005, p. 134), the 
epistemological space for the other in Bakhtinian terms must essentially remain dif-
ferent3. A direct citation from Bakhtin is required to elaborate this point of departure.
In what way would it enrich the event if I merged with the other, and instead of 
two there would be now only one? And what would I myself gain by the other’s 
merging with me? If he did, he would see and know no more than what I see 
and know myself; he would merely repeat in himself that want of any issue 
out of itself which characterizes my own life. Let him rather remain outside of 
me, for in that position he can see and know what I myself do not see and do 
not know from my own place, and he can essentially enrich the event of my 
own life. (Bakhtin, 1990, p. 87)
In viewing Vygotsky ZPD through the lens of scaffolding literature and Bakhtin’s 
concept of utterance, Cheyne and Tarulli produce an extended view of the ZPD. 
They introduce three dialogical genres. In Magistral dialogue, the other appears in 
an authoritative position, Socratic dialogue epitomizes, the questioning other, and 
in Menippean dialogue, the other is presented as a rebellious, carnival-like other 
(Bakhtin, 1981, 1986). 
With this extended view of the ZPD, the concept of internal dialogue/voice/s be-
comes appropriated into the CAT paradigm. Bakhtin’s dialogical genres become de-
vices, which express the possible structures of early scaffolding.
  
The internal dialogue of psychotherapy patients inevitably bears traces of their 
childhood scaffolding. Some bear signs of the childhood internalisation of harsh 
3 A brief explanation of epistemology is required. Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that studies 
the theory of knowledge. It advocates a particular focus on methodology and validity in terms of adequate 
(true) or inadequate (false) knowledge.
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‘Magistral ‘scaffolding (or in more extreme cases of persecution and cruelty); 
others may convey the chaos and confusion of an essentially tragic ‘Menippean’ 
revolt against such harshness and others again show the lack of structure con-
sequent upon the absence of adequate scaffolding. (Ryle & Kerr, 2002 p. 45).
The variations of early scaffolding are encapsulated within three types of discourse, 
Ryle and Kerr (2002), in adopting Cheyne and Tarulli’s definitions describe the nature 
of these voices in the following manner.
The voice of Menippean dialogue is described (Cheyne & Tarulli, 1999) as a 
mocking and cynical questioning after the Menippean satire which Bakhtin 
considered and associated closely with the notion of carnival. The ‘Magistral’ 
voice provides a restrictive scaffolding which imposes compliance on the pupil 
or initiate. In the ‘Socratic’ form of dialogue the scaffolding is less rigid; the 
first voice (parent teacher etc.) will question the second (child, pupil) but may 
in turn be questioned. (Ryle & Kerr, 2002,  p. 45).
9.4 S U M M A RY  
The concept of voice now replaces the notion of organisation of self systems. Although 
some aspects of self may remain poorly integrated, this becomes a dialogical phenom-
enon. It is now attributable to the structure of internal dialogue, namely the nature 
of the dialogical relationship/s to their addressee/s. In their conceptualization, social 
and internal psychological processes mutually influence each other in a dynamic way. 
Ryle and Kerr (2002) adopt this Bakhtinian quote to emphasise the social nature of 
consciousness and the self. 
I am conscious of myself and become myself only while revealing myself for 
another. The most important acts constituting self-consciousness are deter-
mined by a relationship towards another consciousness (toward a thou)....not 
that which takes place within, but that which takes place on the boundary 
between one’s own and someone else’s consciousness, on the threshold....a 
person has no internal sovereign territory; he is wholly and always on the 
boundary; looking inside himself, he looks into the eyes of another or with the 
eyes of another. (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 287).
It becomes the task of therapy to provide new scaffolding to counterbalance the 
Magistral or Menippean internal dialogue, this requires movement away from re-
ciprocal relationships based on power differentials and hierarchical structures and 
should be essentially Socratic in nature (Ryle & Kerr, 2002).
The concept of reciprocation to some degree in contemporary CAT has become 
interchangeable with relational processes; this begins to affect and cloud the idea of 
reciprocation as an inherent aspect of the self. The reciprocal view of human activity, 
and indeed the nature of the objects that mediate intra psychic patterns are not in any 
way defined in this particular citation.
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10 Conceptual Relationship 
Between DST and CAT?
History is important. If you do not know history it is as if you were born yester-
day. And if you were born yesterday, anybody up there in a position of power 
can tell you anything and you have no way of checking up on it.
Howard Zinn
The author’s endeavour has been that of undertaking a piece of theoretical research. 
This was inspired by some degree of confusion concerning what was actually meant 
by the term ’dialogical self’. From my reading, I was aware that dialogical self theory 
(DST) and cognitive analytic therapy (CAT) provided accounts of a ’dialogical self’. 
Was there any relationship between these two accounts? Generally, degrees of confu-
sion appeared to be present, this is evident in the statement made by Stam, ”not every-
one means the same thing by dialogue or dialogical self” (Stam, 2010, p. 300). In order 
to address the confusion there seemed to be a need to study the conceptual history of 
each of these models in order to understand each models approach to the self. In the 
process of addressing the conceptual history of each of these models, a form of poly-
phonic account seems to have emerged. Contained within this thesis is my reading of 
the theorists/theories that influenced Hermans and Ryle.  Borrowing from Sullivan’s 
(2012) ideas in order to describe the process, in undertaking a historical analysis, in 
re-examining, from my point of view, the concepts that influenced the development 
of DST and CAT, this has involved a process of ”re-accentuation.” ”Re-accentuation 
refers to the process of overlaying a new value or tone to a previously intoned concept 
or idea...when someone else’s words become part of our own, then this involves put-
ting a new value on these words (or re-accentuating them)” (Sullivan, 2012, p. 135). 
Therefore, whilst we may find a number of terms and concepts that sound similar in 
DST and CAT, in studying the historical epochs of each of the models, they have far 
less in common than there may first appear. Re-accentuation brings to light new val-
ues and although terms may be similar, the whole theoretical structure in which they 
operate is markedly different. When historically informed in this way, making points 
of comparison becomes problematic. In order to continue to try to do justice to both 
models I will not attempt to make direct comparisons, instead I will discuss points of 
convergence and divergence between the two models.
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10.1 E A R LY FO R M U L AT I O N S I N T H E M O D E L S
Human motivation and achievement, coupled with development of knowledge of 
the self, namely the individual’s understanding of their subjective experience, was 
Hermans’ starting point. Hermans wanted to find a means to gain insight into the cli-
ent’s world, and through this insight develop a means of contributing to the individu-
al’s life (Hermans, Fiddelaers, de Groot & Nauta, 1990). It will be recalled from chapter 
two, that he saw himself as a partisan involved with assessment but detached from 
the process of change. These questions arose in the context of psychological research. 
In the original model, through the utilisation of Allport’s concept of values, 
Hermans postulated values as intentional objects that were construed within the act of 
valuation. Hermans’ account of dialogue between construer and the construed, which 
took place in the act of valuation, echoed the Jamesian account of reflective dialogue 
between I and me. This Jamesian influence was to set the scene for Hermans’ original 
concept of the reflecting I. Valuation theory was embedded in a phenomenological 
understanding.   Hermans was to utilise James’ account of self-feeling to suggest that 
feelings inform the individual about how objects, as such, relate to each other as the 
constituents of Me, or as objects with personal significance. The reflecting I, when 
construing/formulating valuations, is influenced by the ”feelings” that inform the I 
about the salient contents of empirical selves. Intentional objects therefore became 
”felt objects” for the consciousness, and as such an object that the I reflected over. 
For Ryle, the starting point was the exploration of the epidemiology of psychologi-
cal distress and the meaning, for the individual, of subjective phenomena. His interest 
lay in developing an empirical means that enabled the study of subjective phenomena. 
Ryle originally accomplished this by a cross fertilization between object relations and 
personal construct theory. Through his direct clinical work, Ryle concluded that peo-
ple were complex and therefore hard to understand (Ryle, 1975). Whilst he considered 
psychoanalysis essentially dismissive of scientific thinking, Ryle fully acknowledged 
the ”creative impact of psychoanalysis on psychology”, (Ryle, 1975, p. 53). 
However,  rather than adopting classic Kleinian ideas, where innate, biomental 
forces in psychic conflict battle on intrapsychic terrain, with the battle being seen as 
the creator spritus to the ego, the more influential conceptualisation of objects rela-
tions theory for Ryle was the Fairbairnian idea of the object seeking nature of the 
infant.  Kleinian ideas were not however totally dismissed, the phantasy laden impact 
of objects in the world were noted to be salient in relation to Kleinian ideas of splitting 
and projective identification.  
In his reading of Kelly’s personal construct theory Ryle noted that Kelly had re-
articulated some of the Jamesian ideas ”lost in the pseudo-scientific objectification of 
man” (Ryle, 1975, p. 21).  Ryle’s critique of Kellyian concepts are manifold, however he 
acknowledged that at the core, Kelly had attempted to take a more human approach. 
Ryle attributes this to a Jamesian influence upon Kelly perhaps not fully articulated 
by Kelly himself in personal construct theory (Ryle, 1975).
Although both models share a phenomenological approach, Ryle chose to address 
subjective phenomena, mainly in relation to interpersonal experiences. By attending 
to concepts articulated in object relations Ryle was able to develop an understand-
ing of human reciprococity.  Furthermore, influenced by Kleinian ideas related to 
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splitting and projective identification Ryle was able to articulate an early account of 
polyphony in the self.
Whereas Hermans’ construer of valuations is a unitary I, in Ryle’s conceptualisa-
tion the self was to some degree a divided self. Ryle’s emphasis on part objects and 
splitting in conjunction with his utilisation of a common-sense psychology approach 
embedded the observing I within one aspect of the self that related to the other ’bit-
parts’ of the self, and through the process of relating, engage in some form of action 
of ’doing to’ the other part.
10.1.1 Organisation of client self-reflection
Hermans’ research instrument, the self-confrontation method (SCM) begins by bring-
ing the individual’s configurations of valuations into conscious awareness. This is 
linked to the affective modalities associated with any given valuation. A matrix is used 
to organise client self-reflection and this matrix is the starting point for an iterative 
process, consisting of different phases and sub-phases to enhance awareness. 
Through this facilitation of enhanced awareness, Hermans hopes to find an ”en-
trance into the valuation system” (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 69). Once 
inside the valuation system the therapist can introduce potential objects of mean-
ing, and through this, there is the possibility for new meaning structures to emerge 
(namely the creation of new valuations). 
Speaking in repertory grid terms, valuations could be seen as elements and the 
affect list as pre-elicited constructs.  When configurations of valuations were fully 
brought into conscious awareness, then the affective modalities associated with any 
given valuation could also be brought to awareness. Once attention is given to affec-
tive modalities, and affect becomes the object of self-reflection, then the affective 
experience could become part of the reorganisation.  
 Ryle adapted Kelly’s repertory grid to become the dyad grid. He did this in order 
to focus on relationships likely to be of psychodynamic interest rather than using the 
grid to focus on individuals. The psychodynamic influence on Ryle cannot be under-
estimated here. Using dyad grids to organise the process of self-reflection became a 
practical tool to disentangle the observing I from the self processes immediately at-
tached to internal object relations.
 Ryle’s approach was based on uncovering infantile experiences in order to un-
derstand the adult subject (Ryle, 1975). The dyad grid was an instrument that brought 
to light unconscious mental processes, uncovering ”what remainders or reminders of 
early experience are still active in determining his view of him-self and others, his 
expectations and his assumptions and his fantasies about what is possible of what may 
be the consequences of particular actions” (Ryle, 1975, p. 56).  Through this adaptation 
of Kelly’s repertory grid, Ryle was able to assess aspects of reciprocity, remnants of 
childhood experiences that governed the adult’s view of them self and their behaviour.
Hence, although conscious self-observation constituted an essential procedure in 
the early versions of both models, the understanding of the nature of this reflective 
process and its constituents was rather different.
The SCM and the dyad grid both made use of a matrix/grid structure to organ-
ise client self-reflection. Both models used correlation analysis to condense the data 
for feedback in therapy sessions. However, as a direct result of the early theoretical 
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foundations, there is a difference in each research instrument.  The SCM is a research 
tool that enabled a phenomenologically informed analysis of human consciousness 
from a first-person perspective, with the dyad grid being a research instrument that 
was aimed at disentangling conscious self-reflection from the ”reminders of early 
experience”(Ryle, 1975, p. 56) that were ”still active” (Ryle, 1975, p. 56) in the split-off 
parts of the self.  Here is an acknowledgement of the intersubjective nature of human 
consciousness.
10.1.2 Sequencing of Actions
The apparent methodological kinship, identified in each model’s research instru-
ment became diluted as further idiosyncratic theoretical transformations took place. 
Interestingly, temporality, or sequencing of action became focal for both models, but 
they addressed the issue in an almost contrasting manner. The idiosyncratic trans-
formation in Hermans’ valuation theory was the narrative turn. For Ryle, the next idi-
osyncratic turn was the introduction of cognitive sequencing which almost obliterated 
his early ideas of reciprococity and early accounts of polyphony.
Hermans adopted the idea that narrative organised human experience. There was 
a change in terminology, the reflecting I was modified to become I as an author.  The 
I as author now performed a hermeneutic role, constructing meaning from the nar-
rative movement of the protagonists. The I as author interpreted experiences of be-
ing in the world as narrative action. Theoretically, there was a movement away from 
the idea of intentional objects as ’felt objects’ of consciousness as greater stress was 
placed on narrated actions and events. Temporal dimension in the analysis of the self 
was expanded by two ways.Valuations were now seen as self narratives, which had a 
spatio-temporal quality. Moreover, the concept of valuation system was replaced by 
the narrative concept of plot. 
The sequencing of action was also to be the focus for Ryle but he accomplished this 
by adopting the idea of cognitive control of action. This led to the conceptualisation 
of the procedural sequence model (PSM). The object relations informed understand-
ing of the intersubjective nature of human consciousness faded into the background, 
while temporality became the focus of analysis. Hermans, in contrast, adopted the 
idea of a narrative control of action, whereby the process of the construction of the 
story became a means of controlling the action, but in addition, the process of narra-
tive control of the action influenced and shaped personal identity.  
Ryle’s cognitive turn changed the conceptualisation of self-observation. The ob-
serving I no longer held a reciprocal capacity where a part of the self had the ability to 
relate to the other parts. Instead, the observing I became nearly the equivalent of the 
psychoanalytic ego, or indeed akin to the Jamesian ‘I’. For Hermans self-observation 
involved a process of validation/invalidation. Self observation included an ability to 
invalidate self-limiting aspects of valuations (as self-narratives), coupled with an abil-
ity to incorporate and validate new narratives.  
The sequencing of action was a common theme as Hermans and Ryle continued to 
adapt their models. The sequencing of events through narrative action maintained the 
ability for the I as author to construct meaning in Hermans model. Meaning making 
was not central in Ryle’s model the PSM. The Kellyian idea of construing relationships 
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and the self was replaced by the standard cognitive categories of perception, com-
prehension, action and evaluation. Moving through a process of different theoretical 
journeys, later, in the next transition, Hermans and Ryle were both to encounter the 
Russian thinkers.  
10.2.3 Bakhtin, Dialogism and the Polyphonic Self
With Hermans’ modification of I as author and Ryle’s return to consider the key role 
of human relationships following his cognitive turn, both models re-converge to some 
degree in as much as they were both eventually influenced by Bakhtinian concepts. 
In common, both models utilised Bakhtin’s ideas of polyphony.  Sullivan’s (2012) com-
ments concerning re-accentuation that it is the ’tone’ previously set by each model, 
would now influence how they interpreted Bakhtinian ideas. Terminological overlaps 
may conceal differences in meaning.
Due to the narrative influences in Hermans’ work the act of valuation transformed 
into narration involving fully fledged subjective beings or ’characters’ with a distinct 
consciousness. Following the inclusion of Bakhtin’s concept of polyphony, the unitary 
author, was reconceptualised to become I-positions. 
The I was no longer a centred unitary I, or an I as author interpreting and mak-
ing meaning from the action of the observed protagonists from different temporal 
positions. 
Bakhtin’s concept of utterance became aligned with the relationship between the 
author and the hero, and as a result, one person was equated as two or more persons 
in dialogue. The self now had a quality of many-voicedness similar to a polyphonic 
text, therefore the single unitary self now became a pluralistic self. 
It now becomes possible for there to be a form of intersubjective exchange between 
both internal and external positions. The I as author was now no longer making an 
interpretation of narrative action. Meaning was now created through the activity of 
imagination (Hermans & Kempen, 1993) and the network of positions (Hermans & 
Kempen, 1993).
Whilst there was now a movement towards the decentralisation of the human 
mind, there remained a superordinate concept of the self in the model; this was de-
fined as the synthesizing quality of the self (Hermans & Kempen, 1993).  This syn-
thesizing quality of the self moderated the otherwise completely decentred dialogue 
between the I-positions. Hermans included a further import from Bakhtin’s (1981) 
theory in the form of centripetal and centrifugal forces. These forces enabled the 
self to be defined as a community in which human activity was brought into being 
through the perpetual dialogical struggle between internal and external positions 
and dominant and subordinate positions. The metaphor of ”composer” (Hermans & 
Kempen, 1993, p. 96) was used to explain the synthesizing capacity of self.  There was 
an inherent process of exchange of power between I-positions that enabled some 
communities of I-positions to be overthrown, this in turn resulted in a change to the 
composition of self.
The self was now conceptualised as a purely dialogical phenomenon and valuation 
theory was rebranded as dialogical self theory.  Consciousness and differing levels 
of consciousness were addressed directly through the process of dialogicisation and 
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the capacity for increased multiplicity. As Salgado, Cunha and Bento (2013) remind 
us, multiplicity of self has now become a widely recognised phenomenon, represent-
ing an attempt to overcome the ”homunculus view” in the traditional approaches of 
a unitary I.  
Hermans and Hermans-Konopka do address the homunculus view directly in 
their contemporary account.
In order to avoid the homunculus problem and the ghost in the machine idea, 
the I can be meaningfully understood as emerging from individual develop-
ment. The self is fundamentally positioned and arrives at a point at which it 
becomes aware of itself, and can eventually define itself, appropriating some 
parts of itself and the environment and rejecting other parts. The conception 
that the I emerges from the process of positioning and being positioned in 
time and space is in no way incompatible with the consideration that the I is 
able to appropriate and reject elements of self and environment. (Hermans & 
Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 144). 
Ryle, in reinstating the concept of reciprocity, was to base his understanding of mul-
tiplicity in terms of the intersubjective nature of the development of self. He moved 
away from his earlier focus on sequentiality where patterns of thought were essen-
tially described as being absorbed in their own activity, where each had independent 
scripts or rules that resulted in hierarchical schematic mismatches.
This differs from Hermans’ account of I-positions as fully-fledged, semi-autono-
mous subjective beings in a fundamental way. Positioning oneself, always involves a 
reciprocating other. There cannot be I-positions without a counter-positioned objects 
of activity.
The idea of reciprocal role relationships enabled Ryle to maintain the Bakhtinian 
concept of utterance as an expression that is always directed at the addressee.   
In addition, Ryle was to address the question related to individual and differing 
capacities concerning the organization of self processes. This led to the development 
of the multiple self state model (MSSM). From this baseline Ryle was to progress to 
viewing multiplicity in terms of contextual, diminished or pathological multiplicity 
(Ryle & Fawkes, 2007). 
Through the inclusion of Vygotsky’s activity theory, primacy was given to social 
experiences; the development of self was defined as a social phenomenon that could 
be grounded in a cultural and social milieu. In relation to contextual, diminished or 
pathological multiplicity, Ryle grounded the development of these capacities in rela-
tional experiences with primary care takers.
In aiming to reinstate the concept of reciprocity the sociocentric view perhaps 
predominated, ”prelinguistic mediating tools”(Ryle & Kerr, 2002, p. 41) became the 
currency of dialogical exchange rather than the action of centripetal and centrifugal 
forces (or voices in agreement or disagreement). To explain this there is a need to 
reflect further upon the process of ”re-accentuation”. 
The Bakhtinian idea of polyphony in CAT had been ”re-accentuated” through 
Cheyne and Tarulli (1999) in their extended view of the ZPD where they had con-
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sidered the ZPD through the lens of scaffolding literature (Wood, Bruner & Ross, 
1976), and in doing so, the Bakhtinian concept of other had been introduced to ex-
tend the Vygotskian account of ZPD. Through this ”re-accentuation” CAT utilised the 
Bakhtinian idea of dialogical genres.
Bakhtin’s dialogical genres became the devices through which the possible struc-
tures of early scaffolding could be expressed. This form of ”re-accentuation” could 
perhaps be attributed to Ryle’s early understanding of a divided self.  Rather than the 
starting point being a conceptualisation of a unitary I, (as in Hermans’ model), the 
inclusion of Bakhtinian ideas in CAT meant that the concept of polyphony in CAT 
was one where the  voice expressed the speaker’s semantic position (Bakhtin, 1984) 
in relation to, predominately parental or primary caretaker’s voices, in other words 
there was a referential object of speech.
10. 2 S E L F - O T H E R D I S T I N C T I O N (M E - N O T M E)
Due to historical differences, and indeed a process of re-accentuation through par-
ticular theoretical structures, DST and CAT have drawn singularly distinctive ideas 
concerning the role of dialogicality in consciousness and human activity. As my final 
point of comparison, I will focus on theoretical understandings of each model’s ac-
count of me-not me.
With the inclusion of the cultural-anthropological view in DST, there is a creation 
of an internal-external nexus. This internal-external nexus reinforces the idea of the 
external physical world being experienced as part of an inner state of consciousness. 
Under these conditions, Hermans and Hermans-Konopka describe an extended I that 
transcends dualistic separations (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010). Restrictive 
borders between internal and external, self and other and subject and object result 
in the self-other distinction in the contemporary model becoming less distinct, there 
is a greater focus on alterity of the other as part of the self. This is directly addressed 
through the inclusion of three new additions to the model, namely shape-shifting, 
schimcheong and dialogical love. 
In order to expand on the understanding of alterity of the other as part of the self, I 
will select only one of the new additions, shape-shifting, to discuss a point of apparent 
convergence with the concept of projective identification in CAT theory.
Shape-shifting is described as an innate ability to take external positions into 
the internal domains of self, once internal, these positions can temporarily adopt a 
dominant position. There is an interesting parallel between Hermans and Hermans-
Konopka’s account of shape-shifting and Klein’s account of projective identification 
in her paper ”Identification” (Klein, 1955). 
Klein uses an analysis of the novel ”If I were you”, written by French novelist 
Julian Green in 1947 (translated by J. H. F. McEwan, 1949) to discuss the process of 
transformation, or alterity of other in the self.
The essence of the story is the magic power to change himself into other peo-
ple which is conferred on Fabian by a compact with the Devil, who seduces 
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him by false promises of happiness into accepting this sinister gift; he teaches 
Fabian a secret formula by which the change into another person can be ef-
fected. (Klein, 1955, p. 146)    
For Klein, projective identification is strongly associated with the paranoid schizoid 
position (Klein, 1946) as a means of defence against overwhelming persecutory anxi-
eties; however, it is these very fundamental psychotic anxieties of infancy that, for 
Klein, are required for normal development. 
The concept of projective identification is not articulated, or referred to, in DST. 
Rather the authors state, ”central in a dialogical model of the self, the term I is an ex-
tending principle that (re)opens the self to the world” (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 
2010, p. 143). They discuss ”transcendent experiences in childhood” (Hermans & 
Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 218) citing ”I-am-I experiences” (Kohnstamm, 2007), 
these experiences are described as ”a loosening of the self-boundaries”(Hermans & 
Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 218).  The concept of an extended I relies on the I pos-
sessing receptive capacities to increase the field of awareness. With an increased 
field of awareness everything ”outside” can be receptively received and utilised by 
the extended I.   
In this (re)opening primacy is given to transcendental capacities (rather than the 
primacy of phantasy in the Kleinian account). Space and alterity of the other as part 
of the self facilitate what the authors describe as a form of motivation that transcends 
individual traits. Hermans and Hermans-Konopka state
The other-in-self, as one of the central ideas in dialogical self theory, brings 
elements to the self that are not necessarily implied by an internal blueprint 
of genetic program but are added as constitutive elements as a result of in-
novative dialogues with other people or with oneself. (Hermans & Hermans-
Konopka, 2010, p. 117)
Although shape-shifting appears to merge with projective identification as a phe-
nomenon, the theoretical context in which both operate are almost opposite. In the 
recent developments of the CAT model, the affinity with Klein’s original formulations 
can be recognised despite the inclusion of activity theory and Vygotskian semiotics. 
The current account of me-not me in CAT does not contain a concept of innate 
internal conflict, which was still visible in Ryle’s (1975) early description. Rather it 
”is based on the internalization of self-other procedures” (Ryle, 1994, p. 110) and an 
account of ”non-integrated part procedures”(Ryle, 1994, p. 110). These non-integrated 
aspects impede the development of more functional procedures.
Understanding the question of me-not me through a self-other procedural lens, 
results in different facets coming to the fore. The sense of alterity of the other as a de-
velopmental achievement of the self, is not clearly articulated in the CAT model. Due 
to interpersonal origins, reciprocal roles procedures merge and blur the more distinct 
aspects of me-not me, there is not the same subjective sense of the other. Seen through 
a procedural frame, Ryle describes projective identification in this manner. ”More 
fundamentally, projective identification can be understood as a loss of discrimination 
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between self-self and self-other procedures, and as the enactment of unintegrated, 
sometimes unacknowledged, partial procedures” (Ryle, 1990, p 102). 
In order to understand Ryle’s account of self-other and self-self procedures it is 
helpful to consider his restatement of Kleinian projective identification. Rather than 
metapsychology, Ryle’s restatement involves the inclusion of biological influences 
in the form of inborn attachment behaviour (Bowlby, 1969). The infant’s relational 
and developmental task involves, from a developmental position of being unable to 
discriminate self from other, a need to learn and develop an ability to predict the 
response of the other (Ryle, 1991). In other words, the infant is required to learn 
two role procedures (Ryle, 1991). When considered through an activity theory frame, 
”the internalization of the mother’s role is the basis of a capacity for self-care, self-
management, self-consciousness and also a liability to internal conflict” (Ryle, 1991, 
p. 309). As the child develops, they continue to internalize the roles of other caretak-
ers in addition to their primary caretaker. Due to the nature of these interpersonal 
relationships, it becomes a question of whether these internalized procedures become 
integrated into a complex whole procedure, or whether they remain part procedures 
or unacknowledged procedures. Procedures that remain unintegrated or unacknowl-
edged are viewed as primitive intentional acts that have become ”caricatural” (Ryle, 
1990, p. 102) in nature; however, they continue to form the interpersonal and intra-
psychic patterns of transactions and management.  The adult may retain child-like 
procedures in relation to the ’bit part’ caricatural procedure of an internalised adult, 
or unintegrated or unacknowledged aspects of the self may be projected into the other. 
Under these circumstances the ”poorly integrated reciprocal role procedure is elicited 
from the other person” (Ryle, 1991, p. 309).
With Ryle’s redefinition, projective identification ”is seen to represent an exagger-
ated example of the normal processes of reciprocal role relating” Ryle & Kerr, 2002, p. 
52). Within this exaggerated form, there is no differentiation between the projection 
of negative and positive emotions or roles (Ryle 1994). 
In contrast to DST, self-processes do not emerge from a loosening of the bounda-
ries of the self; rather they emerge from joint experience. The processes of self, ”are 
not pre-existing at birth, they are formed - and also potentially deformed - from this 
joint experience” (Ryle & Bennink-Bolt, 2002, p. 136).  
The ’PSORM  adult’ is enacting a direct relationship moulded by continual 
affect-laden communication, centred on the needs of the dependent child, 
the mutually developed and meshing reciprocal roles being concerned with 
the caring-dependent relationship, although increasingly joint environmen-
tal manipulation also occurs. Crucial stages in the relationship antedate the 
development of mediated thought. (Ryle, 1991, p. 313).
Where the development of mediated thought has been impaired, this results in ”the 
failure to achieve an integrated identity” (Pollock, 2001, p. 56), or, in worst case sce-
narios, results in the development of psychopathology.
The ’deforming’ of self processes, as defined in the multiple self state model 
(MSSM), occurs at three levels. Poorly attuned and harsh parental relationships ”col-
our the nature and content of the repertoire of RRPs (reciprocal role procedures, my 
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addition in italics) internalised by the child” (Pollock, 2001, p. 57). This is seen as the 
first level of impairment. In the second level of impairment, frank traumatic experi-
ences and dissociation increase the likelihood of experiencing fragmentation (split-
ting) and ’bit parts’ making the ’experience’ of the self a discontinuous rather than 
integrated experience. Under these conditions, there are no metaprocedures avail-
able ”which promote the fluid deployment of RRPs during interactions with others” 
(Pollock, 2001, p. 63). Lastly, the third level of damage, again primarily due to disso-
ciation being the only available self- management procedure, results in a markedly 
reduced ability for self-reflection.
Under these circumstances, it becomes the therapeutic task to acknowledge, in an 
empathic frame, the projective identification, and through doing so, avoid enactment/s 
of damaging reciprocal role procedures. For those individuals in psychological distress, 
or indeed those who due to early experiences have diminished or pathological tenden-
cies for multiplicity, there is a need to, with the former, recruit the observing I, or where 
latter aspects are present, jointly create the observing I. Once recruited, (or created), it 
becomes a sort of meta aspect of the self where there is a capacity to increase awareness 
and discrimination between self-self and self-other procedures. The task then, of this 
meta-aspect of the self, is to facilitate integration of these separate ’bit part’ selves, to 
increase the individual’s capacity for contextual multiplicity and self-reflection.
Although Ryle’s account of projective identification can be seen as an attempt 
to unite projective identification (in its original sense back in 1975) with a theory of 
mental processes and avoid the reification of metapsychology (Ryle, 1985), his account 
continues to adopt the Kleinian position of assumption of separate selves (Leiman, 
1994) as part of the process.   
10. 3 S U M M A RY
DST and CAT can both be described as living models, and as such, their stories do not 
end here, for in reality, each is located in its own cultural-historical context, and each 
continues to be influenced by their early ideas. It seems evident that the processes 
of self-organisation are embedded in a different contextual matrix for each of the 
models. In DST, contextualization is achieved through an anthropological conceptu-
alisation. In contrast, CAT, through the inclusion of Vygotsky’s sociogenetic law, Ryle’s 
multiple self-state model (MSSM) is tied to a social context.
 The theoretical structure and methods of both models carry the threads of their 
origin ideas and concepts. Those ’new’ aspects woven into the fabric of each model are 
in turn shaped and formed by the earlier structures. Whilst DST and CAT share the 
similar term of a ’dialogical self’ and there are some points of convergence, their con-
ceptual frameworks however have very different theoretical roots. Through adopting 
a historically reflexive position, I have compared DST and CAT’s approach to the self. 
This work of course relies to some degree on my work as a historian. In this histori-
cal endeavour I attempted to revisit some of the theorists that influenced Hermans 
and Ryle, but in doing so I have undoubtedly gone through my own process of re-
accentuation. At best, I can only offer the reader the limitations of my own view, but 
hope that this in itself opens a vista for further discussion.
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